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Plain language summary 
The effectiveness of contract farming for raising income of smallholder 
farmers in low- and middle-income countries 
The evidence suggests that contract farming arrangements need to offer clear incentives to 
farmers in order to survive over time. 
The review in brief 
Contract farming, a sales arrangement between a farmer and a firm, is popular with 
government and donors. Contract farming can produce substantial income gains for farmers. 
Moreover, these benefits may well be required for contract farming schemes to survive. 
Better-off farmers are most likely to participate in contract farming schemes. 
What is this review about? 
Contract farming is a sales arrangement agreed before production begins, which provides the 
farmer with resources or services. The  service package provided by the firm varies per 
location, and can include transport, certification, input provisioning and credit. 
 
This systematic review summarises evidence on income effects for smallholders to assess 
average effects and explore combinations of factors that increase these effects. 
 
What studies are included? 
 
Included studies had to examine the impact of contract farming on income and food security 
of smallholder farmers in low- and middle-income countries. Studies had to use a 
comparison group with appropriate statistical methods to allow for selection effects. 
 
Seventy-five studies were identified with quantitative estimates of the impact of contract 
farming of which 22 studies, covering 7,471 respondents, were of sufficient rigour to include 
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in the meta-analysis of income effects. The meta-analysis covers 26 empirical instances of 
contract farming in 13 developing countries. 
 
What is the aim of this review? 
This Campbell systematic review examines the impact of contract farming on income 
and food security of smallholder farmers in low- and middle-income countries. The 
review summarises findings from 75 reports, of which 22 (covering 26 contract 
farming interventions) were used for meta-analysis. 
What are the main findings of this review? 
Contract farming may substantially increase farmer income with an average effect in the 
range of 23 to 54 per cent.  There is upward bias in the estimate because of survivor bias in 
individual studies (no data on farmers who drop out of schemes) and in the body of evidence 
(no studies on contract farming arrangements that collapsed in their initial years), and 
publication bias in the literature (under-reporting of insignificant outcomes). Therefore, 
some caution is needed in interpreting the findings. 
 
For farmers to give up their autonomy in marketing and prevent side-selling, substantial 
income gains need to be offered. This is especially so for annual crops and when firms have 
contracts directly with farmers rather than through a cooperative. 
 
Poorer farmers are not usually part of contract farming schemes. In 61% of the cases, 
contract farmers had significantly larger landholdings or more assets than the average 
farmers in the region. 
What do the findings of this review mean? 
Contract farming covers a wide range of contractual arrangements. This heterogeneity makes 
it difﬁcult to draw general conclusions from the literature published on this topic. The lack of 
studies on ‘failed treatments’ leads to an overestimation of the effectiveness of contract 
farming. 
 
Moreover, the analysis suggests a marked publication bias; all studies report on at least one 
case of contract farming that has a positive and statistical significant income effect.   
 
Relatively larger or richer farmers can cope better with these risks and are, therefore, more 
likely to take part in a contractual arrangement. This implies that contract farming is more 
suited to the relatively better-off segment of the farming population. 
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Further research should: (1) improve reporting of the intervention; (2) document the less-
successful instances of contract farming, and report inconclusive results (insignificant 
effects); and (3) capture other outcomes of contract farming such as (sector-wide) 
innovation, and livelihood resilience. 
How up-to-date is this review? 
The review authors searched for studies published up to October 2015. This Campbell 
systematic review was published in December 2017. 
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Executive summary/Abstract 
Background 
Contract farming is used by an increasing number of firms as a preferred modality to source 
products from smallholder farmers in low and middle-income countries. Quality 
requirements of consumers, economies of scale in production or land ownership rights are 
common incentives for firms to offer contractual arrangements to farmers. Prices and access 
to key technology, key inputs or support services are the main incentives for farmers to enter 
into these contracts. There is great heterogeneity in contract farming, with differences in 
contracts, farmers, products, buyers, and institutional environments. The focus of this review 
lies on contract farming, defined as: 
 
“a contractual arrangement for a fixed term between a farmer and a firm, agreed 
verbally or in writing before production begins, which provides material or financial 
resources to the farmer and specifies one or more product or process requirements for 
agricultural production on land owned or controlled by the farmer, which gives the firm 
legal title to (most of) the crop or livestock" (Adapted from Prowse, 2012:12). 
 
The last decade shows a rapid increase in studies that use quasi-experimental research 
designs to assess the effects of specific empirical instances of contract farming on 
smallholders. The objective of this systematic review was to distill generalised inferences 
from this rapidly growing body of evidence. 
Objectives 
The review synthesised the studies in order to answer two questions: 
 
• Question 1: What is known about the effect size of contract farming on income and food 
security of smallholder farmers in low- and middle-income countries? 
• Question 2: Under which enabling or limiting conditions are contract farming arrangements 
effective for improving income and food security of smallholders 
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Search methods 
A comprehensive electronic search was applied to Scopus, CAB Abstracts, Econlit, Web of 
Science, Tropag & Rural, and Agricola between 30 September and 21 October 2015. 
Snowballing the reference list in review articles and other repositories of research (e.g. 
worldwidescience.org, FAO, World Bank, Google Scholar) added more studies to the review. 
The search results were uploaded in EPPI Reviewer 4 and screened for relevance and the 
rigour of analysis of the effect estimates, in order to combine these results in a meta-analysis 
of effectiveness. The main terms used to identify the pool of studies within which we expected 
to find studies that covered the effectiveness of contract farming arrangements were: contract 
farming, nucleus estate, cooperative, producer organisation, pre-harvest agreement, value 
chain, farm-firm, outgrower, and vertical integration.  
Selection criteria 
Each study selected for the meta-analysis was required to resolve the counterfactual, that is, 
to use a comparison group to mimic the expected situation of farmers not having a contract. 
When assessing net-effects, the characteristics of groups with or without a contract needed to 
be fairly similar. Ideally, the only difference was the condition of having a contract or not. 
Because firms tend to offer contracts to farmers having certain characteristics and farmers 
self-select when they accept or reject the offer, econometric methods are required to credibly 
assess the net-effects of contract farming.  
 
To be included in the review, studies needed to analyse the impact of the intervention on 
income or food security of smallholder farmers. However, only one study was found with 
food security as an outcome variable (Bellemare & Novak, 2017); all other studies included 
focused on income effects. The review, therefore, has a focus on the income effects of contract 
farming and a meta-analysis explored this outcome. 
Data collection and analysis 
The electronic search retrieved 8,529 unique studies. After the full-text screening, 195 studies 
were found to present research on contract farming. We excluded all papers that did not 
study the effectiveness of contract farming. The remaining set of papers was referred to as the 
core set and consisted of 75 studies that presented quantitative outcomes on smallholder 
farmers. Of the 75 studies in the core set, most did not meet the criteria for methodological 
and econometric rigour and had to be excluded from the meta-analysis. The meta-analysis 
was based on data from 22 studies, covering 28 empirical instances of contract farming, two 
of which had insufficient data to use in the meta-analysis. The studies covered 7,471 
respondents. 
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Results 
We applied meta-analysis on the studies that reported income effects. Based on the 
significance levels and effect sizes, we showed that the set of studies selected for meta-
analysis suffered from publication bias. All studies reported at least one empirical instance 
with a statistically significant positive income effect. Test results suggested that studies with 
non-significant effects of contract farming are likely to exist but are not reported in the 
academic literature. Studies also suffer from survivor bias. All studies are cross-sectional 
studies that assess the effectiveness of the contractual arrangement at one moment in time, 
but only after the contractual arrangements had been in place for some years when these had 
already survived the start-up problems. This implies that contractual arrangements that had 
ceased to function are absent in the literature. The publication and survivor bias detected in 
this review preclude strong conclusions on the income effects of contract farming 
arrangements.  
 
The one study that analysed effects on food security reported a positive result (the duration of 
the hungry season was 8% [95% confidence interval= 0%,15%] lower for farmers having a 
contract). The meta-analysis of the 22 studies showed that the average income effect of 
participation in these contractual arrangement is highly heterogeneous. The (uncorrected) 
pooled average effect-size on the proxy for income used in each study, computed in the meta-
analysis, indicated a 62 percent increase (95% confidence interval=40%, 87%) in income for 
contract farmers over incomes of non-contract farmers. However, strong evidence for 
publication bias suggests that the true effect of contract farming is likely to be much lower, 
although still substantially higher than non-contract farming. When we consider these 
studies representative for enduring contract farming arrangements in general, the pooled 
average income effect is estimated in 38% (95%  confidence interval=23%, 54%).   
 
In almost two-thirds of the studies, the contracted farmers proved to have significantly larger 
holdings or to be richer than the average farmers in the area. A plausible explanation for this 
phenomenon, as mentioned in the studies, is that there are lower transaction costs with 
increasing farm scale and the capacity of the better-endowed farmers to bear the production 
and post-harvest quality risks inherent to contract farming arrangements. In the four studies 
in which contract farmers had relatively smaller than average plot sizes, the income effects 
are relatively low.  
Authors’ conclusions 
Contract farming is a container concept that covers a wide range of contractual 
arrangements. This heterogeneity makes it difﬁcult to draw general conclusions from the 
literature published on this topic. The studies have a marked publication bias. All studies 
report at least one case of contract farming that has a positive and statistical significant 
income effect. Moreover, due to limits inherent to the (cross-sectional) study designs used in 
11 The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
these investigations, the estimated effect size is upward biased. The lack of studies on ‘failed 
treatments’ leads to an overestimation of the effectiveness of contract farming. 
 
Nevertheless, the results of the meta-analysis suggest that contract farming arrangements 
need to offer clear incentives to farmers in order to survive over time in the context of free 
entry and exit of farmers. We generated the hypothesis that relatively large positive effects on 
income may be a precondition for farmers to continue the contractual arrangements with the 
firm and give up their autonomy in marketing, production and quality control. High benefits 
are needed to keep an arrangement attractive and to prevent farmers from dropping out.  
 
Modest expectations and careful planning are needed for contract farming to be effective and 
sustainable. The practitioner-oriented literature indicated the high risk of failure in the first 
years and stressed the need for adaptive management and mechanisms to settle disputes. 
Whereas it is unlikely that contract farming arrangements will on average result in the 
income effects that we derived from the meta-analysis, it shows the need for substantial 
income effects for contract farming arrangements to survive over time. If farmers may opt 
out of a contract - which was the case in all empirical instances covered by the studies except 
oil palm in Indonesia - those contractual arrangements having low effects are likely to 
disappear or be amended, and negative effects on smallholder well-being are unlikely.  
 
Contract farming is an institutional arrangement that may be attractive for farmers who want 
to get access to services or inputs that they cannot obtain in the traditional (spot) market, or 
reach markets that are more remunerative. Farmers who are able to enter a contract farming 
arrangement tend not to be the poorest farmers in their region. Both firms and farmers face 
risks of non-compliance. Relatively larger or richer farmers can cope better with these risks 
and are, therefore, more likely to take part in a contractual arrangement. This implies that 
contract farming is more suited to the relatively better-off segment of the farming population. 
For annual crops, a price premium seems to be a necessary component of the service package 
in order to result in high income effects for farmers, especially in situations where no 
cooperative is involved as an intermediary between the firm and the farmers. 
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Background 
The problem, condition or issue 
Contract farming is a commercial relationship between a firm and a group of farmers. It is a 
business model in which farm products are bought in advance by a firm in exchange for 
certain services and other benefits. Although principally a commercial initiative, contract 
farming is considered to be a way to overcome the challenges that small farmers face when 
linking to remunerative markets. It assists farmers in connecting to output markets and often 
provides inputs, credit, or agricultural extension (Da Silva & Rankin, 2013; Eaton & 
Shepherd, 2001; World Bank, 2007). These services can be provided not only by private 
firms, but can also come from, or be facilitated by, multi-actor partnerships between 
companies, governments and NGOs (Prowse, 2012). Estimates of the incidence of contract 
farming in developing countries are unreliable and differ markedly between countries; they 
are generally below 10% of total area under production (Minot & Ronchi, 2015). 
Unfortunately, there are no reliable data at national levels on the incidence of contract 
farming to assess its relevance in agrarian change (Oya, 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, a rapidly growing number of firms – at least in modern market channels – are 
relying on contracts for the procurement of products from preferred suppliers (Da Silva & 
Rankin, 2013; Reardon & Berdegue, 2002). Modern market channels pose higher demands to 
value chain coordination and traceability than traditional markets. Contract farming is one of 
the institutional arrangements available to organise this chain coordination. It is an 
alternative to centralised governance systems with complete control by the firm, such as 
plantation production (Bijman, 2008), especially in countries in which firms face constraints 
in access to land, or face high risks in production.  
 
Generally, companies offer a contract only to those farmers who comply with some minimum 
requirements (for example land ownership, irrigated lands, minimal plot sizes). Even if these 
arrangements are beneficial to farmers directly or indirectly through spill-over effects, there 
will be heterogeneity in impacts, with certain farmers benefitting more than others, with 
some even losing out. It is clear that contracts will not be randomly distributed within a 
farming community, and contracted farmers will always have special characteristics; a 
situation referred to in the literature as firm-selection and self-selection biases (Barrett et al., 
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2012; Minot & Ronchi, 2015). Studies that infer quantitative effects of contract farming on 
income and food security need a proper research design to control for these biases. 
 
Contracting firms are almost always relatively large processors, exporters, or supermarket 
chains. Rarely do small-scale traders, or even wholesalers offer farmers pre-planting 
contracts. This is not surprising, given the large fixed costs associated with contracting 
(Minot & Ronchi, 2015). Contract farming is induced by a firm’s need to source products with 
specific qualities and in sufficient quantities and is more likely to be established in the 
presence of appropriate geographical and political-economic conditions as well as an 
enabling business environment (Jia & Bijman, 2013). Relevant geographical conditions are, 
for example, road infrastructure, access to water, soil types and climatic conditions. Public 
policies and institutions influence the forms of transaction used by farmers and firms. 
Relevant political-economic conditions are land-rights policies, market regulation, trade 
policies and a low risk of socio-economic shocks. Whether a firm chooses to start offering a 
contract farming arrangement is also highly influenced by the local business environment, 
such as financial services, conflict resolution systems, investment subsidies, business 
development services, brokering services, and farmer organisations. Political decision-
making influences many of these conditions. Therefore, policy makers can enable or 
constrain the opportunities for contract farming, influencing its attractiveness to firms and 
farmers as a way of organising transactions and embedded services. Since 2007, coinciding 
with the investor rush for land in sub-Saharan Africa, international development agencies 
have increasingly presented contract farming as an alternative or complementary 
development opportunity for smallholder inclusion (Lindholm, 2014). 
 
Contract farming is considered by most authors to be a positive development for agricultural 
innovation in developing countries, improving the inclusion of farmers in markets (Eaton & 
Shepherd, 2001; Minot, 1986). Yet, there is serious concern whether smaller farmers benefit 
from these arrangements, because the relative size of buyers may result in an unequal power 
relationship, which influences the terms of the arrangements (Sivramkrishna & Jyotishi, 
2008; von Hagen & Alvarez, 2011). In the earlier literature on contract farming, the issue of 
power imbalances was especially prominent (Glover & Kusterer, 1990; Little & Watts, 1994), 
and the discussion was rather polarised between proponents and critics of contract farming 
(Oya, 2012).  
 
Most of these earlier studies compared the incomes of participating farmers with those not 
participating, or compared incomes before and after the contract was signed. Such direct 
comparisons of averages have a high risk of suffering from selection bias or other 
confounding factors (e.g. weather or prices), rather than reflect the results of the contract 
farming arrangement itself. The last decade shows a rapid increase of studies on contract 
farming that assess the effects of contract farming using stronger econometric research 
designs, which provide more reliable estimates of net-effects. These econometric impact 
evaluations report mixed effects. Therefore, a systematic review of this rapidly growing body of 
evidence is timely and may help to distill generalised inferences from these specific instances. 
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This report presents the results of a systematic review of the effectiveness studies that 
present primary data and were published up to the summer of 2015. To do so, our review 
followed a two-stage process. First, it identified impact studies that applied a research design 
able to reduce selection bias and assess the counterfactual situation (What would have 
happened to the smallholder farmers had there been no contract farming arrangement?). 
Secondly, it placed these contractual arrangements in context. More specifically, the 
qualitative synthesis mapped the relevant contextual conditions for each empirical instance 
of contract farming covered in these rigorous effectiveness studies and made a case-based 
comparative analysis to identify enablers and barriers of effectiveness, to distill 
recommendations for policy makers and practitioners.  
The intervention 
Contractual arrangements in agriculture are extremely diverse, with varying embedded 
services, credit arrangements, payment systems and price-setting mechanisms. Contract 
farming is defined very broadly as ‘agricultural production carried out according to an 
agreement between a buyer and farmers, which establishes conditions for the production and 
marketing of a farm product or products’ (FAO, 2008). There are many different types of 
contracts, going from full resource provisioning contracts with detailed production and 
marketing conditions to mere verbal agreements to buy whatever quantity is produced at the 
going market price. In this review, we only consider studies on contractual arrangements that 
have a service provisioning component, next to a marketing agreement. We use a definition 
of contract farming partly based on Prowse (2012), which covers contracts in which the 
farmer is provided with seeds/breeds, inputs and/or credit.  Contract farming is defined as "a 
contractual arrangement for a fixed term between a farmer and a firm, agreed verbally or 
in writing, before production begins, which provides material or financial resources to the 
farmer and specifies one or more product or process requirements, for agricultural 
production on land owned or controlled by the farmer, which gives the firm legal title to 
(most of) the crop or livestock" (adapted from Prowse [2012:12]) 
 
Input-providing contracts are believed to be beneficial for the poorest farmers, as they lack the 
financial capacity to invest in these inputs themselves and they do not have access to finances 
that would enable them to buy these inputs on credit (Key & Runsten, 1999; Minten, 
Randrianarison, & Swinnen, 2009; Christin Schipmann & Qaim, 2010; Vorley & Proctor, 2008). 
How the intervention might work 
Contract farming arrangements as transactions 
Following Barrett et al. (2012), we identify four stages of decision-making by the parties that 
are involved in contracting (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Process of establishing a contract farming arrangement 
 
In stage 1, a firm chooses its procurement location; next, in stage 2, the firm proposes a 
contract to a (specific group) of farmers, which these farmers may or may not accept. The 
firm may deliberately restrict the contract only to those farmers complying with specific 
characteristics. Stage 3 is the acceptance of the contract details by the farmer(s). Finally, in 
stage 4, the firm and smallholder decide to honour the contract for its duration. A farmer 
organisation, (local) government, financial institution or NGO may play a role in any of the 
steps in this process. After each agricultural cycle or contract period, the parties may decide 
to either stop or renew the arrangements. The possibility to opt-out is dependent on the fixed 
investments made by each of the contracting parties and the alternative use of these 
investments outside the contractual arrangement (asset specificity). For example, 
discontinuation of a contract with a firm after having planted perennial crops or installed 
highly specialised buildings and equipment will imply higher costs than when stopping 
production of a vegetable crop requiring only variable inputs. Furthermore, the availability of 
alternative output markets (e.g. spot markets) and the availability of good quality inputs 
outside the contract (seeds/breeds, agrochemicals, credit) reduces the switching costs for 
smallholders in case the contractual arrangements does not yield the expected benefits 
(Mitchell, Keane, & Coles, 2009; Warning & Key, 2002). 
 
Stage 1:
Firm chooses procurement 
location
Stage 2:
Firm offers contract
Stage 3:
Smallholder accepts 
contract
Stage 4:
Firm and smallholder 
make decisions to 
honor the contract
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Figure 2: Contractual arrangements as a result of a negotiation process 
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Immediate outcomes  
The most obvious immediate outcomes of contract farming arrangements are related to the 
uptake and renewal of contracts. The continuation of a contractual arrangement is an 
indicator of the overall satisfaction of the firm and the farmers with their contractual 
arrangement. Figure 2 illustrates the incentive structure for firms and farmers to decide to 
enter and renew a contractual arrangement. Effects on smallholders will be greater for 
contract farming arrangements that are in place for a longer time because investments in 
productive assets and knowledge take time to bear fruit. Moreover, it is likely that 
unsuccessful farmers will have left the arrangement.  
 
Research by Narayanan (2013) in India shows that farmers may move in and out of contracts 
quite regularly, thus indicating a potential difference between observed short-term dynamics 
for individual farmers and a more structural positive effect on the (local) institutional 
environment. In time, contractual arrangements between firms and farmers may become a 
normal business option in a region, and part of the palette of options available to farmers for 
organising their farms.  
Intermediate outcomes 
Intermediate outcomes are indicators of contract performance and productivity. These 
intended effects of the contractual arrangements are directly related to the contracted 
production, for example, improved agricultural practices, improved yields, better quality, and 
improved crop revenue. Non-contracted farmers may experience spill-over effects (e.g. 
information and technology obtained from neighbours). The technology spill-over effects can 
be expected to be larger if the contractual arrangements in a certain location are continued 
for several years.  
 
Effects on intermediate outcomes can be visible over a shorter time-span than changes in 
ultimate outcomes (income and food security). It is nevertheless more challenging to 
compare the intermediate outcomes between different studies because the indicators used to 
measure these outcomes are more likely to be context- and product-specific and thus rely on 
different constructs and ways of measurement.  
Ultimate outcomes and development impact 
The ultimate outcomes of contract farming arrangements considered here were income and 
food security of smallholder farmers. The causal link between changes in these ultimate 
outcomes and the contract farming arrangements is not always clear-cut, especially when 
contract farming covers only a small part of a farmer’s agricultural activities. Few studies 
provided empirical evidence on development impact, e.g. poverty alleviation, economic 
growth, national food security and employment. Even though no study quantified the effects 
at this outcome level, most studies did claim narratively, in their introductions and 
conclusions, that these impacts exist.  
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Figure 3: Outcome areas that result from the contractual arrangement 
 
Why it is important to do the review 
The body of literature on contract farming is growing rapidly. However, direct comparisons 
between studies are complex because of the large heterogeneity in contract farming, with 
differences in contracts, farmers, products, buyers, and institutional environments. 
Paradoxically, it is this heterogeneity which makes a systematic review of these studies 
particularly useful.  
  
Our review synthesised the findings of research that measured the net-effects of contract 
farming on smallholder farmers, identified commonalities and differences between these 
contractual arrangements, and explored the evidence for lessons learned that might improve 
current and future contract farming arrangements. Policymakers are increasingly interested 
in working with the private sector in development initiatives, using co-investment or 
developing joint projects. Therefore, this review not only aimed to map the evidence about 
the average effects that contract farming has had on income and food security of smallholder 
farmers, according to studies with a strong research design, but it also aimed to show what 
seems to be working where, when, and under which conditions. In all the instances of 
contract farming included in the meta-analysis, we searched for information on the service 
package provided to farmers, the role of social capital in the start-up of the arrangement, and 
if a price-premium was paid vis-a-vis production for the local market. This part of the study 
was explorative in nature, in order to identify potential (combinations of) enabling or 
limiting conditions that influence the effectiveness of contract farming. This review was more 
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systematic and detailed than earlier reviews (Minot & Ronchi, 2015; Prowse, 2012; Wang, 
Wang, & Delgado, 2014), which used document counting and variable-based analysis to 
generate generalised inferences on effectiveness. We report the results of a meta-analysis, 
weighing the studies according to their effect-size, sample size, and variance, following the 
process defined by the Campbell and Cochrane Collaboration (Higgins & Green, 2011), and 
we added configurational comparative analyses (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) to find 
configurations of conditions that predict effectiveness.  
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Objectives 
Review objectives 
The systematic review had two primary research questions to guide the review and synthesis 
process, with six sub-questions.  
 
Question 1: What is known about the effectiveness of contract farming on smallholder 
farmers in low- and middle-income countries? 
1.1. What are the effects of contract farming on income and food security of smallholder 
farmers? 
1.2. What are the effects of the contract farming arrangement on intermediate outcomes 
such as yields and/or net-returns derived from producing the contracted crop or 
livestock? 
1.3. What are the effects on intermediate and ultimate outcomes for non-participating 
neighbouring farmers living in the same communities as the contracted farmers? 
1.4. What are the drop-out rates and side-selling associated with the contract farming 
arrangement (immediate outcomes)? 
 
Question 2: Under which enabling or limiting conditions are contract farming arrangements 
more effective? 
2.1. What are the enabling and limiting conditions associated with the effectiveness and 
continuity of the contract farming arrangements for smallholder farmers? 
2.2. Are there configurations of conditions that may enable success or failure of contract 
farming arrangements? 
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Methods 
Criteria for considering studies for this review 
Types of studies 
The review followed the search and screening process as defined in the protocol, published as 
Ton et al. (2015). The criteria used to select studies are described below following the PICOS 
format (Participants, Interventions, Comparisons, Outcomes, Study designs). Selected 
studies were used to identify the empirical instances on which the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses were based. The same studies were eligible to answer review question 1 
(summative evidence on effectiveness) and review question 2 (enabling and limiting 
conditions for effectiveness). 
Types of participants 
The review focused on the effects of contract farming on smallholder farmers. Generally, 
smallholders have at least two of the following criteria proposed by Stewart et al. (2014): 
1. Limited size of farm (as compared to other farms in the sector). 
2. Mostly dependent on family labour. 
3. Subsistence farming or mix of subsistence and market-oriented farming. 
4. Reportedly limited resources in terms of land, technical and technological support, 
and/or capital for maintenance and investment. 
 
The land needed to qualify as smallholder depends per location and crop-type, with large 
variation even within one country resulting from agro-climatic conditions. Therefore, during 
the screening, we did not exclude studies based on their definition of smallholders. All 
selected studies relate to contracts with such farmers in low-income economies, lower-middle 
income economies and upper-middle income economies. We used the classification 
according to the World Bank.  
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Types of interventions 
We only included studies that covered contractual arrangements where a firm provided 
services to farmers next to a price for their products. In the screening procedure, studies were 
excluded if related to: 
• Contractual arrangements without service-providing clauses. This excluded commercial 
contracts such as forward sales and price hedging. These price stabilisation strategies 
are common practice in agro-export crops, such as coffee, cocoa, soybeans, and corn. 
Though they use contracts, it is not relate to a contractual relation between a 
procuring firm and supplying farmers. 
• Contractual arrangements only concerning marketing, such as collective marketing, 
marketing boards, and preferred suppliers to supermarkets. We only included these 
in the review when additional services were provided. 
• Traditional sharecropping arrangements in which a tenant farmer was provided with 
inputs and works the land for the owner in exchange for an agreed share of the value 
of the crop minus charges. We only included studies where farmers had land that was 
not owned by the firm with which they agreed the contract. 
• Certification schemes such as UTZ Certified, Fair Trade, and Rainforest Alliance unless 
a non–transferable fixed-term forward sales contract with a specific firm was offered.  
• Hybrid situations, such as when a contract between a cooperative and a fixed buyer 
specified service-delivery of the cooperative to its members, have only been included 
when the decision to enter into the contract was optional for individual members.  
• Contractual arrangements outside the realm of ‘smallholder agriculture’, such as timber 
exploitation and marine fishery.  
Types of comparisons 
Contract farming is a complex intervention, consisting of a package of services provided to a 
farmer in exchange for a pre-planting sales agreement. Arrangements may provide farmers 
with various packages: e.g. higher than local prices, inputs, credit, agricultural extension, and 
transport. If any of these services in the package were also available to the comparison group, 
we considered the net- effect of this differential service package, comparing the outcome in 
the treatment and comparison group. 
In many instances, comparison-group farmers were located in the same region as treatment-
group farmers, creating a potential for spill-over effects. Studies which did not explicitly 
controlled for spill-over effects were accepted in the meta-analysis but mapped as having a 
higher risk of bias (see section 4.3).  
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Types of outcome measures 
Primary outcomes included in the review are income and food security. Income may be 
measured by farm household reporting of crop income, farm income, household income or 
household expenditure, for example. No studies were excluded based on the way in which 
they measured income, although there were substantial differences between the proxy-
indicators used by various authors. Definitions of income differed in three ways: whether 
expenditure or income was measured, if the costs of inputs or hired labour were discounted 
or not, and whether total household income, farming income, or only the net-returns from 
the contracted crop or livestock was considered.  
 
Multiple proxy-indicators exist for food security, such as length of the hungry season, food 
consumption recall, diet composition or anthropometric measures (Masset, Haddad, 
Cornelius, & Isaza-Castro, 2011; Webb, 2013). No studies were excluded based on the 
definition of food security outcome indicators used.  
 
Secondary outcomes used in the studies were yield, price and labour use. No study was 
excluded based on their definition of secondary outcomes. However, we only included 
secondary outcomes included in studies that also reported primary outcomes.  As the aim of 
the review was to analyse whether contract farming may benefit smallholder farmers, the 
ultimate outcomes considered were income and food security. The immediate outcome 
indicators, side-selling and drop-out rates were not available in any of the selected studies. 
Types of study design  
 
In the search strategy and the initial title-abstract screening, no studies were excluded based 
on the study design, in order to get a fairly complete set of quantitative and qualitative 
contract farming studies. From this set of substantive-relevant studies, a selection was made 
based on study design, to identify the studies that contained a quantitative assessment of the 
effectiveness of one or more empirical instance of contract farming and met the criteria for 
methodological rigour described in the next section.  
 
We included all studies with a credible design to reduce the risk of selection bias. This 
includes experimental studies (Randomised Controlled Trials - RCTs) and quasi-
experimental design. We include quasi-experimental designs that used statistical matching 
(e.g., propensity score matching or PSM, or covariate matching), regression adjustment (e.g., 
difference-in-differences or DID, and single difference regression analysis, instrumental 
variables or IV, estimation and Heckman selection models), as well as similar cross-sectional 
or longitudinal designs.  
 
Selection can be the result of decisions by either the firm or the farmer. It is common practice 
for the company to prefer those farmers which it believes can offer the right quality at the 
right price. Large farms in easy-to-reach locations are more likely to be selected. Often, the 
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criteria used by firms to select farmers are a combination of observable and non-observable 
characteristics (Bellemare, 2012). Farmers who are offered a contract can decide whether or 
not to take it. Those farmers who expect to benefit most from the contract are more likely to 
accept the offer. This decision is at least partly based on unobservable characteristics such as 
ability, dedication, and knowledge. To be selected for the meta-analysis, effectiveness studies 
need to have a design that addresses the issue of selection bias. A simple comparison of 
outcomes between contracted and non-contracted will therefore almost never retrieve the 
causal impact of contract farming. More complicated strategies are needed and have been 
proposed in the vast literature on impact evaluations (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2008). These 
research designs have strengths and weaknesses, and their validity and appropriateness will 
depend on the context and dynamics of each empirical instance. Also, their validity depends 
on the way that the research methods were implemented in these designs (e.g. the quality of 
the Instrumental Variables or matching algorithms that are used).  
 
Analysing the validity of the statistical conclusions involved a critical scrutiny of the 
econometric methods used. In general, the net-effects of contract farming on income can be 
conceptualised as a system of three equations that guide the estimation procedures: 
 
 
         (1) 
  
 
Farmer  can choose to operate under two different regimes: the farmer can participate in 
contract farming (regime 1) or the farmer can sell his or her produce on local markets 
(regime 0). With each regime, the farmer obtains a different outcome (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖), which is a 
function of observable household characteristics ( ) and unobservable characteristics 
captured by the error term . The choice between the two regimes depends on observable and 
unobservable characteristics of the farmer and the contract . The indicator function, , 
equals 1 if the farmer participates in contract farming and 0 otherwise. 
 
This set of equations can be summarised by the following switching regression: 
 
    (2) 
 
Most papers implicitly assume that contract farming only has a ‘level’ effect, but that the 
return on the observable characteristics, , does not depend on the regime. In other words, it 
is assumed that . This assumption simplifies equation 2 substantially and 
facilitates the empirical estimation. Whether this assumption is justified depends on the 
details of the contractual arrangements (Bolwig, Gibbon, & Jones, 2009; Narayanan, 2014). 
Contractual arrangements that only change the channel through which farmers sell their 
produce, from spot markets to a firm, are unlikely to significantly alter marginal returns on 
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land, labour and other inputs. Contractual arrangements that introduce a new crop that is 
not sold in local markets are, on the other hand, more likely to imply a regime switch. For 
instance, if contracted farmers switch from producing staple crops for local markets to cash 
crops for export such as cotton, production factors such as irrigation may become more 
important and profitable. 
 
If the assumption of constant returns on inputs across regimes holds, the switching 
regression equation simplifies to: 
 
      (3) 
 
This equation neatly summarises the selection problem that haunts causal identification of 
the impact of contract farming. As we cannot assume that farmers participate randomly in 
contract farming, the unobservable term  will be correlated with the treatment. 
Hence, estimating this equation with OLS, while omitting the term , will give 
biased estimates. In other words, selection into contract farming is endogenous. For example, 
a very able farmer may be more likely to participate in contract farming and always obtains, 
at the same time, higher outputs than a less able farmer, even if he would not participate in 
contract farming. In this case, OLS overestimates the impact of contract farming as it does 
not account for ‘farming ability’ which is unobserved by the researcher. 
 
The simplest approach to estimate equation 3 consistently is to include all factors that 
determine participation in contract farming as explanatory variables. Conditional on these 
variables, participation in contract farming is then assumed to be random. In exceptional cases, 
this assumption is met. For instance, if the firm decides which farmers are eligible for contract 
farming based on clear criteria known and observable to the researcher and all farmers accept 
the offer, one can perfectly control for selection into the program and equation 3 can 
consistently be estimated with OLS. In general, however, some of the factors that determine 
participation in contract farming (such as risk aversion and farming ability) are unobservable. 
Hence, more advanced strategies are required to deal with bias due to self-selection.  
 
The gold standard in net-effect studies, as codified by most systematic review boards such as 
the Campbell and Cochrane Collaboration –though contested by others (Cartwright, 2007; 
Deaton & Cartwright, 2016; Ravallion, 2009)- is Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs), in 
which farmers are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. This random 
assignment assures, by design, that the error term  is zero and therefore allows the 
estimation of equation 3 with OLS. The implementation of a RCT for contract farming is 
rarely feasible. It would require a firm that accepts a research design for out-rolling its 
contract offer. For instance, the firm could offer contracts in a predefined number of villages 
(the treatment group), while not offering it in neighbouring villages (the control group). Data 
could then be collected before the implementation of the contract in all villages (the baseline) 
and after the implementation of the treatment (the end line).  
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Panel data are considered as the second best approach to establishing the causal impact of 
contract farming on welfare. Panel data allow us to control for time-invariant household 
characteristics, such as farming ability, that determine both the selection into contract 
farming and the resulting outcome (income). Hence, if the error term  in equation 3 
is correlated with time-invariant household characteristics, household fixed effects will solve 
the endogeneity problem. Panel data need to be collected before the implementation of the 
treatment. If panel data are only collected once the treatment has been implemented, some 
households may have opted in and out of contract farming because of unobservable, 
idiosyncratic shocks. Unfortunately, no study was identified that collected data before and 
after a firm offered contractual arrangements to small-scale farmers. A study by 
Dedehouanou, Swinnen and Maertens (2013), which did not quantitatively estimate income 
effects, collected data at two points in time, but some farmers were already participating in 
contract farming during the first wave of data collection. 
 
Observational studies that rely on cross-sectional data to identify the causal impact of 
contract farming are more likely to be biased than RCTs or studies using panel data. Cross-
sectional surveys take a ‘snapshot’ of income effects at one point in time. The variables 
(characteristics) that define participation in the contract may have changed due to this 
participation, and this may preclude credible net-effect estimates. Therefore, some studies 
attempted to create a panel dataset retrospectively by asking farmers to report on living 
conditions and assets before they participated in contract farming (e.g. Maertens and 
Swinnen [2009]). These lagged variables were then used to match households using 
propensity score matching or as instrumental variables.  
 
A simple OLS regression with a set of explanatory variables for a certain outcome (e.g. 
income), comparing treatment and control group with a dummy variable, would yield 
unreliable results due to collinearity. It would be impossible to determine if the effect was the 
result of the intervention or a result of the other factors that define the propensity of the 
farmer to participate in the contract. This is solved econometrically by identifying one or 
more good instruments that can isolate the effect of the contract. With cross-sectional data, 
there are several approaches to addressing the selection problem: Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM), Instrumental Variable (IV)/Heckman models and endogenous switching regression 
models. PSM studies assume that the researcher has observed all relevant criteria for 
selection into contract farming, and they compute the likelihood of a farmer becoming 
involved, based on his/her observables, in the contractual arrangement. Using these 
propensity scores, comparable contracted and non-contracted farmers are selected 
(matched), and the difference in the outcome variable between both groups is considered as 
the causal impact of contract farming on income. However, this estimate may well remain 
biased if selection into contract farming is partially based on unobservable characteristics.  
 
IV and Heckman studies use a unique variable or a vector of variables that has such a high 
correlation with the propensity to participate that it can be used to isolate the effects of the 
intervention. This instrumental variable should be strongly correlated with selection into 
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contract farming, but uncorrelated with the outcome variable. In theory, an IV approach is 
preferable over PSM whenever it credibly controls for selection on unobservables. In 
empirical work, however, this distinction is less clear-cut, as many studies lack sufficiently 
strong instruments. Heckman studies use a vector of variables to do so. Based on a first-stage 
regression that estimates participation in the contract, a second-stage regression uses the 
estimated parameters of each farmer in the regression to estimate the net-income effects of 
the contractual arrangement. Switching Regressions take account of the different ‘production 
functions’ for the contracted and the traditional crops. For each ‘regime’, a separate 
regression is performed and the net-results are the subtraction of the (modelled) results in 
both regimes for a farmer with the same characteristics: the farmer modelled as producing 
the contracted crop versus producing the traditional crop. 
 
All study designs may be vulnerable to the fact that they assess net-effects at one moment in 
time. Most longitudinal panel studies (e.g. RCT, Diff-in-diff) use two measurements to derive 
inference of impact. The years used for baseline or endline may, however, refer to ‘unusual’ 
situations (e.g. weather, markets). These sources of variability are especially relevant when 
the contract farming arrangement covers new crops or livestock that are different than the 
traditional (counterfactual) farming in the comparison group. If conditions vary between 
years and affect these crops differently (e.g. terms of trade, drought resistance, etc.) a 
comparison between baseline and endline results in unreliable net-effect estimates. 
 
In a context of high variability, baseline surveys are not always a cost-effective way to obtain 
impact data. McKenzie (2012) argues that more observations over time may improve the 
validity of any of the (quasi) experimental designs. He argues that for outcomes with a high 
variability over time (a low autocorrelation), multiple post-treatment measurements can 
dramatically increase the statistical power of the design, and, within budget constraints, even 
be preferable to a design with a baseline survey (McKenzie, 2012, pp. 219-220). The time 
series that results from multiple follow-up surveys would better capture time-varying 
outcomes and register stepping-out (attrition), which are important validity threats to 
inferences based on cross-sectional surveys only.  
 
This overview of the different strategies to identify the causal impact of contract farming on 
welfare shows that some study designs were more statistically robust than others. Studies 
reporting only comparative statistics without attempting to control for unobservable 
variables were excluded from the meta-analysis, and are listed in Appendix 9.2. All studies 
used were observational studies that used econometric methods to control for selection bias. 
Furthermore, some studies were excluded because they applied these methods incorrectly– 
for example, by using unconvincing instrumental variables. For all studies included, the risk 
of bias was assessed using 3ie’s Risk of Bias tool explained in section 3.5. 
 
The 28 contract farming arrangements, covered by the 22 studies included in the meta-
analysis of income effects, were subsequently used in the explorative analysis for enablers 
and barriers of effectiveness, using truth-table analysis (Qualitative Comparative Analysis). 
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Search methods for identification of studies 
To find the studies that could be used in the meta-analysis, we used a comprehensive search 
strategy. The main terms used to identify the pool of studies within which we expected to find 
studies that covered the effectiveness of contract farming arrangements were: contract 
farming, nucleus estate, cooperative, producer organisation, pre-harvest agreement, value 
chain, farm-firm, outgrower, vertical integration. See the detailed search terms in Appendix 
9.3 and the systematic research protocol (Ton et al., 2015). 
 
We screened the retrieved studies to identify a core set of studies that give evidence on 
quantitative effectiveness (research question 1), to define the empirical instances of contract 
farming for meta-analysis. A wider pool of studies, related to these empirical instances was 
used for responding to research question 2, to identify relevant complementary information 
on the contextual conditions of these empirical instances.  
Electronic searches 
We used the results of a preliminary Scopus search in October 2014 and February 2015 to 
develop and fine-tune the search strategy with appropriate search terms. We applied the 
search terms between 30 September and 21 October 2015, as documented in Annex 2 of the 
protocol (Ton et al., 2015). We searched the following electronic libraries: 
• Scopus.com 
• CAB Abstracts 
• Web of Science 
• Agricola 
• Econlit 
• Tropag & Rural 
Searching other resources 
In addition to the electronic search, hand-searching and snowballing added more studies to the 
review. First, we searched for complementary academic and non-academic literature in several 
databases in which electronic search results are impossible or cannot be exported in a useable 
format. Databases of organisations such as the FAO, World Bank, and IFAD were searched for 
additional grey literature. See Ton et al. (2015) for further details on this search process. 
 
Second, we snowballed the references mentioned in review articles and books on the subject.  
 
Third, citations to the studies used in the meta-analysis were identified through citation searches 
(Google Scholar, Scopus, Web of Science) and, if not yet included, screened on the inclusion/ 
exclusion criteria. Subsequently, the references of all newly included studies were screened for 
other relevant studies, using snowballing of references and forward citation tracking. 
 
Fourth, the link and information on a website dedicated to this systematic review 
(http://contractfarming-systematicreview.wikispaces.com/) was used to present the results 
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of the initial search process and used to contact key resource persons to suggest missing, 
unpublished or unfinished studies.  
 
Fifth, to answer research question 2, we retrieved additional material referring to the same 
contractual arrangements and contexts which were the focus of the studies selected for meta-
analysis. This allowed us to complement the information on context characteristics and 
contract modalities needed to reflect on the enablers and barriers in the empirical instances 
of contract farming covered by the studies selected for the meta-analysis. Furthermore, we 
did separate searches for each empirical instance: the name of the contract farming 
arrangement, the name of contracting firm, and the geographical location of the empirical 
instance. To do so, we used Google, www.google.com and Google Scholar 
(scholar.google.com). The retrieved documents were further checked for other useful 
references.This is a sentence with normal text style. 
Data collection and analysis 
Selection of studies 
The search results used to identify a broad set of potentially relevant qualitative and 
quantitative empirical studies as well as conceptual papers on contract farming were stored 
in EPPI Reviewer 4. Each upload indicates the source and search terms used in search-
specific RIS-files.  
 
In the title-abstract screening, reviewers were deliberately over-inclusive and incorporated all 
studies that were related to agriculture and in which transactions in product or input markets 
were mentioned. After the first preliminary search in Scopus.com (February 2015), all 
retrieved references (around 2,500) were double-coded to align criteria between reviewers 
during the title-abstract screening. After the final search (October 2015), half of the new 
references were double coded and the other half single coded.  
 
During full-text screening, all studies were assessed by two reviewers independently assessed 
for inclusion in the meta-analysis. The lead researcher reconciled the differences, consulting 
the full-text of the study and discussing his assessment with both reviewers. The data 
extraction of all studies included in the meta-analysis was done by two of the lead 
researchers. A third reviewer arbitrated any disagreements.  
Title-abstract screening 
In the title and abstract screening, studies were excluded if they did not relate to or comply 
with one or more of the following six exclusion criteria, mentioned in paragraph 3.1: no 
agricultural value chain; forestry (timber, wood); marine fishery (sea, coastal); not in 
low/middle-income country; no market-related contractual arrangement; not considering 
farmers; and relevant but no empirical instance. 
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Full-text screening 
After title-abstract screening, we retrieved the full text for the set of selected publications. 
The references were screened on the above-mentioned exclusion criteria about relevance. 
Some studies did not assess effectiveness but, for example, differences in characteristics of 
farmers with and without contracts, or explored differences in performance between 
contracting farmers. We used two additional exclusion criteria to focus further on the subset 
of studies potentially useful for answering the research questions: study not examining 
impact effects; and no pre-harvest service delivery. All studies that resulted from this full-text 
screening contained information on one or more empirical instances of contract farming. 
Selection for meta-analysis 
The studies that remained were differentiated based on the methodological rigour of the 
assessment of the effect size. To be selected for meta-analysis, data had to be collected at 
farm or household level in both intervention and comparison groups. Observational studies 
were included whenever they controlled for unobservable characteristics using statistical 
matching (propensity score or covariate matching) or regression adjustment (difference-in-
differences, single difference regression analysis, instrumental variables estimation, and 
Heckman selection models). Both study designs that collect longitudinal data at baseline and 
end-line, and those that use cross-sectional end-line data only, were included.  
 
The studies that did not have a counterfactual design were excluded from the meta-analysis. 
However, some of these studies were retrieved during synthesis if they related to one or more 
of the selected empirical instances of contract farming, and were used to obtain additional 
insights in processes or mechanisms related to the contract farming arrangement in that 
empirical instance, to answer our second research question.  
Data extraction and management 
All studies were entered in the specialist systematic review software – EPPI Reviewer 4 
(Thomas, Brunton, & Graziosi, 2010). EPPI-Reviewer 4 has been developed and maintained 
by the EPPI-Centre at the Social Science Research Unit at the Institute of Education, 
University College London, UK. EPPI-Reviewer was used to screen the studies, to archive the 
studies used in the qualitative and qualitative analysis, and for the assessment of study 
quality and risk of bias.  
 
The meta-analysis was done by using packages available in Stata. Metan is the main Stata 
meta-analysis command. Its latest version allows the user to input the cell frequencies from 
the 2 × 2 table for each study (for binary outcomes), the mean and standard deviation in each 
group (for numerical outcomes), or the effect estimate and standard error from each study. It 
provides a comprehensive range of methods for meta-analysis, including inverse-variance–
weighted meta-analysis, and creates new variables containing the treatment effect estimate 
and its standard error for each study. These variables can then be used as inputs into a wide 
range of other Stata meta-analysis commands (Harris et al., 2010). 
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The detailed analysis of evidence on enablers and barriers in each of the empirical instances 
used EPPI Reviewer 4 (Thomas et al., 2010) and Atlas.ti 7 (Friese, 2014) to prepare for 
qualitative data analysis. Kirq 2.1.12 (Reichert & Rubinson, 2014) was used to make the truth 
tables and explore configurational patterns in the data. 
Assessment of risk of bias in included studies 
Measures of treatment effect 
Response ratios (RRs) were calculated to measure effect sizes. Response ratios have the 
advantage of being straightforward to calculate. Only two of the studies reported sufficient 
information to calculate SMDs directly (other methods would be needed to back-translate 
them from t-statistics and so on). To complete the information needed for calculating the 
RRs and confidence intervals, we contacted 15 authors, only seven of whom provided the 
missing information. One author indicated that they had no access to the data and nine did 
not react to the request and follow-up emails. These studies were therefore excluded from the 
meta-analysis (see Appendix 9.2). 
Response ratios are expressed as the difference in mean outcome in the intervention group as 
a proportion of the outcome mean in the comparison group. RRs have the advantage of being 
easy to interpret. Values above and below one indicate proportionate changes in the outcome 
of the treatment group over the comparison. Thus, an RR of 0.90 indicates a 10 percent 
average decrease in the treatment group relative to the comparison, and an RR of 1.10 
indicates a 10 percent average increase. All outcomes were measured on a continuous ratio 
scale with a natural zero point, which is a required condition for RR to be meaningful 
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2011).  
 
For matched-based studies, response ratios were calculated using the following formulae: 
 
 
 
 
  
where Yt is the outcome on the treated, Yc the outcome for the comparison group, and t the 
value of the t-statistic. For regression-based studies, response ratios were calculated using 
the following formulae: 
 
 
 
where 𝛽𝛽 is the unstandardized regression coefficient. Effect sizes are only strictly comparable 
across studies using a common regression model (Keef & Roberts, 2004:103). In the case of 
multivariate studies, this means that studies should analyse the same treatment, use the 
same way of measuring the outcome variable, the same method, and the same covariates. 
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This was clearly not the case. Hence, the sensitivity of the results to these factors was checked 
using analyses described in section 4.3.2. 
 
The data required to calculate the RRs depended on the estimation strategy used in the study. 
Often the studies did not report exact t-statistic, standard errors or p-values, but indicated 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. In those cases, we assumed that the p-value was 
exactly equal to the reported significance level. 
 
The calculation of the RRs was most straightforward for studies using propensity score 
matching or endogenous switching regression models. These studies typically reported income 
of treatment (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) and control group (𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐) after matching along with the standard error or t-
statistic of the difference between treatment and control group. RRs were then calculated as 
𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐/𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 and the standard error of the logarithm of RR as: ln(𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) = ln (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)/𝑡𝑡. Most of these 
studies matched treatment and control groups using nearest neighbour and/or kernel 
matching. Whenever the results of both techniques were reported, we used nearest neighbour 
matching. Some studies only reported the difference between control and treatment group after 
matching. In those case, the authors of the study were contacted and asked to report 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 and 𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐. 
If the authors did not reply, we assumed that 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 after matching equalled 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 before matching. 
 
The calculation of RR for studies using instrumental variables followed the guidelines of 
Waddington et al. (2014). The response ratio was calculated as: 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽)/𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐, where 𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐 is 
the average income of the control group and 𝛽𝛽 identifies the impact of the contract. Standard 
errors of the logarithm of the RR were then calculated as ln(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) /𝑡𝑡. Most studies reported 𝛽𝛽 
with and without correcting for self-selection. We always used 𝛽𝛽 reported in the regression that 
addressed the endogeneity issue, even if a Hausman specification test rejected the endogeneity 
of participation in contract farming in the regression to estimate the income effects. 
 
An additional complication occurred if the regression framework used the logarithm of the 
outcome variable as the dependent variable (five studies). In these studies, 𝛽𝛽 represents the 
percentage increase in the outcome variable if the probability of participating in contract 
farming increases by 100%. To calculate RR, we followed the strategy proposed by Bellemare 
(2012) and assumed that the RR equal 𝛽𝛽*nc/(nc+nt), where 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 and 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 are the number of 
observations in control and treatment group, respectively. This is an upper limit of the 
impact of contract farming on the outcome variable, as a linear interpolation of the effect size 
is used, whereas the logarithmic function is concave. 
Unit of analysis issues 
For our meta-analyses of income effects, the unit of analysis was the empirical instance of 
contract farming. We did not find any paper that reported effects on higher cluster levels 
than the farm household. For each meta-analysis, only one effect size was used per 
empirical instance. 
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No studies reported more than one ultimate outcome. More problematic were studies 
containing several empirical instances of contract farming, covering distinct crops. There 
were four such studies: Bellemare (2012), Miyata et al. (2009), Narayanan (2014), and 
Simmons et al. (2005). Of these, the first two contained several empirical instances of 
contract farming but did not distinguish between them in the analysis. Hence, they had to be 
considered as consisting of a single case in the meta-analysis. The study of Narayanan (2014) 
did report separately on each of the four empirical instances. However, it relied on the same 
control group. Considering these instances as completely independent would put too high a 
weight on what is, in effect, a single study. We present the results of the meta-analysis using a 
synthetic effect. However, in the moderator analysis, the synthetic effect size would cancel out 
the existing heterogeneity between the instances. Hence, we reported both the separate effect 
sizes as well as the synthetic effect size, and showed how the difference affected overall results. 
 
Simmons et al. (2005) reported on three empirical instances, two of which were used to 
calculate effect sizes. The effect size of the third instance was calculated based on data taken 
from another more detailed paper of the same authors on this particular contract farming 
scheme (Winters et al. 2005) in which they applied a two-staged regression using the same 
data as in Simmons et al. (2005). The analyses of these three instances relied on independent 
data and different model specifications and hence were considered to be independent. 
 
When authors presented results of several models, the results of the methodology with the 
best control for selection bias were selected. For this decision, we follow the hierarchy of 
models explicated in section 3.1.5. When multiple regressions based on the same method 
were presented, we selected results from the most appropriate specification (based on use of 
appropriate covariates and whether covariates in less parsimonious models were statistically 
significant). Similarly, when the results of multiple PSM models were presented, we 
preferred nearest neighbour matching. The reason for preferring nearest neighbour matching 
over other matching algorithms was consistency: all papers that used PSM included the results 
based on nearest neighbour matching, which was not the case for other matching algorithms. 
Dealing with missing data 
Authors of studies with missing data were contacted, in some cases up to four times, with a 
request to provide for the specific data required to complete the effect size calculation. Five 
authors responded to the request. Of the six remaining studies, two had to be excluded. For 
the other four studies, effect size calculations were completed using assumptions or 
approximations. Additional assumptions were sometimes required because of missing data: 
t-statistic, standard errors or p-values.  
Risk of bias assessment  
For the risk of bias assessment of each study, we used a 3ie Risk of Bias tool (Hombrados and 
Waddington, 2012), which was developed to enable consistent assessment of internal validity 
of social experiments and quasi-experiments. Studies were assessed by each researcher 
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individually, and resulting disagreements were discussed and resolved jointly. The 3ie Risk of 
Bias tool consists of eight evaluation criteria, each focusing on a different type of threat to 
validity (see section 4.2). The tool contains detailed descriptions of how to attribute a score to 
each criterion specified per type of study design. 
Assessment of heterogeneity 
The presence of heterogeneity was visually examined by making forest plots of the pooled 
results and tested using the chi-squared test. Given the small number of included studies, the 
level of significance at which we considered heterogeneity to be present was set at 0.1, to 
account for the low power of the test. Furthermore, heterogeneity was assessed with the I-
squared statistic, which measures the percentage of variability that is due to real variability 
between studies. Values close to 100% indicate a large real variability and values close to zero 
indicate no observable real variability. Final evaluation of test results depended on the 
significance of the chi-square test described above and the sign and size of standardised 
effect sizes. As we used a random effects model for the meta-analysis, between-study 
heterogeneity could also be assessed with the tau-squared statistic. Potential sources of 
heterogeneity were formally investigated using subgroup analysis. 
Assessment of reporting biases 
Publication bias was assessed visually with funnel plots produced using the metafunnel and 
metabias command in Stata, and tested more formally with the Egger’s meta-regression test 
(Egger et al., 1997). 
Data synthesis 
Quantitative information on the effectiveness of contract farming was synthesized using 
inverse-variance weighted statistical meta-analysis. Random effects rather than fixed effects 
meta-analysis was used, because the treatment was not uniform and its effects were likely to 
be context-specific. Effect sizes were also likely to have been affected by differences in study 
designs and control variables used, in the case of regression-based studies. Random effects 
meta-analysis allows for such differences, by assuming that there is some true variation 
between the included studies besides random variation due to sampling. 
 
The results of the meta-analysis were checked for their sensitivity to outliers, synthetic 
effects, research design, and outcome measure (definition of income). These analyses were 
only done for the ultimate outcome variable income, as this was the only variable for which 
sufficient observations were available. It was not possible to compare studies based on the 
length of follow-up, because all included studies relied on cross-sectional data. 
We complemented the impact studies with qualitative studies and other pieces of 
information that could shed light on the contextual conditions and content of the contractual 
arrangement in each empirical instance. Most studies included t-tests or Probit regressions 
to identify differences between farmers with a contract and those without, but sometimes this 
information was not in the main study and had to be derived from other studies that reported 
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on the same empirical instance. We used the results of these analyses to explore for plausible 
predictors of participation and exclusion in contract farming arrangements, and especially to 
answer the question if these arrangements tended to benefit larger or asset-richer, or smaller 
and asset-poorer households. 
Subgroup analysis and investigation of heterogeneity 
According to the practitioners in the Advisory Board of this review, the most important 
sources of heterogeneity between empirical instances were expected to be due to the type of 
production, region, and the service package embedded in the transaction. The effect of these 
sources on the impact of contract farming on income was explicitly tested for in the meta-
analysis. Ex-ante, before analysis, the types of production were categorised as annual or 
perennial crops or animal husbandry, and depending on their perishability. Regions were 
broadly distinguished as Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Ex-post, during analysis, the 
contracts were characterised according to the market incentives, price-premium, the role of 
farmer organisations in the set-up, and the level of service provisioning, including credit, 
extension, and inputs.  
 
In addition to the analysis of these conditions as single predictors in the meta-regression, we 
also used a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Charles Ragin, 2008; Reichert & 
Rubinson, 2014) to explore configurations of conditions that could explain differences in 
effectiveness, using as conditons the incentives to farmers embedded in the contract: 
involvement of a farmer organization at the start, offering higher-than-local prices (price-
premium), access to credit, and provision of key inputs (seeds/breeds, agro-chemicals).  
 
QCA creates an overview (called a ‘truth table’) of all possible combinations of conditions and 
lists the cases that share the same combination. This matrix is called a ‘truth table’. The truth 
table shows which cases (empirical instances of contract farming) and associated 
combinations of conditions were consistent with a relatively high or relatively low 
effectiveness on income. Some cases will be ambiguous and cannot be classified as 0 (not 
having a condition) or 1 (having a condition). Therefore, fuzzy set scores are used, with 0.8 
indicating most likely present, and 0.2 as most likely absent. For each combination of 
conditions, QCA presents the set-consistency score, which is the lowest value of the fuzzy-
score of one of the cases that is member of the group of cases that shares the combination of 
conditions, be it in the set of conditions or the in the outcome.  
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To calibrate the outcome variable as high or low effectiveness, the pooled average effect size 
is used as the cross-over point. Cases with a response ratio below 25% are considered low 
effective, and cases above 50% are considered high effective. The intermediate values are 
converted to fuzzy set scores using a logistic regression function, as recommended by Ragin 
(2008). The pooled average effect-size is used as the cross-over point (fuzzy set score= 0.5). 
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Results 
Description of studies 
Results of the search 
A preliminary electronic search was performed in February 2015 on Scopus and retrieved 
3,355 studies. These papers were title-abstract screened by a team of master students in 
Ghent and Wageningen University to select the agriculture related studies. Each paper was 
double-screened, using EPPI Reviewer 4, with a senior researcher reconciling differences. At 
this stage, papers not concerning the agricultural value chain, developing countries, market-
related contracts, farmers, or empirical instances were excluded. When titles and abstracts 
provided insufficient information to justify exclusion, papers proceeded to the next screening 
stage. Twelve papers were excluded because a full-text version could not be retrieved.  
 
We performed the final search for this review in all electronic libraries in October 2015, 
which retrieved a total of 8,529 studies (Figure 4). The new studies, compared with the 
Scopus results in February 2015, were single-screened by one of the reviewers that 
participated in the initial double-screening.  
 
After title-abstract screening, we were left with 637 studies. In addition to the electronic 
search, a manual search was conducted on online databases and by snowballing references. 
This manual search retrieved another 181 studies. 
 
The full-text screening was performed on all remaining studies. All these papers were double-
screened, reconciling differences. All studies with no market-related contract, counterfactual 
design, report of smallholder effects, pre-harvest services, or farmers were excluded. After 
the full-text screening, 195 studies remained. 
 
In the next step, all studies which were not effectiveness studies of contract farming were 
excluded. The definition given in section in section 3.1.2 was applied. The remaining set of 
papers was referred to as the core set and consisted of 75 studies. Of the studies contained 
in the core set, 25 met the criteria for relevance and rigour required for inclusion in the 
meta-analysis. 
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Figure 4: Sources of included studies 
 
Only studies which reported on at least one of the ultimate outcomes of food security and 
income and had a proper design for addressing selection bias in the effect estimate were 
included in the meta-analysis. Several papers were retrieved as working papers and 
subsequently published in 2015 and 2016. We used the data in the printed version of the 
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study in the meta-analysis and synthesis. As only one study reported on food security 
(Bellemare & Novak, 2017) it could not be included in a meta-analysis of food security effects 
for lack of comparable studies. This study relied on the same method and data as an earlier 
study by the one of the authors which was included (Bellemare, 2012). Two studies had 
irreconcilable data inconsistencies that prevented the calculation of the effect size (Briones, 
2014; Munungo, 2010). In the end, 22 studies could be included in the meta-analysis of 
income effects. The papers included in the review contained 28 empirical instances and 
provided sufficient data on 26 of these to be included in the qualitative comparative analysis 
on factors influencing participation and effectiveness. 
 
Included studies 
 
Included studies dealt with contract farming arrangements in 13 countries. The majority of 
studies concerned African and Asian countries; only one study came from South America 
(Peru: Escobal and Cavero, 2012). Moreover, most empirical instances covered in the studies 
were highly regional in nature, and not necessarily representative for a country as a whole. As 
described in section 1.3, this geographical focus is understandable, because companies select 
regions with agro-ecological conditions suitable for a certain crop, having a sufficient number 
of farmers, and where some essential infrastructure is present (Barrett, 2010).  
 
Only one of the retrieved studies assessed the impact of contract farming on food security 
with an econometric design that controlled for selection bias. Bellemare and Novak (2016) 
asked the household about the ‘duration of the hungry season’ (in months), and reported the 
difference between contract farmers and non-contract farmers. Moreover, they used this 
variable to estimate a second effect-size, the likelihood that a household would exit the 
hungry season at any point in time. 
 
Although 22 included studies used income as the dependent variable in the regression, the 
definition and proxy-indicators varied between studies. Most studies reported crop income 
(41%), farm income (23%) or household income (27%). Two studies (9%) reported household 
expenditure. Only eight studies also reported some intermediate outcomes. Most of these 
studies reported more than one intermediate outcome, often part of a causal relation that 
leads to income effects (see Table 1). Yield (4), price (2), and labour use (2) were the most 
frequently reported intermediate outcomes. All other outcomes were only reported once.  
 
Sample size in some studies was relatively low. The average sample size was 260 and ranged 
from 26 (Warning & Key, 2002) to 1178 (Bellemare, 2012; Bellemare & Novak, 2017). In 
total, the studies covered 7,471 respondents in 28 contract farming arrangements. 
 
In the following we describe the samples used in the studies included in the meta-analysis in 
more detail (see also Appendix 9.1).  
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The study from Awotide et al. (2015) comprises a sample of 341 Nigerian rice farmers of 
which 150 participated in different contract farming schemes of several private firms 
providing seeds, agrochemicals and extension services. The study population was largely 
male (59%) with an average age of 43 years with five years of formal education, and owning 
an average of 2.9 ha of land.  
 
The sample used for both Bellemare (2012) and Bellemare and Novak (2016) was larger and 
included 1178 farmers of green beans, leek, snow peas, barley and rice that were contracted 
by different private firms in Madagascar. The contracts offered differed between the firms 
with all offering agrochemicals and extension, with some adding seeds to the package. Just 
under 50% of the sample participated in one of the contracts. Similar to the study by Awotide 
et al. (2015), the household heads in the sample had an average age of 43 years with six years 
of formal education. Most of them were male (92%). The average size of land owned by the 
households was somewhat smaller with 1.7 ha.  
 
The sample of Bolwig et al.’s study (2009) included 160 coffee farmers of which 112 
participated in a contract. Participating household heads were 46 years of age on average and 
had seven years of education. The average land holding was 1.1 ha. Non-participant 
households owned 0.8 ha, and household heads were 47 years of age also with seven years of 
education. The contract farming arrangement was offered by one firm and included seeds 
and agrochemicals on a limited scale and extension services.  
 
The study of Briones (2014) considered tobacco farmers in the Philippines and studied the 
effect of contract farming on profitability. The contract offered by a private firm includes 
credit, seeds, agrochemicals and extension. The sample comprised 316 farmers, of which 77% 
produce under contract and sell 74% of their production under this contract. The farmers 
were on average 46 years old, went to school for 8 years, had 23 years of farming experience 
and owned 0.6 ha of land. Most of the household heads (83%) were male.  
Cahyadi and Waibel (2011) looked at 245 palm oil producers in Indonesia contracted by a 
single private firm. The contract included seeds and extension. Of the sample, 126 farmers 
participated in the contracting scheme. The average age of the household head was 46 years, 
and households owned 2.9 ha of land on average.  
 
The only study from South America included 360 potato farmers in Peru of which one fifth 
was contracted by a private firm in cooperation with an NGO (Escobal & Cavero, 2012). The 
participating farmers were provided with extension. Other services provided by a supporting 
NGO remained unclear. Descriptive statistics were reported separately for participants and 
non-participants. The age of the household head was 47 and 48 years and average years of 
education were 10 and 12, respectively. Participants owned 5.6 ha of land and non-
participants 2.6 ha. Household heads were mostly male (84% for participants and 96% for 
non-participants).  
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Girma and Gardebroek’s (2015) study looked at 195 honey producers in Ethiopia. The 
contract offered by a single private firm, in which 79 of the beekeepers participated, included 
credit, extension, inspections, honey containers and other necessary inputs. Again, summary 
statistics were reported separately. Participants had an average of 5 years of schooling and 23 
years of experience in beekeeping. Similar to non-participants, who had four years of 
education and 20 years of experience in honey production.  
 
Ito et al. (2012) considered 318 Chinese Watermelon farmers. In this case, the contract 
included seeds, agrochemicals, extension, subsidies on land improvement and access to the 
wholesale market and was offered by a farmer cooperative and not a private firm. Roughly 
half of the sample participated in the contract. The household heads were 53 and 55 years of 
age, participants and non-participants respectively, both with three years of education on 
average. The average land size between them was similar: 0.5 ha and 0.4 ha.  
 
The study performed by Jones and Gibbon (2011) covered 222 cocoa farmers in Uganda of 
which 135 participated in a contract offered by a private firm. Initially, the firm offered seeds 
and agrochemicals. Later, only extension and support in the initiation of saving societies 
were included in the contract. Farms had an average size of 1.7 ha, and household heads were 
44 years of age.  
 
Maertens and Swinnen (2009) considered contracts offered by several different exporting 
companies of French beans in Senegal. The services included in the contracts were credit (for 
some), seeds, agrochemicals, extension, and land preparation, and coordination and 
financing of planting and harvesting (on demand). The sample comprised 217 farmers of 
which 59 produced French beans on contract. Non-participants were from the same area but 
did not produce the beans. The average household head was 53 years old, 18% had primary 
education, and almost none of them were female. Average land holding was 5 ha. 
 
The study performed by Miyata et al. (2009) dealt with both apples and green onions in 
China. The contract for apples included agrochemicals (for most), extension, and sometimes 
spraying services, while the green onion contract offered seeds in addition to these services. 
The total sample was 162 farmers with 98 participating in one of the two contracts. On 
average household heads were 45 years old, went to school for eight years and cultivated 0.8 
ha of land.  
 
Munungo (2012) assessed 516 farmers in rural Zimbabwe to explore welfare gains for 
contract farmers in terms of higher crop income and higher household expenditure. The 
contract conditions were not specified but the category (‘participation in a private 
partnership’) combined farmers who either received a private loan (21% of the sample) or 
produced with a contract (50% of the sample). Contract farmers were considerably younger 
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on average, 36 years compared to 54 years for non-contract farmers. They were also more 
educated, 11 compared to 6 years of education.  
 
Narayanan (2014) looks at four different empirical instances with sample sizes between 262 
and 289 farmers per instance. For Marigold, farmers were 46 and 45 years and owned 2.4 ha 
and 2.1 ha on average, for the 208 non-participants and 59 participants, respectively. The 
contract included seeds and extension. The second instance is papaya for which there were 72 
contract and 208 non-participants. The average age was 45 and 46 years and land size was 
2.3 ha and 2.5 ha, respectively. The contract was similar to those for marigold farmers but 
added the organisation and training of hired labour. Broiler farmers were the third instance 
described in the study. However, all 81 broiler farmers produced on contract. They received 
the breeds, agrochemicals and extension; other services were not specified. The 208 farmers 
in the comparison group did not produce broilers. The former group had an average land size 
of 2.8 ha, the latter 2.5 ha. In both cases, the average age was 46 years. The last empirical 
instance concerns gherkins. In this case, all 262 farmers produced on contract but only 77 
produced gherkins. They had an average age of 38 years and owned 0.9 ha of land. The 
control group had an average age of 47 years and owned 2.7 ha of land. The gherkins contract 
offered seeds and extension; other services remained unspecified.  
 
Ramaswami’s study (2009) also looked at broiler production in India using a sample of 50 
farmers of which 25 produced on contract and 25 were independent farmers. The contract 
included inputs and extension, credit (in kind), and price insurance. Contract farmers were 
on average 39 years old, had 11 years of schooling and owned 2.5 ha of land. Independent 
broiler farmers were 36 years old on average, had 12 years of education and owned 3.1 ha of 
land.  
 
Rao and Qaim’s (2011) sample of Kenyan vegetable farmers included 402 farmers of which 
133 participated in a contract. However, the contracts were offered by multiple firms, and the 
provisions of the contracts were unclear. The average age of the farm operator was 47 and 49 
years, years of education were 10 and 9, and operators were 93% and 88% male, for contract 
and non-contract farmers respectively. Land ownership was 1.1 ha for contract farmers and 
0.8 ha for non-contract farmers.  
 
Saigenji (2012) compared Vietnamese tea growers that were either contracted by private 
firms and farmer cooperatives, or they supplied to state-owned enterprises. 
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Table 1: Overview of the studies included in the research synthesis 
 
Author Country Product Sample size Study design Outcomes1 Effect size 
(RR) 
95% CI 
RR)2, 3 
Awotide et al., 2015 Nigeria Rice 341 PSM Yield  
Crop income  
Poverty 
1.55 
1.71 
0.83 
[1.33, 1.77] 
[1.42, 2.00] 
[0.66, 1.00] 
Bellemare, 2012 Madagascar Green beans, leek, snow peas, rice, barley 1178 IV Household income 1.55 [1.28, 1.81] 
Bellemare and Novak, 2016 Madagascar Green beans, leek, snow peas, rice, barley 1178 IV Duration hungry season 0.92 [0.84, 1.00] 
Bolwig et al., 2009 Uganda Coffee 160 Heckman Yield  
Practice adoption  
Crop income 
1.30 
1.53 
1.92 
[1.17, 1.44] 
[1.06, 2.23] 
[1.55, 2.29] 
 
Briones, 2014 Philippines Tobacco 316 Heckman Farm income Not possible  
Cahyadi and Waibel, 2011 Indonesia Oil palm 245 Heckman Household income 1.24 [0.95, 1.53] 
 
Escobal and Cavero, 2012 Peru Potato 360 Switching regression Crop income 1.76 [1.17, 2.35] 
 
Girma and Gardebroek, 2015 Ethiopia Honey 195 IV Price  
Crop income 
1.23 
2.19 
[1.20, 1.25] 
[1.66, 2.72] 
 
Ito et al.,2012 China Watermelon 318 PSM Farming income 1.56 [1.22, 1.90] 
Jones and Gibbon, 2011 Uganda Cocoa 222 IV Total output  
Price  
Crop income 
1.25 
1.08 
1.52 
[1.13, 1.36] 
[1.04, 1.12] 
[1.32, 1.72] 
 
Maertens and Swinnen, 2009 Senegal French beans 217 PSM Household income 3.23 [1.41, 5.05] 
Miyata et al.,2009 China Apples, green onions 162 Heckman Household income 1.27 [1.02, 1.51] 
Munongo (2012) Zimbabwe Various (cotton, paprika, tobacco) 516 PSM Crop income  
Household expenditure 
Not possible  
Narayanan, 2014 India Marigold 
Papaya 
Broiler chicken 
Gherkins 
262-289 Switching regression Crop income 0.52 
1.43 
17.64 
 
1.27 
[0.18, 1.54]3 
[0.59, 3.45]3 
[9.38, 33.15]3 
 
[0.15, 10.92]3 
Ramaswami, 2009 India Broiler chicken 50 IV Crop income 1.85 [0.85, 2.84] 
 
Rao and Qaim, 2011 Kenya Various vegetables 402 Switching regression Household income 1.48 [1.11, 1.85] 
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Author Country Product Sample size Study design Outcomes1 Effect size 
(RR) 
95% CI 
RR)2, 3 
Saigenji, 2012 Vietnam Tea 88, 90 PSM Technical efficiency  
Household expenditure 
Not possible 
1.04 
[1.01, 1.07] 
Setboonsarng et al., 2008 Laos Rice 585 PSM Yield  
Price  
Crop income 
1.26 
1.18 
1.80 
[1.08, 1.44] 
[0.66, 1.70] 
[1.30, 2.18] 
Simmons et al., 2005 Indonesia Seed rice 124 IV Farming income  
Household labour  
0.94 
1.10 
[0.70, 1.18] 
[0.98, 1.22] 
Simmons et al., 2005 Indonesia Broiler chicken 200 IV Farming income  
Household labour 
4.91 
0.67 
[2.67, 7.15] 
[0.27, 1.70]3 
Sokchea and Culas, 2015 Cambodia Rice 75 Heckman Farming income 1.85 [1.03, 2.67] 
Trifković, 2014 Vietnam Catfish 191 Heckman Household expenditure 1.29 [1.14, 1.45] 
Wainaina et al., 2014 Kenya Broiler chicken 180 PSM Crop income 1.31 [1.03, 1.58] 
 
Wang et al., 2014 Vietnam Various vegetables 107 PSM Household income 1.37 [1.06, 1.67] 
 
Warning and Key, 2002 Senegal Peanuts 26 Heckman Farming income 1.29 [1.00, 1.58] 
Winters et al., 2005 Indonesia Seed corn 300 Heckman Input use  
Labour use  
Farming income 
2.13 
1.15 
2.83 
[1.25, 3.01] 
[0.97, 1.33] 
[1.66, 4.01] 
 
1 Arrows reflect the causal logic as described in the study by the authors;  
2 The CI reported here differ from the CI reported in the meta-analysis (forest plots) because the CI is this table are symmetric around the RR, while the CI used in the meta-analysis are symmetric around ln(RR). The CI 
reported here equal [RR ± 1.96 se(RR)], while the CI reported in the meta-analysis equal [exp (ln(RR) ± 1.96 se(RR))]; 
3 CI interval calculated using [exp (ln(RR) ± 1.96 se(RR))] as CI would otherwise include negative RR values. 
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The contracts included credit, seeds, agrochemicals, extension, and input application. The 
sample compared 40 farmers contracting with state-owned enterprises and 34 farmers 
contracting with private firms to 50 non-contract farmers. The average age was 34 years and 
32 years for contracted and non-contracted farmers, respectively. Contract farmers cultivated 
1.05 ha, while non-contract farmers cultivated 1.12 ha.  
 
A sample of 585 rice farmers in Laos was studied by Setboonsang et al. (2008) of which 332 
farmers produced on contract. The contract was offered by a private firm through a farmers’ 
cooperative and included seeds, agrochemicals and extension services. Contract farmers 
planted 1.11 ha of land, while conventional farmers used 1.43 ha.  
 
Simmonds et al. (2005) covered three empirical instances in Indonesia of which one is also 
covered by Winters et al. (2005) and will be described separately. The first empirical instance 
covers 300 seed rice farmers of which 150 were under contract. The related contract includes 
seeds and extension, with remaining services being unclear, and is offered by a state-owned 
enterprise. 
 
The average age in both groups is 48 years, and the average duration of schooling was six 
years. Contracted farmers owned 0.5 ha of land while non-contracted farmers owned 0.7 ha. 
The second instance covers 200 broiler producers. The 80 contracted farmers received credit, 
breeds, agrochemicals, extension and veterinary services. Their average age was 38 years, 
they had 12 years of education and owned 0.6 ha of land. The non-contract farmers owned 
0.4 ha, were 43 years old and went to school for five years.  
 
The study conducted by Sokchea and Culas (2015) has a sample of 75 rice farmers in 
Cambodia. A farmer cooperative contracts 39 of these farmers providing credit through 
collection savings, extension, transportation cost, packaging and annual dividends of the 
cooperative and the credit program.  Contract farmers had an average age of 47 years and 
cultivated on average 2.4 ha of land. In contrast, non-contract farmers were 56 years old on 
average and cultivated 2.8 ha of land.  
 
Trifković (2014) considered 191 catfish farmers in Vietnam. Here, private firms offered an 
outgrower contract providing fingerlings, fry, feed, and medicines to 17 percent of the 88 
contract farmers or a simple marketing contract without further services to the other 83 
percent.  
 
Wainaina et al.’s study (2014) used a sample of 180 poultry growers in Kenya. Of these 
households, 69 were contracted. However, the contracts were offered by several firms, and no 
further information is given on the services provided by these contracts. In both groups, the 
average age was 47 years. Contract farmers had 13 years of education on average and owned 
0.5 ha of land. Non-contract farmers, on the other hand, had 12 years of education and 
worked on 0.4 ha of land.  
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The sample used by Wang et al. (2014) included 41 farmers from Vietnam that supplied ‘safe’ 
vegetables to private firms through farmer cooperatives, but no additional services were 
provided. The total sample contained 107 observations. On average, farmers selling through 
contracts were 32 years of age, had eight years of education and owned 0.2 ha of land. 
Farmers selling to spot markets were 36 years old on average, had eight years of education 
and owned 0.26 ha. 
 
The study published by Warning and Key (2002) had a small sample of 26 peanut farmers in 
Senegal. Of these, 15 were contracted by an investor-owned firm, in which the government 
owns shares. The contract included seeds, agrochemicals, and extension and collection 
services. Non-contract household heads were 52 years and owned 9.1 ha, while contract 
suppliers were 48 years of age and owned 9.4 ha, on average.  
 
Winters et al. (2005) used a sample of 189 farmers in Indonesia producing seed corn. Half of 
them produced under contract. It included credit for land preparation, seeds, agrochemicals, 
extension, and risk insurance in the form of acceptance of all production regardless of 
quality. On average the farmers in the sample were 51 years old, had seven years of education 
and owned a total of 0.66 ha of land. This is a sentence with normal text style. 
Excluded studies 
Most studies in the core set did not meet the criteria for relevance and rigour defined at 
protocol stage and had to be excluded from the synthesis. A full list of these 50 excluded 
studies along with the reason for their exclusion is provided in Appendix 9.2.  
Seven studies reported outcomes that did not comply with the inclusion criteria of relevance 
specified in the protocol, that is, to have as outcome variables income or food security. Jabbar 
and Akter (2013) used contract farming as a control variable in a study of technical efficiency 
in poultry farming; Lee et al. (2014) did the same in a study of oil palm production in 
Indonesia; Bamiro et al. (2009) compared full with partial and non-integrated poultry 
systems, but did not specifically mention contracts nor control for self-selection; Rana et al. 
(2014) provided descriptive information on potato farming in India, including contract 
uptake. Birthal et al. (2009) assessed contract farming in the Indian dairy sector. The authors 
estimate net revenues per litre, but did not report effects on income. Cai et al. (2008) studied 
rice farmers in Cambodia but did not report income or food security outcomes. The study 
assessed the effect of contract farming on yields only. Roy and Thorat (2008) consider 
contracts of Indian grape producers with a cooperative association. They use two interaction 
terms in the regression that make it impossible to interpret the income effects.  
 
One study was excluded because it did not consider a contract that provided additional 
services to the farmers. Michelson (2010, 2013) estimated income effects of supplying to 
supermarkets but with a contractual arrangement in which no additional services were 
provided. 
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Most excluded studies had an inadequate counterfactual design, which meant they either had 
no comparison group or relied on simple comparative statistics such as t-tests, which did not 
control for self-selection bias. Freguin-Gresh et al. (2012) used an appropriate counterfactual 
method but relied on instruments that were deemed too weak and whose choice was not 
motivated in the paper. Moreover, average farm size of contracted farmers in this study was 
around 50 hectares, which was deemed too large to be considered smallholder farming.  
 
Finally, one study (Barrett et al., 2012) was excluded as it summarised results from  other 
studies that were already included in the review.  
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Table 2: Risk of bias assessment 
 
Short Title 
Mechanis
m of 
assignme
nt bias 
Group 
equivalenc
e bias 
Motivat
ion bias 
Spill-over 
effect bias 
Selective 
outcome  
reporting bias 
Selective 
analysis  
reporting bias 
Other 
sources 
of bias 
Awotide et al., 
2015 Unclear Unclear 
Low Unclear High Low Low 
Bellemare, 
2012 Unclear Low 
Low Unclear Low Low Low 
Bellemare & 
Novak, 2016 Unclear Unclear 
Low Unclear Unclear Low Low 
Bolwig et al., 
2009 
High High Low Unclear Low Unclear Low 
Briones, 2014 High Low Low Unclear Low Unclear High 
Cahyadi and 
Waibel, 2011 
High High Low Unclear Low Unclear Unclear 
Escobal and 
Cavero, 2012 
High High Low Unclear High Low Low 
Girma and 
Gardebroek, 
2015 
Unclear 
High Low 
Unclear Unclear 
Low Low 
Ito et al.,2012 Unclear Low Low Unclear High Low Low 
Jones and 
Gibbon, 2011 Unclear Unclear 
Low Unclear High Low Unclear 
Maertens and 
Swinnen, 
2009 
Unclear High 
Low 
Unclear 
Low 
High Low 
Miyata et 
al.,2009 Unclear Low High Unclear 
Low Low Unclear 
Munungo, 
2010 High High 
Low Unclear Low Unclear High 
Narayanan, 
2014 Unclear Unclear 
Low Unclear Low Unclear Low 
Ramaswami, 
2009 Unclear 
High Low Unclear Low Low Unclear 
Rao and Qaim, 
2011 High 
High Low Unclear High Low Low 
Saigenji, 2012 Unclear Unclear Low Unclear High Low Unclear 
Setboonsarng 
et al., 2008 
High Unclear Low Unclear Low Low Unclear 
Simmons et 
al., 2005 
High High Low Unclear High Low Unclear 
Sokchea and 
Culas, 2015 
High High Low Unclear High High Unclear 
Trifković, 2014 Unclear High Low Unclear Low Low Low 
Wainaina et 
al., 2014 Unclear Low 
Low Unclear Low Low Unclear 
Wang et al., 
2014 Unclear Unclear 
Low Unclear Low Low Low 
Warning and 
Key, 2002 
High High Low Unclear High Low Low 
Winters et al., 
2005 
High Unclear Low Unclear Low Low Low 
 
Notes: ‘Low’ refers to low risk of bias in the relevant domain; ‘high’ refers to high risk of bias; ‘unclear’ means that 
information was not reported in order to assess bias.  
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Risk of bias in effect estimates 
Although the studies differed considerably regarding context and contractual arrangements, 
they all faced similar challenges when attempting to identify the impact of contract farming. 
The validity of the approach to deal with these challenges – with respect to data quality, the 
way the assessment was conducted, and the analyses and outcomes reported – determined 
the risk of bias.  
 
The 3ie Risk of Bias tool (Hombrados and Waddington, 2012) consists of eight evaluation 
criteria, each focusing on a different type of threat to validity. It assesses whether: 
• the mechanism of assignment was able to control for confounding.  
• the method of analysis was executed in such a way that it ensured comparability of 
groups throughout the study and prevented confounding. 
• the method of being observed did not cause observation bias. 
• the study design adequately controlled or corrected for performance bias, such as bias 
caused by spill-overs. 
• there was no evidence of outcomes being selectively reported. 
• authors used common methods of estimation and there was no evidence of biased 
exploratory research methods. 
• there was no evidence of other sources of bias, such as bias in the sample of 
observations selected into the study; concerns about coherence of results; data on the 
baseline collected retrospectively; information was collected using an inappropriate 
instrument (or a different instrument/at different time/after different follow-up period 
in the comparison and treatment groups). 
• the statistical significance of the effect was calculated correctly and appropriate 
statistical tests were used to check the appropriateness of the model. 
Each criterion was scored “low risk of bias” if no such bias appeared present, “UNCLEAR” if 
the study provided insufficient details to assess whether or not the bias was present, and 
“high risk of bias” if coders determined that there was evidence of bias. The tool contains 
detailed descriptions of how to attribute a score to each criterion specified per type of study 
design, described in the coding tool published in the protocol (Ton et al., 2015). 
 
The results of the risk of bias assessments are shown in Table 2. Five sources of bias were 
found to be particularly important: mechanism of assignment, group equivalence, spillover 
effects, selective outcome reporting, and other biases arising from sample selection into the 
study. These sources of bias are discussed in detail in the sections below. The other sources of 
bias were less important, and will not be discussed in depth. Motivation bias, which evaluates 
whether households change their behaviour (or answers to survey questions) because they 
participate in the study, was not mentioned in any of the studies, but are considered less 
important sources of bias in retrospective studies. Selective analysis reporting was 
determined to be not a major concern, nor statistical conclusion validity, except for three 
studies In two studies the results reported by the authors did not match with the data 
provided in the tables (Briones, 2014; Munungo, 2010). Data quality and the coherence of the 
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results, were considered as being unclear in another case (Cahyadi & Waibel, 2011). However, 
we marked several of the studies as unclear, due to the fact that these studies collected data 
only after several years, while the studies mention drop-out dynamics in previous years.  
Synthesis of results 
Risk of bias due to mechanism of assignment and group equivalence 
The risk of bias assessment evaluated the reliability of the statistical methods used to identify 
the causal impact of contract farming on income. As explained in 3.1.5., the decision to 
participate in contract farming is non-random, which creates a bias. Three different 
statistical methods were used to address this selection bias: Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) (8 studies), Instrumental Variables (IV)/Heckman (12 studies) or endogenous 
switching regression models (3 models).
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Table 3: Details of risk assessment of 'selection mechanism' and 'group equivalence' for PSM studies 
 
    
Awotide 
et al. 
2015 
Bellemare 
& Novak 
(2016) 
Ito et 
al.2012 
Setboons
arng et al. 
2008 
Maertens 
& 
Swinnen 
2009 
Munungo 
2010 
Saigeni 
ji2012 
Wainaina 
2014 
Wang et 
al. 
2014 
Mechanism of 
assignment 
bias 
Authors match on all 
relevant characteristics  No No No No No No No No No 
Group 
equivalence 
bias 
Match on most relevant 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Matching is based on baseline data No No Yes No Yes No No No No 
 
Matching based on 
time-invariant 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
  Rosenbaum bounds reported 
No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
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PSM is a non-parametric approach which assumes that all household characteristics 
determining participation in contract farming are observable. Hence, conditional on these 
selection variables, differences regarding the income level between the matched comparison 
and treatment groups are assumed to occur randomly and can be attributed to the treatment. 
Several matching procedures exist, and most studies reported results for both nearest 
neighbour matching and/or Kernel matching. 
 
Ideally, matching relies on baseline data, that is, before the availability of contract farming in 
the region. None of the studies, however, collected baseline data. Miet Maertens and Swinnen 
(2009) and Ito, Bao, and Su (2012) used recall of baseline conditions to match treatment and 
control groups. Most PSM studies matched contracted and non-contracted farmers based on 
current household characteristics and considered these time-invariant or unlikely to be 
affected by participation in contract farming, such as total landholdings, household size and 
age of the head of the household. Bellemare and Novak (2016) used the results of the 
willingness to pay questions as controls in their regressions. Except the study of 
Sethboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan (2008), which did not sufficiently discuss the first stage of 
the matching procedure, the risk of bias assessment concludes that all PSM studies used 
relevant and time-invariant variables to match the households (Table 3).  
 
Because propensity score matching relies solely on observable characteristics, the estimates 
could still be biased if unobservable variables simultaneously determine participation in 
contract farming and income. To assess the sensitivity of the estimated impact to selection on 
unobservables, Rosenbaum bounds can be calculated (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Although 
Rosenbaum bounds can provide evidence that the impact of contract farming is significantly 
positive (or negative), the estimate of the effect size will still be biased if unobservables play a 
role in the selection equation. As such, the risk of bias is considered to be relatively high for 
all PSM studies. 
 
Moreover, out of the seven PSM studies, only three studies reported (a variant of) 
Rosenbaum bounds. Most PSM studies were scored as medium or high risk of bias on the 
criterion on ‘group equivalence’, depending on whether the studies matched on time-
invariant variables and reported Rosenbaum bounds (see Table 3 for details). 
 
Four studies used an IV approach and eight studies used a Heckman selection model. Both 
approaches require an instrument that is correlated with the choice that farmers have to 
participate in contract farming, but which is uncorrelated with the error term in the 
regression with income as the independent variable. The quest for such an instrument is 
challenging. One instrument that was frequently used was distance of the household to a 
relevant location, such as the village leader (Miyata, Minot, & Hu, 2009), the rural bank (P. S. 
Birthal, Jha, Tiongco, & Narrod, 2009) or the forest (Girma & Gardebroek, 2015). Other 
instruments included the social position of the household (Girma & Gardebroek, 2015), the 
number of formal credit institutions in the village (Escobal & Cavero, 2012) or eligibility for 
contract farming (Jones & Gibbon, 2011). 
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Two studies used more original instruments: a contingent valuation experiment (Bellemare, 
2012; Bellemare & Novak, 2017) and a proxy for honesty (Warning & Key, 2002). The 
instruments in five studies were classified as having a medium risk of being exogenous, 
whereas the instruments in seven studies were considered to have a high risk of bias. 
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Table 4: Details of risk assessment of 'selection mechanism' and 'group equivalence' for IV/Heckman studies 
 
  
Bellema
re 
(2012) 
Bolwig 
et al. 
(2008) 
Briones 
(2014) 
Cahyadi 
et al. 
(2011) 
Girma 
& 
Gardeb
roek 
(2015) 
Jones & 
Gibbon 
(2011) 
Miyata 
et al. 
(2009) 
Ramas
wami 
(2009) 
Simmo
ns et al. 
(2005) 
Sokche
a & 
Culas 
(2015) 
Trifkovi
c (2014) 
Warnin
g & Key 
(2002) 
Winters  
et al. 
(2005) 
  IV Heckman IV 
Heckm
an IV IV 
Heckm
an IV IV 
Heckm
an 
Heckm
an 
Heckm
an 
Heckm
an 
Mechanism 
of 
assignment 
bias 
Instrument is 
credible Unclear No No No Unclear Unclear Unclear No No No Unclear No No 
Group 
equivalence 
bias 
Instrumenting 
equation is 
significant 
F>10, 
R² is reported 
and assessed 
Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No No No 
 
Instruments 
significant at 
1% 
Yes No Yes No No Unclear Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
 
Hausman test 
for exogenety is 
reported (and 
significant at 
5%) 
No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
 
Heckman: 
mill's ratio 
reported and 
significant at 
5% 
Not 
relevant No 
Not 
relevant No 
Not 
relevant 
Not 
relevant No 
Not 
relevant 
Not 
relevant No No No Yes 
  
Two 
instruments: 
over-identifying 
restrictions are 
reported 
No No Not relevant No No Yes 
Not 
relevant Yes No No No No No 
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For IV or Heckman studies, the score on ‘group equivalence’ consisted of four elements 
(Table 4). Studies had to demonstrate that the correlation between the instrument and 
participation in contract farming was sufficiently strong for correct identification. It appeared 
that the correlation between the instrument and participation was weak (p>0.01) in some 
studies (e.g. Girma and Gardebroek [2015]), or that the Mill’s ratio in the Heckman model 
was not significant at the 5% level (e.g. Bolwig et al. [2009]). When more than one 
instrument was used, the Hansen J-test was used to assess whether the over-identifying 
restrictions should be reported, which would support the validity of the instruments (Jones & 
Gibbon, 2011). Unfortunately, this test was not consistently reported by all the studies that 
used more than one instrument. Depending on these three criteria, IV and Heckman studies 
scored low, medium or high risk of bias on ‘group equivalence’. 
 
Closely related to instrumental variable approaches are endogenous switching regression 
models, which were used in three studies. As with instrumental variable techniques, 
switching regression models require an instrument that explains participation in the program 
for proper identification. In contrast to PSM, the endogenous switching regression models do 
not assume that both regimes (spot market or contract farming) have a similar production 
function. Instead, they verify empirically whether the marginal return on observable 
characteristics differs between the regimes. This approach requires a larger sample size, as it 
needs more parameters to accurately estimate the impact of contract farming. Also, the 
estimate of effect sizes is more sensitive to specification errors. Out of the three endogenous 
switching regression models, two were considered to have a medium risk of bias because 
their instruments were found not strong enough (Narayanan, 2014; Rao & Qaim, 2011), 
whereas the instruments in the Escobal and Cavero (2012) study were considered to have a 
high risk of bias on ‘mechanism of assignment’. With regards to ‘group equivalence’, the same 
criteria were used as for IV studies. 
 
Table 5: Details of risk assessment of 'selection mechanism' and 'group 
equivalence' for endogenous switching regression models 
    
Escobal & 
Cavero (2012) 
Narayanan 
(2014) 
Rao & Qaim 
(2011) 
Mechanism of 
assignment Instrument is credible  No Unclear Unclear 
Group 
equivalence 
Instrumenting equation is significant 
F>10, R² is reported and assessed No No No 
  Instruments in selection equation are significant at 1% Yes No No 
Risk of bas due to spillovers and dynamics  
Self-selection of farmers in a contractual arrangement is arguably the most important 
challenge in identifying the causal impact of contract farming in cross-sectional observational 
studies. Two other issues which complicate causal identification nevertheless deserve a brief 
discussion: spillovers and impact dynamics. 
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Spillovers challenge causal identification. They arise if participation in contract farming by 
some farmers has a direct or indirect effect on the income of farmers who do not participate 
in contract farming. An example is spillovers through labour markets. If contract farming 
increases demand for labour or increases wages in the region, this may increase income for 
farmers who do not participate in contract farming but do engage in off-farm labour. Because 
this will increase the income of the farmers in the control group, the impact of contract 
farming will be underestimated. This is called the ‘contamination effect’. Similar spillovers 
may arise through product markets (increased output of contracted farmers reduces local 
prices), input markets (side-selling of inputs provided by the firm to contracted farmers) and 
credit markets (better access to credit for all farmers in villages with contract farming). 
 
Another spillover effect found in the literature on technology adoption is a learning effect: 
farmers in the control group may also adopt the technologies offered under the contract (De 
Janvry, Dustan, & Sadoulet, 2010). Learning and technology adoption are often an integral 
part of contract farming. An intriguing example is provided by Christin Schipmann and Qaim 
(2010) – not included in the meta-analysis – who show that contract farming introduced a 
new crop, sweet pepper, in local agricultural markets in Thailand. Initially, this new crop was 
only cultivated by contracted farmers and not sold on local markets. Over time, however, 
many farmers adopted the new crop and started selling it in local markets. Although the 
authors did not find a direct positive effect of contract farming on income, they argued that 
the innovation by the contracting firms improve income for farmers who adopted the new 
crop and sold it on spot markets. 
 
None of the studies included in the meta-analyses explicitly addressed spillovers or 
contamination of the control group. However, as most studies sampled the control group 
from the same village as the treatment group, contamination can be a concern. For this 
reason, we scored bias due to spillovers as ‘unclear’ in the risk of bias assessment. Arguably, 
spillovers are less of an issue for impact evaluations of contract farming than for many other 
impact evaluations, because in most regions only a minority of the farmers participates in 
contract farming, which limits general equilibrium effects.  
 
The impact of contract farming is not static, but likely to evolve over time. For instance, the 
impact on income may increase over time as farmers and the firm learn and optimise 
production processes. These dynamic spillovers were not addressed by any of the studies. 
Assessing such dynamic effects would require panel or repeated cross-sectional data, whereas 
all selected studies used cross-sectional data.  
Risk of bias due to selective reporting 
Studies were considered guilty of selective outcome reporting when the authors did have data 
on a (more) relevant outcome variable but chose to base their main analysis on another 
outcome variable. An example of this was the study of Warning and Key (2002), who used 
agricultural income in their main analysis because households’ income proved not to be 
significantly different between the groups. Bellemare and Novak (2016) measured the 
 
 
57    The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
duration of the hungry season, but in their conclusions emphasize the higher effect-size of a 
derived outcome, ‘the likelihood that the hungry season ends’. Another form of selective 
reporting was merging data. For example, Miyata et al. (2009) in their paper on contract 
farming in apples and green onions, report descriptive statistics separately for each crop. 
These statistics show clear differences between both groups. However, in the main analysis, 
both crops are grouped together, such that these differences are no longer visible. Both 
forms of selective reporting may be considered as a kind of publication bias, with authors 
reporting only those outcomes which show a significant effect, as insignificant results are 
unlikely to be published. 
Other sources of bias  
Most studies took place some years after the contractual arrangement had been in place. The 
surveys use different methods to resolve this selection bias. However, there is a risk of bias to 
the treatment estimates of a contract farming arrangement because some farmers could have 
stopped the arrangement in these early years, for example, due to low income effects. These 
drop-out dynamics can only be measured and controlled for unambiguously with baseline 
sampling. Several studies mentioned drop-out dynamics in the years before the research took 
place (Jones & Gibbon, 2011; Miyata et al., 2009; Ramaswami, Singh Birthal, & Joshi, 2009; 
Saigenji, 2012; Sethboonsarng et al., 2008; Simmons, Winters, & Patrick, 2005; Sokchea & 
Culas, 2015; Wainaina, Okello, & Nzuma, 2014). We consider endogenous switching and 
Heckman models as being relatively unaffected by this bias. The other methods use an 
arithmetic comparison between the outcomes of (matched) participants and non-
participants, and, without baseline or follow-up measurements, are vulnerable for the bias of 
the treatment estimates. 
External validity of net-effect estimate  
In this section, we examine whether the results of the studies included in the systematic 
review can be expected to hold for the wider population from which these studies took their 
samples. This relates to the ‘external validity’ of the net-effect estimate of inferences made 
‘within’ each study. 
 
External validity depends on the sampling design adopted in the studies as well as how 
representative the sampled farmers are for the ‘average’ small-holder farmer. With regards to 
sampling design, most studies attempted to select households as randomly as possible. Out of 
the 22 studies, three did not select households randomly, and sampling design was not 
clearly discussed in another four studies (Table 6).  
 
The remaining 15 studies adopted two distinct sampling strategies. A first strategy consisted 
of randomly drawing households from a complete list of contracted farmers provided by the 
contracting firm. Non-contracted farmers were subsequently randomly drawn from a 
complete list of households living nearby or in the same villages as the sampled contracted 
farmers. This list was often provided by village heads. In some cases, the control group was 
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randomly selected from a list of households that grew the same crop as the contracted 
farmers. If a list of contracted farmers was available, this approach was straightforward, cost-
effective, and ensured that contracted farmers were indeed randomly sampled.  
 
When researchers did not have access to a complete list of contracted farmers, a different 
strategy was used. Regions where contract farming was common were purposively selected 
(based on qualitative information or on an agricultural census). Within these regions, villages 
were randomly selected and all households were listed and stratified according to 
participation in contract farming. From this list, contract and non-contracted farmers were 
randomly selected. In theory, this sampling approach does not exclude that farmers contract 
to different firms with different ‘treatments’, that is, different service packages provided by 
each firm as part of the contractual arrangement. 
 
Table 6: Sampling strategy used in the studies 
Author Year Country Sampling 
 design 
Remarks 
Awotide et al. 2015 Nigeria Sampling villages Purposive sampling of regions with 
high density of contract farming 
Bellemare 
Bellemare & 
Novak 
2012  Madagascar Complete list Purposive sampling of regions with 
high density of contract farming 2016 
Bolwig et al. 2008 Uganda Complete list 
 
Cahyadi & Waibel 2011 Indonesia Sampling villages 
 
Escobal & Cavero 2012 Peru Unclear Discussed the representativeness of 
household in sample (compared to 
the census) 
Girma & 
Gardebroek 
2015 Ethiopia Sampling villages 
 
Ito et al. 2012 China Complete list Purposive sampling of regions with 
high density of contract farming 
Jones & Gibbon 2011 Uganda Complete list 
 
Maertens & 
Swinnen 
2009 Senegal Unclear Estimation of total contracted 
farmers, and unclear selection of 
households within 25 randomly 
selected villages 
Miyata et al. 2009 China Complete list of 4 
contract firms 
 
Narayanan 2014 India Combination of 
complete list and 
sampling villages 
 
Ramaswami 2009 India Sampling villages 
 
Rao & Qaim 2011 Kenya Complete list 
 
Saigenji 2012 Vietnam Complete list 
 
Setboornsang et 
al. 
2008 Laos Unclear List available, but unclear if randomly 
selected 
Simmons et al. 2005 Indonesia Sampling villages 
 
Sokchea & Culas 2015 Cambodia No random sampling 
 
Trifkovic 2014 Vietnam No random sampling 
 
Wainaina et al. 2014 Kenya Complete list 
 
Wanget et al. 2014 Vietnam Unclear Sampling strategy not clearly 
discussed, farmers partly selected by 
cooperative leaders 
Warning & Key 2002 Senegal No random sampling Data from a study about impact of a 
credit allocation program 
Winters et al. 2005 Indonesia Sampling villages   
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In sum, all studies attempted to select contracted and non-contracted farmers randomly - 
although this at times required some creative thinking. However, all were selected from 
certain geographical locations in a country that are not necessarily representative for the 
whole country. Most likely, contractual arrangements were set up in regions which benefitted 
from external factors such as relatively good access to infrastructure or nearby processing 
facilities. Hence, one cannot conclude that contract farming will work in every region in these 
countries. Most studies provided relatively little quantitative information to assess such 
external factors, which makes it challenging to determine the external validity of the findings. 
Risk of bias in research synthesis 
Construct validity 
We already discussed extensively the heterogeneity of arrangements grouped under the 
construct ‘contract farming’. We have argued, already at the protocol stage of this review, that 
the meta-analyses on a widely heterogeneous sample of empirical instances of contract 
farming will have important construct validity threats. Therefore, in the forest plots and 
tables, we also provide information about the type of production and location of each 
empirical instance in order to facilitate interpretation and reduce the chances for 
misinterpretation of our findings. There are important construct validity threats to the 
results of the meta-analysis of contract farming, even when these are grouped in ‘similar 
types of studies’ to compute pooled average of effect-sizes. For example, when we group cases 
as being ‘animal production’, this may hide the fact that most of these are related to broiler 
chicken production, and that we did not include dairy production, which is, probably the 
most direct association that lay persons make with ‘animal production'.  
 
We show that authors use different proxy-indicators to measure effects on income. For 
example, authors used crop income, farming income, or household income (see Table 1). We 
analyse these moderators and show that they affect the pooled average income effect estimate. 
 
The same indicators may also be used to compute different effect-sizes. For example, to 
assess impact on food security, Bellemare and Novak (2016) measure the ‘length of the 
hungry season’, but also use the indicator to compute ‘the likelihood that a household's 
hungry season will end at any given time’, which illustrates the challenge to find 
unambiguous indicators for food security effects in future systematic reviews. Several other 
studies that study impacts on food security of production for supermarkets (Chege, 
Andersson, & Qaim, 2015) use 7-days food consumption recall. Masset et al. (2011) proposes 
the use of anthropometric measures to identify food security outcomes.  
Publication bias 
Scientific articles are more likely to be written and published when they find a significant 
effect of the program being evaluated (Ioannidis, 2005; Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007). This 
publication bias is apparent in the studies that we selected for meta-analysis, as only three of 
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the 22 studies report insignificant or negative income effects of contract farming (Cahyadi & 
Waibel, 2011; Narayanan, 2014; Simmons et al., 2005). Notably, two of these three evaluated 
more than one empirical instance of contract farming in their paper, and report a positive 
effect in most of these other instances. This implies that the academic literature is biased 
towards studies that find significant effects. The pooled average effect sizes that result from 
the meta-analysis will inevitably over-estimate the ‘true’ effect of contract farming on income 
because (many) studies with insignificant effects could not be included in the meta-analysis.  
 
Furthermore, publication bias was assessed formally using funnel plots and Egger’s statistical 
test (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997). A funnel plot is a graph that shows the effect 
size (horizontal axis) against the precision of the study (vertical axis). In the absence of 
publication bias, the effect size of the different studies should be distributed symmetrically 
around the average effect size (the vertical line in the middle). Logically, the effect size of 
studies with low precision (plotted at the bottom of the graph) will on average deviate more 
from the pooled effect size than the effect size of studies with a high precision (plotted at the 
top of the graph), creating a funnel-shaped distribution. An asymmetric funnel plot suggests 
publication bias.  
 
The funnel plot of the studies that measured income effects suggests substantial publication 
bias (Figure 5). The plot is clearly not symmetrical around the pooled effect estimate. Most 
studies are outside the 95 percent confidence interval (95%CI) that shows the expected 
distribution of effect sizes. This asymmetry indicates that there was a strong publication bias, 
which was confirmed by Egger’s test (Table 7). The correlation between effect size and 
standard error was positive and significant at the 10 percent level, which is considerable 
given the small sample size (n=26).  
 
Table 7: Meta-regression: examining publication bias based on Egger’s test 
  
(1) 
Egger’s test on 
all empirical instances 
(2) 
Egger’s test using a synthetic 
effect for Narayanan’s instances 
Log standard error 1.336* 2.414*** 
 (1.81) (4.80) 
Constant 0.257 0.0603 
 (1.51) (0.81) 
Observations 26 23 
R-squared adjusted 24.15% 65.74% 
F-statistic 3.274 23.05 
tau-squared 0.148 0.0137 
I-squared 75.9% 41.9% 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 5: Funnel plot 
 
 
The funnel plot shows a highly imprecise estimated effect size reported by Narayanan (2014) 
for contract farming of gherkins (the dot at the bottom) and the extremely high effect size for 
broiler chickens (the dot at the right-hand side of the funnel plot). To test the sensitivity of 
the result to this single observation, we replaced the four effect sizes reported by Narayanan 
(2014) by its average synthetic effect size and redrew the funnel plot (Figure 6) and re-
conducted the meta-regression (Table 7). This confirms that publication bias due to small 
study effects is a concern. It also provides evidence for the importance of appropriate analysis 
of dependency, since the funnel plot is even more asymmetrical and the correlation between 
effect size and its standard error is highly significant (p<0.01). 
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Figure 6: Funnel plot: replacing four effect sizes by its synthetic effect size 
 
 
To assess the sensitivity of the results to publication bias, we conducted trim-and-fill analysis 
(Duval & Tweedie, 2000) on the data used for the funnel plot with the synthetic effect for 
Narayanan (2014). This method exploits the fact that, without publication bias, a funnel plot 
can be expected to be symmetrical and also include the less favourable results (in our case 
these are the observations on the left-hand side of the funnel plot). To mimic this, the trim-
and-fill exercise imputes missing studies to the funnel plot to achieve this symmetry. The 
pooled effect size is subsequently re-estimated including these non-existent studies. The 
trim-and-fill analyses added seven non-existent studies to the funnel plot (Figure 7) and 
estimates the pooled effect estimate at 1.38 (95%CI=1.23, 1.55). This is less than the pooled 
effect estimate without trim-and-fill error correction (RR=1.53; 95%CI=1.35, 1.74), reported 
below. In other words, the positive impact of contract farming on income decreased but 
remained significant once missing small studies are imputed using trim-and-fill methods. 
However, some caution is warranted when interpreting these results. The validity of trim-
and-fill methods is questionable if there is substantial between-study heterogeneity (Peters, 
Sutton, Jones, Abrams, & Rushton, 2007). This is clearly the case in our meta-analysis of 
contract farming, which varies in crop type or services provided.  
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Figure 7: Funnel plot of a trim-and-fill analysis 
 
Survivor bias 
In addition to publication bias, the meta-analysis is affected by survivor bias, which causes an 
overestimation of the pooled average effectiveness of contract farming. All studies used cross-
sectional surveys to assess effectiveness after the contract farming arrangement had been in 
place for several years (see Table 8). Therefore, logically, all the empirical instances of 
contract farming covered by the studies needed to be operational at the time of the research. 
This implies that per definition the meta-analysis did not include studies on contract farming 
arrangements that had ceased. All studies covered empirical instances that already managed 
to survive the initial tensions between firm and farmers about prices, services and quality 
requirements, which are mentioned in the professional literature as being important 
challenges to contract farming (ActionAid, 2015; Barrett et al., 2012; Bijman, 2008; Da Silva 
& Rankin, 2013; Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; FAO, 2008; Narayanan, 2013; Oya, 2012; Prowse, 
2012; Ton & Mheen-Sluijer, 2009; Will, 2013; Williamson, 2003). Because failed attempts to 
establish a functional contractual relationship could not be studied with a cross-sectional 
design, their results could not be included in the meta-analysis. Therefore, the pooled 
average effect size is an upward-biased estimate of the effectiveness of contract farming. 
However, the response rates may well be indicative for the effect size that is required for 
contract farming arrangements to be maintained over time. 
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Table 8: Timing of impact evaluation and start of contract farming 
 
Author Country Product Start of the 
contractual 
arrangement 
Year of data 
collection 
Awotide et al., 2015 Nigeria Rice No unique contractual 
arrangement 
2013 
Bellemare, 2012; 
Bellemare and Novak, 
2016 
Madagascar Green beans, leek, 
snow peas, rice, 
barley 
No unique contractual 
arrangement. The main 
company operates since 
the early 1990s 
2008 
Bolwig et al., 2009 Uganda Coffee 2000 2005 
Cahyadi and Waibel, 2011 Indonesia Oil palm 1989-1994 and  
1995-2000. 
2010 
Escobal and Cavero, 2012 Peru Potato 2000 2002/2003 
Girma and Gardebroek, 
2015 
Ethiopia Honey 2007 2009 
Ito et al.,2012 China Watermelon 2000 2009 
Jones and Gibbon, 2011 Uganda Cocoa 2001/2002 2005 & 2009 
Maertens and Swinnen, 
2009 
Senegal French beans No unique contractual 
arrangement. 
2005 
Miyata et al.,2009 China Apples, green 
onions 
No details 2005 
Narayanan, 2014 India Marigold, papaya, 
broiler, gherkins 
No details 2009/2010 
Ramaswami, 2009 India Broiler No details 2002/2003 
Rao and Qaim, 2011 Kenya Various vegetables No unique contractual 
arrangement 
2008 
Saigenji, 2012 Vietnam Tea 1950s 2007 
Setboonsarng et al., 2008 Laos Rice 2002 2004 
Simmons et al., 2005 Indonesia Seed rice 1988 2002 
Simmons et al., 2005 Indonesia Broiler 1998 2002 
Sokchea and Culas, 2015 Cambodia Rice 2003 2010 
Trifković, 2014 Vietnam Catfish No unique contractual 
arrangement 
2010 
Wainaina et al., 2014 Kenya Broiler No details 2010/2011 
Wang et al., 2014 Vietnam Various vegetables Multiple firms involved, 
since 1995 
2007/2008 
Warning and Key, 2002 Senegal Peanuts 1990 1992 & 1994 
Winters et al., 2005 Indonesia Seed corn 1986 2002 
 
Synthesis of effects 
This section reports the results of the sensitivity, moderator and meta-regressions that tested 
the impact of contract farming on the well-being of small-scale farmers. First, we present the 
pooled effect estimate of all studies included in the meta-analysis. In the meta-analysis, we 
used all studies with a proper design to resolve selection bias. The risk of bias analysis showed 
that all income effect estimates reported in the studies had threats to validity. Being all cross-
sectional studies, no study could be classified as being with low level of bias.  
 
We already pointed to the substantial heterogeneity across studies. To control for this observed 
heterogeneity, we conducted a sensitivity and moderator analysis. Sensitivity analysis examines 
whether the design of the study, including the estimation strategy and the reported outcome, 
explain the heterogeneity across studies. Moderator analysis tests whether crop or contract 
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characteristics explain the between-study heterogeneity. Finally, the robustness of the bivariate 
sensitivity and moderator analysis was examined using meta-regressions. 
Overall results 
In Figure 3, we present the intervention logic of the development effect of contract farming. 
We depict as immediate outcomes the farmer’s and firms’ incentive to continue the 
contractual arrangement. Intermediate outcomes are the effects of the contract farming 
arrangement on production. The ultimate outcomes relate to income and food security.   
 
Figure 8: Forest plot of the effect of contract farming on yields 
Intermediate outcomes 
From several studies, we could distill net-effect estimates of the intermediate outcomes (see 
Table 1). Because we only include intermediate outcomes reported in studies that also report 
ultimate outcomes, and the constructs used to measure these intermediate outcomes differ 
importantly between studies, reporting pooled average effect sizes is not appropriate.  Some 
studies estimated yield effects of contract farming (see Figure 8). Awotide et al. (2015) found 
a yield effect of 55% for traditional rice. Setboonsarng et al. (2008) report a 26% yield 
increase for organic rice. Bolwig et al. found a 30% increase in coffee yields as a result of 
improved organic production practices. Jones and Gibbon (2011) found a yield effect of 25%. 
When the contracted crop is new, or a new variety, and only produced by the contract farmers, 
it is not possible to determine a yield effect. For example, some contract farming arrangements 
make it easier for farmers to use chemical inputs, such as fertiliser or pesticides, to grow special 
varieties. Winters et al. (2005) and Simmons et al. (2005) describe this mechanism for contract 
Jones and Gibbon, 2011
Setboonsarng et al., 2008
Bolwig et al., 2008
Awotide et al., 2015
Study
cocoa_uganda
rice_laos
coffee_uganda
rice_nigeria
Empirical_instance
1.25 (1.13, 1.39)
1.26 (1.07, 1.48)
1.30 (1.16, 1.46)
1.55 (1.30, 1.85)
ratio (95% CI)
Response
“Favours no-contract farmers” ”Favours contract farmers” 
1.5 2
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farming in seed corn production in Indonesia, where input use more than doubled as a result of 
contract farming and household labour use increased with 20%. 
 
Figure 9: Forest plot of the effect of contract farming on household labour 
 
The effects on household labour were also reported in the other contractual arrangements 
(see Figure 9) covered by Simmons et al. (2005). They found an increase in the use of 
household labour for seed rice production (RR=1.10) but a decrease of household labour use 
in broiler chicken production (RR=0.67). 
 
Jones and Gibbon (2011), for organic cocoa in Uganda, and Setboonsarng et al. (2008), for 
organic rice in Laos, estimated the net-effects on yields and prices separately, in order to 
analyse the main drivers of income effects. The reported price effects are 8% in organic cocoa 
and 18% in organic rice production. Girma and Gardeborek (2015) report a price increase of 
23% due to the contractual arrangement in organic honey production. Prices (and price 
premiums) are crucially important in all other contract farming arrangements. However, in 
most of the studies prices were considered as a (fixed) component of the treatment (service 
package) provided by the firm, not as an outcome of the treatment, which explains the 
narrow confidence interval in two of the studies. 
 
  
Simmons et al., 2005
Simmons et al., 2005
Winters et al., 2005
Study
broiler_indon
seedrice_indon
seedcorn_indon
Empirical_instance
0.67 (0.27, 1.70)
1.10 (0.98, 1.24)
1.15 (0.97, 1.36)
ratio (95% CI)
Response
“Favours no-contract farmers” ”Favours contract farmers” 
1.5 2 4
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Figure 10: Forest plot of the effect of contract farming on prices 
 
Ultimate outcomes 
The ultimate outcomes considered in this review are household income, livelihood strategies, 
market power and household food security. We retrieved no study that reported net-effects of 
contract farming on market power and livelihood strategies. Within the set of 25 studies, only 
one reported net-effects on household food security. Bellemare and Novak (2016) reported 
an average effect size of 8% reduction in the length of the hungry season (RR=0.92; CI=0.85-
1.00). In their conclusions, they also report ‘the likelihood that a household's hungry season 
will end at any given time’, with an effect size of 18% (RR=1.19; CI= 1.12-1.26).  
 
Twenty-two studies estimated income effects. The forest plot (Figure 11) shows the effect size 
of contract farming on income for each empirical instance. Effect sizes are reported in 
response ratios. Results from the meta-analysis indicate that in the 26 empirical instances 
covered by the 22 studies, contract farming increased income on average by 62% (RR=1.63, 
CI=1.41–1.89, I-squared=89.0%, tau-square=0.0978) 
 
  
Jones and Gibbon, 2011
Setboonsarng et al., 2008
Girma and Gardebroek, 2015
Study
cocoa_uganda
rice_laos
honey_ethiop
Empirical_instance
1.08 (1.04, 1.13)
1.18 (0.73, 1.91)
1.23 (1.20, 1.25)
ratio (95% CI)
Response
“Favours no-contract farmers” ”Favours contract farmers” 
1.5 2 4
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Figure 11: Forest plot of the effect of contract farming on income: all empirical 
instances 
 
 
The pooled average effect reported in Figure 11 is an overestimation due to the inclusion of 
four empirical instances of contract farming which used the same control group. In Figure 12, 
we present the forest plot that uses the synthetic effect for Narayanan (2014). The pooled 
average effect size of the meta-analysis is 1.53 (CI=1.35-1.74, I-squares=86.2, tau-
squared=0.065). 
 
Of the 26 empirical instances of contract farming covered by the studies, only two had a 
negative effect on income (see above), and even in those studies, the negative effect was not 
significantly different from zero. Five studies reported that contract farming more than 
doubled income. The largest effect was reported by Narayanan (2014), who found that 
contract farming increased income from broiler chicken more than 17-fold. The substantial 
heterogeneity between studies was confirmed by the low tau-squared and the large I-squared 
statistic. The I-squared statistic indicated that most of the variation (89.2% using all 
empirical instances; 86.2% using the synthetic effects for Narayanan) might be attributed to 
heterogeneity between studies rather than sampling variation within studies. The 
heterogeneity was (partly) due to differences in the contractual arrangements.  
Overall  (I-squared = 89.0%, p = 0.000)
Setboonsarng et al., 2008
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Warning and Key, 2002
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Figure 12: Forest plot of the effect of contract farming on income: synthetic 
effect for Narayanan, 2014 
 
 
In line with expectations, contract farming had a less pronounced effect when household 
income (RR=1.32, CI=1.13-1.54 was measured, compared with studies in which farming 
income (RR=1.65, CI=1.17-2.33) or income from the contracted crop (RR=1.92, CI=1.47-
2.50) was measured. No study provided sufficient data to estimate net-effects at crop, farm 
and household level. In most of the studies that used crop income (in coffee, cocoa, broiler 
chicken) it provides a good estimate of overall household income effects. Also, when 
endogenous switching models were used, the main factor substitution effects are controlled 
for in the regression, and the results can be considered valid proxies of household income 
effects.  
 
One study reported the effects of this income increase on the household’s poverty status. 
Awotide et al. (2015) reported 55% effect on rice yield (RR=1.55, CI=1.30-1.85), which 
contributed to a 71% increase of crop income (RR=1.71, CI=) and a 20% reduction in poverty 
status (RR=1.20,CI=1.00-1.44).  
Overall  (I-squared = 86.2%, p = 0.000)
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Sensitivity analysis  
The sensitivity analysis examined if the estimated pooled effect size was sensitive to (1) the 
outlier of broiler farming in India, (2) study design, and (3) the reported outcome variable. 
We report the results of this bivariate analysis in Table 9.  
 
The empirical instance of broiler production in India (Narayanan, 2014) had a substantial 
effect on the pooled effect estimate. This large response ratio probably results from the very 
low alternative income measured for non-contracted farmers living in the same area, using 
the same plot size for other activities than broiler chicken production. Typically, broiler 
production takes place in sheds, on small plots, and located near urban areas. A comparison 
with other (non-agricultural) investment opportunities in the urban area would likely have 
provided additional insight into the possible counterfactual situation of the broiler producers. 
It is, in any case, evident that this empirical instance is a severe outlier. Such a severe outlier 
may also be expected to affect the results of the moderator and sensitivity analyses. 
Excluding this particular empirical instance reduced the pooled response ratio to 1.50 
(CI=1.32-1.70). Replacing the four empirical instances reported in Narayanan’s study by a 
synthetic effect reduced the response ratio to 1.53 (CI=1.35-1.74). The heterogeneity across 
studies, however, decreased only slightly (I-sq=86%) when it was excluded. This indicates 
that between-study heterogeneity is very high, even when we exclude these outliers. 
 
Results suggested that the econometric design did not affect the estimated pooled effect 
estimates (Table 9). A meta-analysis by econometric strategy (IV, PSM or endogenous 
switching regression) showed no significant differences between the pooled effect estimates. 
The heterogeneity between studies was lower for IV-studies (I-sq=70%) than for studies 
using switching regressions (I-sq=91%) or PSM (I-sq=88%). 
 
Pooled effect estimates differed with respect to the reported outcome variable (Table 9). In 
line with expectations, contract farming had a less pronounced effect when household 
income (RR=1.32, CI=1.13-1.54 was measured, compared with studies in which farming 
income (RR=1.65, CI=1.17-2.33) or income from the contracted crop (RR=1.92, CI=1.47-
2.50) was measured. The variance was very high, which means that these differences were 
not statistically significant. However, these results do suggest that substitution effects may 
play a role – i.e. substituting land and labour from other activities towards the crop under 
contract. The two studies that measured income by consumption expenditure (RR=1.15, 
CI=0.92-1.42) reported lower response ratios than studies that measured income (RR=1.69, 
CI=1.45-1.96). By contrast, no difference in RRs was observed between studies reporting net 
income (RR=1.70, CI=1.42-2.04) or gross income (revenue) (RR=1.68, CI=1.33-2.11).  
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Table 9: Sensitivity analysis 
 RR 95% confidence interval Q Tau-sq I-sq 
Number of 
instances 
All studies 1.62 1.40 1.88 232.21 0.10 89.23 26 
Outlier: broiler farming in 
India        
Synthetic effect size 1.53 1.35 1.74 159.61 0.07 86.22 23 
Exclude outlier  1.50 1.32 1.70 158.35 0.06 84.84 25 
Research design        
IV 1.51 1.31 1.74 40.38 0.04 70.28 13 
PSM 1.47 1.16 1.86 48.93 0.08 87.74 7 
Switching regressions 2.02 0.84 4.87 56.47 0.98 91.15 6 
Outcome measurement        
Expenditure 1.15 0.92 1.42 9.40 0.02 89.36 2 
Income 1.69 1.45 1.96 108.28 0.09 78.76 24 
Definition of income        
Household 1.32 1.13 1.54 40.27 0.03 82.62 8 
Farming 1.65 1.17 2.33 23.36 0.13 78.60 6 
Contracted crop 1.92 1.47 2.50 67.11 0.15 83.61 12 
Revenue or net income        
Revenue 1.68 1.33 2.11 6.25 0.03 51.97 4 
Net income 1.70 1.42 2.04 100.71 0.11 81.13 20 
 
Moderator analysis 
A bivariate moderator analysis examined if the estimated pooled effects differed with respect 
to (1) type of production; (2) continent, and (3) contract characteristics (Table 10). Contract 
farming of animal products was more remunerative (RR=2.69, CI=1.55-4.65) than annual 
(RR=1.50, CI=1.30-1.73) or perennial products (RR=1.49, CI=1.13-1.96). The forest plot 
(figure 13) shows that this higher effectiveness of contract farming in animal products was 
driven by the example of broiler farming. We argued in 4.3.1. that a counterfactual analysis 
through a comparison with alternative investment opportunities in these semi-urban areas 
would most likely have resulted in smaller net-effect estimates.  
 
We are aware of the wide heterogeneity included under these labels, and, therefore, present 
in each forest plot the type of production and location of each empirical instance, to facilitate 
interpretation of the results. 
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Table 10: Moderator analysisa 
 RR 
95% confidence 
intervals Q tau-sq I-sq Sample size 
Crop characteristics        
Animal husbandry 2.69** 1.55 4.65 75.42 0.40 93.37 6 
Annual crop 1.47 1.29 1.68 30.46 0.03 54.04 15 
Perennial crop 1.35 1.07 1.70 46.50 0.06 89.25 6 
Perishable product 1.61 1.31 1.98 129.61 0.10 89.20 16 
Non-perishable product 1.63 1.37 1.94 29.92 0.05 69.92 10 
Region        
Africa 1.59 1.42 1.77 13.22 0.01 39.47 9 
Asia 1.64 1.34 2.00 142.27 0.11 88.75 17 
South-America 1.76 1.14 2.74 0.00 0.00 100.00 1 
Contract characteristics        
Existing cooperative        
Yes 1.41 1.17 1.70 60.53 0.06 85.13 10 
No 1.80** 1.47 2.20 89.90 0.11 82.20 17 
Price premium        
Yes 1.65** 1.51 1.81 12.64 0.00 5.07 13 
No 1.50 1.23 1.84 133.80 0.10 91.03 13 
Transport        
Yes 2.49** 1.69 3.66 65.46 0.24 89.31 8 
No 1.41 1.24 1.61 99.26 0.05 81.87 19 
Credit        
Yes 1.65** 1.51 1.81 12.64 0.00 5.07 13 
No 1.43 1.28 1.61 27.25 0.02 52.30 14 
Seeds        
Yes 1.64 1.36 1.98 172.23 0.11 89.55 19 
No 1.58 1.38 1.81 11.86 0.01 40.97 8 
Key inputs        
Yes 1.72* 1.43 2.06 187.20 0.11 89.85 20 
No 1.47 1.22 1.77 18.43 0.04 67.44 7 
Extension services        
Yes 1.70** 1.43 2.02 220.18 0.12 90.01 23 
No 1.36 1.22 1.52 2.14 0.00 0.00 4 
Level of services provided        
High 1.78** 1.44 2.19 181.22 0.15 90.07 19 
Low 1.43 1.23 1.66 20.08 0.03 65.14 8 
a. Apples and onions in Miyata et al (2009) are analysed as two separate instances of contract farming.  
*. ** Significantly higher than contract farmers without this characteristic with p<0.10, p<0.05. 
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Figure 13: Forest plot of the effect of contract farming on income per crop type 
 
 
We also analysed the moderating effect of geographical location, using the continent as a 
proxy indicator. The positive effect of contract farming on income did not differ between 
Africa and Asia. No comparison was done with the single study from South America. Figure 
14 shows the forest plot according to the level of service provisioning. All contractual 
arrangements studied included services provided by the firm to the farmer. Five services 
were frequently encountered as part of the contractual arrangement: credit, (improved) 
seeds, agrochemicals, extension and transport services (see Table 11). Unfortunately, not all 
studies detailed the inclusion of the services in the contract.  
.
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Table 11: Overview of the heterogeneity of service provisioning in the empirical 
instances covered by the meta-analysis 
 Study Empirical instance transport credit seeds inputs extension 
1 Awotide et al., 2015 rice_nigeria 1 0 1 1 1 
2 Bellemare, 2012 beans_madag 1 1 1 1 1 
3 Bolwig et al., 2009 coffee_uganda 1 0 0 0.2 1 
4 
Cahyadi and Waibel, 
2011 oilpalm_indon 0 0.8 1 1 1 
5 Escobal and Cavero, 2012 potato_peru 0 0 1 0 0 
6 
Girma and Gardebroek, 
2015 honey_ethiop 0 1 0 1 1 
7 Ito et al.,2012 wmelon_china 0 0 1 1 1 
8 Jones and Gibbon, 2011 cocoa_uganda 0 0 0 0 1 
9 
Maertens and Swinnen, 
2009 beans_senegal 1 1 1 1 1 
10 Miyata et al.,2009 apples_china 0 0.8 0.2 1 1 
11 Miyata et al.,2009 onions_china 0 0.8 1 1 1 
12 Narayanan, 2014 marigold_india 0 0 1 0.8 1 
13 Narayanan, 2014 papaya_india 0 0.2 1 0.8 1 
14 Narayanan, 2014 broiler_india 1 1 1 1 1 
15 Narayanan, 2014 gherkins_india 0 0.2 1 1 1 
16 Ramaswami, 2005 broiler_india 1 1 1 1 1 
17 Rao and Qaim, 2011 vegetables_kenya 0 0 0 0 0 
18 Saigenji, 2012 tea_vietnam 0 0 1 1 1 
19 Saigenji, 2012 tea_viernam 0 1 1 1 1 
20 Setboonsarng et al.,2008 rice_laos 0 0.8 1 1 1 
21 Simmons et al., 2005 seedrice_indon 0 0 1 0 1 
22 Simmons et al., 2005 broiler_indon 1 1 1 1 1 
23 Sokchea and Culas, 2015 rice_cambodia 0 0 0 0 1 
24 Trifković, 2014, 2016 fish_vietnam 0 0 1 1 0 
25 Wainaina et al., 2014 broiler_kenya 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
26 Wang et al., 2014 
vegetables_vietna
m 0 0 0 0 0 
27 Warning and Key, 2002 peanuts_senegal 0 0 1 1 1 
28 Winters et al., 2005 seedcorn_indon 0 1 1 1 1 
Note: 0 means absence, 1 means presence: when information was not provided we inferred: 0.2 means 
likely absence, 0.8 means likely present. 
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Figure 14: Forest plot by level of service provisioning 
 
Contractual arrangements were classified as having a ‘high level of service provisioning’ if 
they provided at least three of the five services, and as having a ‘low level of service 
provisioning’ if they offered fewer than three services (Table 10).  It is noteworthy that 
contracts that offered transport to farmers had a substantially larger impact on income 
(RR=2.49, CI=1.69-3.66) than contracts that did not include transport (RR=1.41, CI=1.24-
1.61). This highlights that access to distant markets through a firm might be one of the main 
benefits of contract farming for farmers. The service index confirms that contractual 
arrangements offering at least three services were associated with significantly larger effects 
on income (RR=1.78, CI=1.44-2.19) than those offering fewer services (RR=1.43, CI=1.23-
1.66). These results appear not to be driven by the single empirical instance of broiler 
farming in India. As these moderator variables may suffer from collinearity, we explore these 
differences in more detail in the next section. 
Meta-regressions 
Meta-regressions were conducted in order to control for several sensitivity and moderator 
variables simultaneously (Table 12). We only included variables that were shown to be 
statistically significant in the bivariate analyses, in order to preserve degrees of freedom. 
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Nevertheless, due to the limited sample size, the power of the analyses was low and the 
results should be interpreted with care. 
 
Table 12: Meta-regression on moderator and sensitivity variables for income 
effects of contract farming 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Animal husbandry 0.518*  0.168 0.205 0.159 
 (2.02)  (1.04) (1.40) (1.12) 
Measurement of household income 
(expenditure=0; other=1)  0.206 0.284 0.349** 0.231 
  (1.26) (1.43) (2.18) (1.38) 
Income level (baseline: household)      
Farming income  0.0214 0.0312   
  (0.14) (0.19)   
Income from contracted crop  0.156 0.103   
  (1.18) (0.68)   
Low level of service provisioning -0.132  -0.0193 -0.0147 -0.0020 
 (-0.59)  (00.16) (-0.13) (-0.02) 
Dummy for outlier of broiler farming in India 
(Narayan)  2.371*** 2.244*** 2.265*** 2.175*** 
  (5.59) (5.07) (3.31) (5.09) 
Standard error (log)     0.849 
     (1.44) 
Constant 0.444*** 0.136 0.070 0.051 0.032 
 (3.00) (1.05) (0.40) (0.31) (0.21) 
Observations 26 26 26 26 26 
R-squared adjusted 9.1% 90.2% 85.7% 86.3% 89.0% 
F-statistic 2.464 10.31 6.782 10.79 9.35 
tau-sq 0.202 0.0222 0.0318 0.0305 0.0245 
I-sq 87.5% 59.4% 57.3% 57.1% 55.3% 
***,**,* coefficient statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; values are unstandardized meta-regression 
coefficients, with their corresponding standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
The first and second regressions only included the moderator and sensitivity variables, 
respectively. The third regression included all moderator and sensitivity variables 
simultaneously, whereas the fourth regression included all variables that were significant in 
at least one of the previous regressions. In the fifth regression, the log of the standard errors 
was included to reduce publication bias. The analyses confirmed the sensitivity of the results 
to the single empirical instance of broiler farming in India (Narayanan, 2014). The meta-
regressions suggested that there was no statistically significant effect of any of the 
moderating factors. Measuring income by expenditure was associated with lower RRs 
compared with other methods. The direction of the coefficients is indicative only, and some 
moderators might become significant with higher sample size. The adjusted R-squared and 
tau-squared show that several models explained most of the heterogeneity between studies. 
Note, however, that the outlier of broiler farming contributed most to explaining the 
variance.  
 
 
77    The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
Factors influencing participation 
All included studies had a design and reporting quality that made it possible to extract the 
indicators used to assess differences between participating and non-participating farmers. 
Table 12 summarises the indicators used to assess whether the contractual arrangements 
were accepted by larger or smaller farmers, and by asset-rich or asset-poor farmers. These 
indicators were extracted from the descriptive statistics on characteristics of the treatment 
and comparison group (t- or Z-tests) or, when not reported, from the results of the 
econometric analysis to determine the factors that influence participation in the contract 
farming arrangement, usually a Probit analysis.  Generally, the results of the t-tests on the 
descriptives, and the results of the first stage regressions (usually Probit models) coincided. 
However, when the results did differ, we used the more straightforward t-test on the 
treatment and comparison groups, because in the Probit analysis, differences between 
participants and non-participants are not always reflected as significant coefficients in the 
regression due to collinearity with other variables in the equation.  
 
Table 13 shows that in 52% of the studies, the contracted farmers had significantly more land 
(12 out of 23). Only in 17% of the cases (4 out of 23) did participation in the contract tend to 
involve the relatively smaller farms. Except broiler farming, the instances of contract farming 
that involved relatively smaller farms showed substantially lower income effects (response 
ratios) than the average, which suggests that for the larger farmers these relatively lower 
benefits might not outweigh the costs of participating in the contract. When differences in 
asset endowments between contracting and non-contracted farmers were taken into account 
- for those studies containing such information – the tendency to contract relatively better-
endowed farmers was even more accentuated. Only in one of the 15 studies that provided 
data on assets, did contracted farmers have significantly fewer assets than the comparison 
group; in 66% of the cases, contracted farmers were significantly wealthier in terms of assets 
(10 out of 15). When we combine both analyses, we see that in 61% of the empirical instances 
covered in the studies (14 out of 23) the contracted farmers were better off than the non-
contracted farmers in the sample.  
 
The above analysis suggests that contract farming tends to attract relatively larger and 
wealthier farmers. However, scale and asset ownership are relative. It might well be that even 
the relatively larger and wealthier strata are still small scale in absolute terms (small scale 
was indeed a selection criterion in the search procedure). To verify this, data on average 
landholdings was extracted from the various studies. We selected this variable for two 
reasons. First, it was reported in all studies, except for the study on honey collectors of Girma 
and Gardebroek (2015) , and the study of Ito et al. (2012), who registered the cultivated area 
of the contracted crop instead of total land area owned. Second, no assumptions are required 
to compare landholdings between regions and over time. The boxplot (Figure 14) shows that, 
with the exception of the study of Warning and Key (Warning & Key, 2002) in Senegal, 
landholdings were below 6 ha for all studies. Most studies covered smallholder farmers, with 
landholdings in the range of 0.5 to 3 ha. 
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Figure 14: Average landholding in selected studies 
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Table 13: Assessment of differences in scale and wealth between participants and non-participants 
 Author Product Proxy-indicators for scale ++  +- -- Proxy-indicators for 
wealth 
++  +- -- Income 
effect (RR) 
1 Awotide et al. (2015) rice none 
   
none       1.71 
2 Bellemare (2012);  various crops landholding 1 
  
equipment and inputs 1    1.55 
3 Bolwig et al. (2009) coffee number of trees, farm size 1 
  
(house) walls 1    1.92 
4 Cahyadi and Waibel (2011) oil palm land size 1 
  
total assets 1    1.24 
5 Escobal and Cavero (2012) potato land size 1 
  
productive assets 1    1.76 
6 Girma and Gardebroek (2015) honey traditional hives 1 
  
none      2.19 
7 Ito et al. (2012) watermelon none (area watermelon) 
   
total assets 1    1.56 
8 Jones and Gibbon (2011) cocoa farm size, cocoa trees 1 
  
none      1.52 
9 Maertens and Swinnen (2009) green beans landholding in 1995 1 
  
non-land assets   1  3.23 
10* Miyata et al. (2009) apples land cultivated, irrigated 
  
1 agricultural assets 1    1.27 
11* Miyata et al. (2009) green onions land cultivated, irrigated 1 
  
agricultural assets   1  
12 Narayanan (2014) gherkins land owned 
  
1 none      1.27 
13 Narayanan (2014) marigold land owned 
 
1  none      0.52 
14 Narayanan (2014) papaya land owned 
 
1  none      1.43 
15 Narayanan (2014) broiler land owned 
 
1  none      17.64 
16 Ramaswami (2009) broiler (un)irrigated lands 
  
1 none      1.85 
17 Rao and Qaim (2011) various crops land area 1 
  
none      1.48 
18** Saigenji (2012) state - tea none 
   
none      no data 
19 Saigenji (2012) private - tea none 
   
none      1.04 
20 Setboonsarng et al. (2008) rice none 
   
none      1.8 
21 Simmons et al. (2005) broiler dry and irrigated land  1 
  
(non)agric. assets, 1    4.91 
22 Simmons et al. (2005) seed rice dry and irrigated land  1 
  
(non)agric. assets   1  0.94 
23 Sokchea and Culas (2015) rice cultivated land 
 
1 
 
agric. equipment   1  1.85 
24 Trifković (2014, 2016) catfish aquaculture area  
 
1 
 
asset index     1 1.29 
25 Wainaina et al. (2014) broiler land size 
 
1 
 
total assets 1    1.31 
26 Wang et al. (2014) various crops total land area 
  
1 none      1.37 
27 Warning and Key (2002)(2002) peanuts land cultivated 
 
1 
 
agric. equipment 1    1.29 
28 Winters et al. (2005) seed corn (irrigated) area operated  1 
  
assets incl. land 1    3.05 
TOTAL    12 7 4  10 4 1  
*. Analysed as one instance in the meta-analysis; **. Not part of meta-analysis 
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Table 14: Dataset of cases and conditions for the qualitative comparative analysis 
  Conditions 
Response 
ratio Outcome  
 
Studies QCA name 
existing 
farmer org 
price 
premium credit in cash 
seeds/ 
breeds 
key 
inputs 
income effect 
size 
high 
effective 
low 
effective 
Awotide et al., 2015 rice_nigeria 0.8 0 0 1 1 1.71 1 0 
Bellemare, 2012 beans_madag 0.8 1 1 1 1 1.55 0.97 0.03 
Bolwig et al., 2009 coffee_uganda 0 1 0 0 0.2 1.92 1 0 
Cahyadi and Waibel, 2011 oilpalm_indon 0 0 0.8 1 1 1.24 0.47 0.53 
Escobal and Cavero, 2012 potato_peru 0 1 0 1 0 1.76 1 0 
Girma and Gardebroek, 2015 honey_ethiop 0 1 1 0 1 2.19 1 0 
Ito et al.,2012 wmelon_china 0.2 1 0 1 1 1.56 0.98 0.02 
Jones and Gibbon, 2011 cocoa_uganda 0 1 0 0 0 1.52 0.96 0.04 
Maertens and Swinnen, 2009 beans_senegal 0.2 1 1 1 1 3.23 1 0 
Miyata et al.,2009 apples_china 0.8 0 0.8 0.2 1 1.27 0.56 0.44 
Miyata et al.,2009 onions_china 0 0 0.8 1 1 1.27 0.56 0.44 
Narayanan, 2014 broiler_n_india 0 0 1 1 1 17.64 1 0 
Narayanan, 2014 gherkins_india 0 1 0.2 1 1 1.27 0.56 0.44 
Narayanan, 2014 marigold_india 0 0 0 1 0.8 0.52 0 1 
Narayanan, 2014 papaya_india 0 1 0.2 1 0.8 1.43 0.9 0.1 
Rao and Qaim, 2011 vegetables_kenya 0.8 0 0 0 0 1.48 0.94 0.06 
Saigenji, 2012 broiler_w_india 0 0 1 1 1 1.85 1 0 
Saigenji, 2012 tea_viernam 1 0 1 1 1 1.04 0.07 0.93 
Setboonsarng et al., 2008 rice_laos 0.2 1 0.8 1 1 1.8 1 0 
Simmons et al., 2005 broiler_indon 0 0 1 1 1 4.91 1 0 
Simmons et al., 2005 seedcorn_indon 1 1 1 1 1 3.05 1 0 
Sokchea and Culas, 2015 rice_cambodia 1 1 0 0 0 1.85 1 0 
Trifković, 2014, 2016 fish_vietnam 0 0 0 1 1 1.29 0.62 0.38 
Wainaina et al., 2014 broiler_kenya 0 0 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.31 0.67 0.33 
Wang et al., 2014 vegetables_vietnam 0.8 1 0 0 0 1.37 0.81 0.19 
Warning and Key, 2002 peanuts_senegal 0.2 0 0 1 1 1.29 0.62 0.38 
Winters et al,. 2005 seedrice_indon 1 1 0 1 1 0.94 0.02 0.98 
Source: Authors          
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Factors associated with effectiveness 
For half of the 28 empirical instances of contract farming, we could link the study selected for 
meta-analysis with other (peer-reviewed) literature that offered additional information on 
contextual conditions or content of the service package delivered under contract to the 
participating farmers (Table 14). Using qualitative comparative analysis, we created an 
overview of all possible combinations of conditions (configurations) and listed the cases that 
shared the same combination. This matrix is called a ‘truth-table’. We analysed the truth-
table for combinations of conditions that were consistently related with being highly effective 
or being a less effective. To make the analysis less sensitive for the threshold chosen to 
differentiate between highly and less effective instances of contract farming, we used fuzzy-
set scores. We used the pooled average effect size of 38 percent as the cross-over point, and a 
response rate of 1.50 as the threshold value to define the relatively high and 1.25 to define 
relatively the low effective contractual arrangements. Intermediate values (1.25<RR<1.50) 
were converted into fuzzy-set scores using the logistic function provided by the software 
application fsQCA™ (Charles  Ragin & Davey, 2009). The truth-table shows which cases 
(empirical instances of contract farming) and associated combinations of conditions were 
consistent with a relatively high or relatively low effectiveness on income. The set-consistency 
score is the lowest value of the fuzzy-score of the case, be it in the set of conditions or the in 
the outcome.  
  
With the 27 empirical instances for which we had sufficient information, we could only use a 
limited number of conditions for the QCA. We focused on the five conditions that appeared 
most important as predictors of effectiveness, based on the moderator analysis and our 
reading of the literature. For some studies, we could not classify the empirical instance as 
‘present’ or ‘absent’ without caveats, due to missing information, and we used fuzzy-set 
scores to account for this uncertainty. A fuzzy-set score of 0.2 means that the condition is 
most likely absent, whereas 0.8 indicates that it is most likely present. The scoring was based 
on contextual information. This fuzzy-set ambiguity was taken into account when the set 
consistency score was calculated for each truth-table row, or for each combination of 
conditions in the QCA-solutions.  
  
Table 15 provides an overview of all empirical instances covered in the studies according to 
the logical combination of incentives and services provided in the contracts. The study of 
Trifković (2014) on catfish in Vietnam combined different types of marketing contracts. 
Using additional data provided by the author (Trifković, 2016), we were able to disaggregate 
her analysis and use the information on farmers that had input-provisioning contracts in the 
qualitative comparative analysis. Sixteen of these combinations (the rows in Table 13) were 
unique and covered by only one empirical instance. This was a reflection of the diversity in 
extremis that characterised the contractual arrangements included in the meta-analysis. 
Nevertheless, some conclusions may be drawn based on this table. The broiler cases 
demonstrate some uniformity, with four cases sharing a similar combination. The contracts 
for broiler production provided full-service packages, and the destination of the chicken was 
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a market that did not provide a higher price than the local market. The two studies that 
analysed vegetables as a generic crop type (Rao & Qaim, 2011; Wang, Moustier, et al., 2014), 
documented no service provisioning and can be considered borderline cases of contract 
farming. The contract included only support for compliance with quality requirements in 
addition to the forward-sales agreement. These studies would have been excluded had we 
applied a narrower interpretation of our definition of contract farming. Several other studies 
on the impact of supermarkets were excluded because these marketing contracts did not 
include technical support in production as a service provided by the firm to the farmers, but 
only provided marketing contracts. 
 
Table 15: Combination of services and incentives embedded in the contracts 
 
Existing 
cooperative 
involved 
Price- 
premium 
above 
local market 
Transport 
provided 
Credit in cash 
provided 
Seeds 
provided 
Key agro- 
inputs 
provided 
On-farm 
extension 
provided 
Empirical 
instances 
covered 
1 Present Present Present Present Present Present Present beans_madagascar 
2 Present Present Not Present Present Present Present seedcorn_indonesia 
3 Present Present Not Not Present Present Present seedrice_indonesia 
4 Present Present Not Not Not Not Present rice_cambodia 
5 Present Present Not Not Not Not Not vegetables_vietnam 
6 Present Not Present Not Present Present Present rice_nigeria 
7 Present Not Not Present Present Present Present tea_vietnam 
8 Present Not Not Present Not Present Present apples_china 
9 Present Not Not Not Not Not Not vegetables_kenya 
10 Not Not Present Present Present Present Present 
 
broiler_n_india 
broiler_w_india 
broiler_indonesia 
broiler_kenya 
 
11 Not Present Not Not Present Present Present 
wmelon_china 
gherkins_india 
papaya_india 
 
12 Not Not Not Present Present Present Present 
 
oilpalm_indonesia 
onions_china 
 
13 Not Not Not Not Present Present Present 
 
marigold_india 
peanuts_senegal 
 
14 Not Present Present Present Present Present Present beans_senegal 
15 Not Present Present Not Not Not Present coffee_uganda 
16 Not Present Not Present Present Present Present rice_laos 
17 Not Present Not Present Not Present Present honey_ethiopia 
18 Not Present Not Not Present Not Not potato_peru 
19 Not Present Not Not Not Not Present cocoa_uganda 
20 Not Not Not Not Present Present Not fish_vietnam 
  
The conditions are considered present or absent and do not take into consideration the 
‘intensity’ of the service provisioning, e.g. the quality of the services or quantity of the 
resources implied. Furthermore, to limit the large number of combinations (27= 128) that are 
logically possible when using the seven conditions presented in Table 14, we reduced the 
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number of conditions to the four that appeared to make most difference between the cases. 
These were: existing cooperative involved (present/not present), price premium above local 
market (true/false), provisioning of credit in cash (present/not present), and provisioning of 
key inputs (present/not present). These four conditions result in a truth-table with 16 rows 
(24) containing all possible combinations, with 11 of these rows covered by one or more 
empirical case (Table 16).  
 
Table 16: Truth-table with all contract farming arrangements in the sample 
Conditions used as possible predictors Sets of cases Outcome pattern 
Existing 
farmer 
organisatio
n 
Price 
premium  Credit 
Key 
inputs N 
Set 
consis-
tency Outcome High-effectiveness  Low-effectiveness 
Present Present Present Present 2 1 True beans_madagascar; seedcorn_indonesia - 
Present Present Present Not 0 n/a - - - 
Present Present Not Present 1 0.3 False - seedrice_indonesia 
Present Present Not Not 2 1 True rice_cambodia; vegetables_vietnam - 
Present Not Present Present 2 0.35 False - apples_china; tea_vietnam 
Present Not Present Not 0 n/a - - - 
Present Not Not Present 1 1 True rice_nigeria - 
Present Not Not Not 1 1 True vegetables_kenya - 
Not Present Present Present 3 1 True 
honey_ethiopia; 
beans_senegal; 
rice_laos 
- 
Not Present Present Not 0 n/a - - - 
Not Present Not Present 3 0.91 Unclear wmelon_china; papaya_india gherkins_india 
Not Present Not Not 3 0.99 True 
coffee_uganda; 
potato_peru; 
cocoa_uganda 
- 
Not Not Present Present 6 0.88 Unclear 
broiler_n_india; 
broiler_w_india; 
broiler_indonesia 
oilpalm_indonesia 
onions_china; 
broiler_kenya 
Not Not Present Not 0 n/a - - - 
Not Not Not Present 3 0.62 False - 
marigold_india; 
fish_vietnam; 
peanuts_senegal 
Not Not Not Not 0 n/a - - - 
 
 
We expected, based on the moderator analysis, that some combinations of conditions could 
be enablers or barriers of effectiveness in a certain type of production and not in other. 
Therefore, to limit the diversity in contractual arrangements due to crop characteristics, we 
present the truth-tables separately for perennial crops, annual crops and animal husbandry. 
We are aware of the wide heterogeneity included under these labels, and, therefore, added 
the country and crop name to facilitate interpretation of the results. These reduced truth-
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tables (Tables 17, 18 and 19) excluded the logical combinations of conditions that are not 
covered by the cases in the sample (so-called ‘logical remainders’).  
 
For six contractual arrangements related to perennial crops (Table 17), we found suggestive 
evidence that a price premium may be essential in the incentive structure for high 
effectiveness. It was present in the two high-effective cases and absent in the two less-
effective cases. Interestingly, the absence of credit seemed consistently related to higher 
effectiveness. This suggests that in perennial crops, a ‘lock-in’ situation due to credit 
obligations may explain why farmers did not opt-out of the contract even if it was not very 
effective. In the studies on oil palm (Cahyadi & Waibel, 2011) and tea (Saigenji, 2012), the 
authors explicitly mentioned the possibility of farmers becoming locked into less effective 
contracts, though they did not find evidence that this indeed took place.  
 
For annual crops (Table 18), the price premium in combination with credit and inputs was 
also an important ingredient of the recipe for high effectiveness. It was absent in only two of 
the highly effective cases. In both cases, however, we see that existing farmer organisations 
were involved in brokering and governing the contractual arrangements. This suggests that a 
price premium is required for a contractual arrangement to become highly effective on 
income, especially when cooperatives cannot serve as an intermediary between the firm and 
the farmer. 
 
For the animal husbandry cases (Table 19), the role of an existing farmer organisation as 
broker or intermediary in a contractual arrangement between a firm and farmers was not 
reported. The provision of both inputs and credit did not result in high effectiveness in the 
Kenyan broiler case. However, this combination appears to be a likely enabler of 
effectiveness, as evidenced by its presence in all other highly effective contracts arrangements 
related to animal husbandry.  
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Table 16: Truth-table of contract farming related to perennial crops 
Existing 
farmer 
organization 
Price 
premium  Credit 
Key 
inputs N 
Set 
consis-
tency Outcome High-effective  Low-effective 
Not Present Not Present 1 1 True papaya_india - 
Not Present Not Not 2 0.98 True coffee_uganda; cocoa_uganda - 
Present Not Present Present 2 0.35 False - apples_china; tea_vietnam 
Not Not Present Present 1 0.67 False - oilpalm_indonesia 
 
 
Table 17: Truth-table of contract farming related to annual crops 
Existing 
farmer 
organization 
Price 
premium  Credit 
Key 
inputs N 
Set 
consis-
tency Outcome High-effective  Low-effective 
Present Present Present Present 2 1 True beans_madagascar; seedcorn_indonesia - 
Present Present Not Not 3 0.65 Unclear rice_cambodia; vegetables_vietnam seedrice_indonesia 
Present Not Not Present 1 1 True rice_nigeria - 
Present Not Not Not 1 1 True vegetables_kenya - 
Not Present Present Present 2 1 True beans_senegal; rice_laos - 
Not Present Not Present 2 0.87 Unclear watermelon_china gherkins_india 
Not Present Not Not 1 1 True potatoes_peru - 
Not Not Present Present 1 0.7 False - onions_china 
Not Not Not Present 2 0.51 False - marigold_india; peanuts_senegal 
 
 
Table 18: Truth-table with contract farming arrangements related to animal 
husbandry 
Existing 
farmer 
organization 
Price 
premium  Credit 
Key 
inputs N 
Set 
consis-
tency Outcome High-effective  Low-effective 
Not Present Present Present 1 1 True honey_ethiopia - 
Not Not Present Present 4 0.97 Likely 
broiler_indonesia; 
broiler_n_india; 
broiler_w_india 
broiler_kenya 
Not Not Not Present 1 0.68 False - fish_vietnam 
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Discussion 
Summary of main results 
What is known about the effect size of contract farming? 
The search and screening process identified 25 studies for inclusion in the review. Only one 
study reported on food security (Bellemare & Novak, 2017). They measure the ‘length of the 
hungry season’, and report the reduction in time (9% effect, RR=0.92) and compute ‘the 
likelihood that a household's hungry season will end at any given time’ (18% effect, RR=1.18). 
This study relied on the same methodology and data as another study by the same author, 
which was included in the meta-analysis of income effects (Bellemare, 2012). However, this 
indicates that there is a lack of serious research on the effects of contract farming on food 
security, whereas this issue is prominent in the critique of certain international NGOs (for 
example, ActionAid, 2015; Holt-Giménez, Williams, & Hachmyer, 2015).  
 
For the meta-analysis of income effects, we could use 22 studies. The meta-analysis suggests 
that on average, the income effect of participation in a contractual arrangement, measured 
with the respective proxy-indicator of income in each study, is 62% (RR=1.62, CI=1.40-1.88). 
The empirical instance of broiler production in India (Narayanan 2014) was a clear outlier 
and had a substantial effect on the pooled effect estimate. Replacing the four empirical 
instances reported in Narayanan’s study by their synthetic effect reduced the overall response 
ratio from 1.62 to 1.53 (CI=1.35-1.74). For the eight studies that used household income as 
the proxy-indicator, the pooled effect size was 1.32 (CI=1.13-1.54), for the six studies that 
used farm income it was 1.65 (CI=1.17-2.33) and for the 12 studies that measured effects in 
the income derived from the crop or animal husbandry, it was 1.92 (CI=1.47-2.50).  
 
To assess publication bias, we regressed the effect sizes on the standard errors and showed 
that there was a large asymmetry in the funnel plot, which is considered a strong indicator of 
small study effects and therefore possible publication bias. We showed that all included 
studies reported positive effects for at least one of the empirical instances covered in their 
study. A trim-and-fill exercise to partially reduce this publication bias resulted in a pooled 
average effect-size of 1.38 (CI=1.23-1.55). We generated the hypothesis that these relatively 
large positive effects on income might be an important incentive for farmers to give up their 
autonomy in markets, production, and quality handling. Contract farming arrangements 
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need to offer clear benefits to farmers in order to survive over time, especially in a context of 
free entry and exit of farmers (Narayanan, 2013; Wendimu, Henningsen, & Gibbon, 2016).  
 
We showed that even this partially corrected pooled average effect size of 38% is upwardly 
flawed due to survivor bias: most studies took place in empirical instances of contract 
farming that had survived their first difficult years. This implies that the meta-analysis did 
not account for the effects of the empirical instances that did cease to exist and that it will 
inevitably overestimate the contract farming average treatment effect. It is unlikely that new 
contract farming arrangements will on average result in these large positive effects. Modest 
expectations and careful planning is needed for contract farming to be effective and 
sustainable. All empirical instances covered by the studies related to contract schemes that 
had already been operational for several years at the time of data collection. We found 
information on only one empirical instance that was reported as being collapsed after the 
study period, the Laos organic rice case, reported in Campbell et al. (2012). The professional 
literature suggest that failed attempts to establish contract farming arrangements with 
smallholder farmers are quite common, and stress the need for adaptive management and 
dispute settlement mechanisms to prevent failure (Da Silva & Rankin, 2013; Da Silva & 
Shepherd, 2013; Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; FAO, 2008; Prowse, 2012; Ton & Mheen-Sluijer, 
2009; UNIDROIT-FAO, 2016; Will, 2013). 
 
The information retrieved from the effectiveness studies did not permit strong inferences on 
spill-over effects. Other literature strongly indicated the positive effects of contract farming 
pilots for sector-wide technological innovation in the area of incidence (Euler, Schwarze, 
Siregar, & Qaim, 2016; Otsuka, Nakano, & Takahashi, 2016; Christin Schipmann & Qaim, 
2010), especially in the adoption of new crops, cultivation practices, post-harvest handling 
and access to new markets. We could not assess potential negative effects of, for example, 
indebtedness, land ‘grabbing’, gender discrimination and crop intensification, whereas these 
are key concerns for organisations that are critical of contract farming, as for example 
ActionAid (2015). However, the negative livelihood effects are unlikely to endure if farmers 
are free to step in or out of the contract. Unintended environmental effects of the contract 
farming arrangements have not been reported in any of the studies. Interestingly, many of 
the studies selected in this review cover production contracts under improved environmental 
management (e.g. organic, certified) that are better than conventional production. 
Under which enabling or limiting conditions are contract farming 
arrangements more effective 
The analyses of possible enablers and barriers show that in most of the studies, the 
contractual arrangements that were offered by the firms tended to be agreed with farmers 
that were relatively asset-richer. In 61 percent of the studies, the contracted farms were 
significantly larger or farmers were richer than non-participating farmers. Only in 11 percent 
of the cases (3 out of 26), did participation in the contract tend to involve relatively less-
endowed farmers, and, two of these instances showed relatively low income effects compared 
to the average in the sample. This might suggest that the better-off farmers, having multiple 
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market alternatives and higher risk-bearing capacities, opt out of contracts, because the 
relatively low income effects in these contractual arrangements may not compensate for the 
costs implied. For example, better-off farmers may have more autonomy obtaining 
(unsecured) credit from a bank or using personal savings than accessing the credit provided 
under the contractual arrangement.  
 
We found suggestive evidence on combinations of conditions that may predict relatively high 
income effects for farmers from the contractual arrangement that is offered to them. For 
perennial crops, the presence of a price premium was consistently present in all empirical 
instances with a relatively high effectiveness (RR>1.50). In the high effectiveness cases, the 
firms did not offer credit as part of the service package, but only provided a sales point where 
farmers could buy key inputs with cash. For annual crops, a price premium also seems to be a 
necessary part of the service package for the arrangement to become highly effective in 
raising income, especially when no cooperative is involved. Where no price premium exists, 
and a competitive price is paid on local markets, the intermediary role of farmer 
organisations may become more important for enabling higher income effects of the contract 
farming arrangement. For animal husbandry, there is suggestive evidence that the package of 
‘inputs plus credit’ is an enabling factor for higher effectiveness. All highly effective cases 
offered such a package. 
Overall completeness and applicability of evidence 
The contractual arrangements covered by this meta-analysis varied very much in terms of 
crops grown, embedded services and the role of intermediaries, such as cooperatives, state 
agencies, and NGOs. Therefore, pooled meta-analyses of these studies resulted in inferences 
with important threats to construct validity (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Even though 
we used a quite restrictive definition of contract farming, the diversity was still huge, not only 
because the type of production under contract differed, but also due to differences in the 
socio-economic and agro-ecological context of each country and region in which the study 
was done. We demonstrated that there were important differences in the service package and 
incentive structure offered to farmers. It often proved difficult to extract sufficient detailed 
information about these incentives and services from the effectiveness studies alone. Studies 
would benefit from a better specification and description of what the contract farming 
arrangements comprise in practice.  
 
We are aware that the inferences derived from this review have a constrained generalisation 
domain. The mandatory screening of studies on the risk of bias to their net-effect estimates, 
resulted in a limited number of studies, which do not cover the whole range of sectors in 
which contract farming is an important modality of procurement (e.g. sugar, dairy, barley, 
banana, asparagus, fresh fruits). Inevitably, meta-analyses on a small but widely 
heterogeneous sample of empirical instances of contract farming will have important 
construct validity threats. Therefore, in the forest plots and tables, we also provide 
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information about the type of production and location of each empirical instance, in order to 
facilitate interpretation and reduce the chances of misinterpretation of our findings. 
Quality of the evidence 
We noticed that the academic community is highly interested in studying the effectiveness of 
contract farming. We found 22 studies - containing 26 empirical instances - with a strong 
counterfactual design. All studies selected for the meta-analysis were observational, cross-
sectional studies that used advanced econometric methods to resolve the challenges related 
to selection and self-selection of farmers into contracts.  
 
All experimental and quasi-experimental study designs are vulnerable to the fact that they 
assess net-effects in specific (months of the) year(s). Most panel studies (RCT, Diff-in-diff) 
use two measurements to derive inference of impact. The years used for baseline or endline 
may, however, refer to ‘unusual’ situations (e.g. weather, markets). These sources of 
variability are especially relevant when the contract farming arrangement covers news crops 
or livestock that are different from the traditional (counterfactual) activities. If conditions 
differ between years and affect these crops differently (e.g. terms of trade, drought resistance, 
etc.) a comparison between baseline and endline, and contracted farmer versus non-
contracted farmer, will result in net-effect estimates with limited predictive value. 
 
Because the content of the ‘treatment’, targeted geographical area, and the incentives and 
services embedded in the contractual arrangement may vary and evolve over time, there are 
operational challenges to clean baseline surveys. Cross-sectional study designs with 
econometric controls for selection bias are arguably more robust to these changes and may 
result in better estimates of net-effects. Notwithstanding this operational robustness, one-off 
cross-sectional surveys (with no baseline) only take a snapshot and therefore suffer from 
survivor bias. The repetition of the survey in the same empirical instance in a longitudinal 
panel design with multiple follow-up measurements, as advised by McKenzie (2012), would 
increase the robustness of the inferences, and help to shed light on the step-in and drop-out 
dynamics of contract farming.  
 
We found no randomised control trials or longitudinal studies with a quasi-experimental 
design. The absence of RCT impact studies is not surprising, as the nature of contract 
farming implies deliberate self-selection by farmers and deliberate targeting by firms. 
Theoretically, an RCT with an encouragement design – randomly providing an additional 
stimulus to convince farmers to participate in the contract, and assessing the difference 
between those that do and those that do not respond to this stimulus - might work to assess 
the net-effects of treatments characterised by self-selection. In such a design, it might be 
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feasible to experiment with different (intensity of) service packages, or contractual modalities 
(Saenger, Torero, & Qaim, 2013).  
Limitations and potential biases in the review process 
We are aware that the screening process to select the studies for meta-analysis resulted in a 
sample of empirical instances of contract farming that is not necessarily representative of the 
whole population of empirical instances. The systematic review yielded only one study of the 
effects of contract farming on food security with an econometric design to reduce selection 
bias. However, this precludes more generalised inferences, beyond the context of 
Madagascar. For income effects, we cover more empirical instances but also in this collection 
we observe limitations in coverage, especially of traditional crops where contract farming 
arrangements are common, such as sugar and cotton production. 
 
For the analysis of enablers of effectiveness, we could have used the wider body of literature, 
identified during the search. Time and budget constraints, however, limited the scope of this 
review to only those empirical instances of contract farming covered by the effectiveness 
studies with a sufficiently strong econometric design to be selected for meta-analysis. 
However, there is more scope to learn from the wider body of literature identified in the 
search process. Ideally, we would have applied the analysis of enablers and barriers to a 
larger set of empirical instances. Therefore, we propose a follow-up explorative review of the 
qualitative and quantitative literature identified after title-abstract screening, in order to 
generate hypotheses on enablers and barriers of effectiveness of contract farming, 
differentiating the farmers according to types of crops and service packages which we 
identified. This may also allow us to find more qualitative evidence on sector innovation, 
drop-out dynamics and spillover effects, for which we found little evidence in the studies 
selected for meta-analysis but that may have been recorded by studies that we excluded. 
 
The process of deriving the pooled average results of the meta-analysis followed the protocol 
(Ton et al., 2015). All studies were reviewed by at least two independent reviewers, except for 
the screening of relevance based on title and abstract. The reason for this single-screening 
was the heavy time investment needed to scan literature retrieved from electronic libraries 
with the broad search terms that were necessary to capture the fuzzy concept ‘contract 
farming’. However, as the criteria for exclusion used in title-abstract screening proved quite 
straightforward, we do not expect this decision to have had an influence on the inferences 
from the meta-analysis. Normative bias is more likely in the qualitative comparative analysis, 
which explored for plausible enablers and barriers of effectiveness. We focused on the 
incentives and services embedded in the contracts. As with realist synthesis, other 
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researchers are likely to put other emphases, which could have resulted in other inferences 
(Wong, Greenhalgh, Westhorp, Buckingham, & Pawson, 2013). 
 
Finally, the search in October 2015 might not have captured all studies that were published in 
the months immediately preceding October 2015 due to the time lag between the date of 
publication as a working paper or academic article and the date that the reference is included 
in the electronic libraries. 
Agreements and disagreements with other studies or reviews 
The meta-analysis covered studies discussed in earlier literature reviews (Minot & Ronchi, 
2015; Otsuka et al., 2016; Oya, 2012; Prowse, 2012; Wang, Wang, et al., 2014). Three of these 
reviews had similar objectives to our review, namely to derive inferences about effects on 
income, selecting only econometric studies (Minot & Ronchi, 2015; Otsuka et al., 2016; 
Wang, Wang, et al., 2014). Two other reviews were less restrictive and reviewed a broader 
body of evidence (Oya, 2012; Prowse, 2012).  
 
Our conclusions on the relatively high average effect-size corroborate those of Minot and 
Ronchi (2015) who mention an overall increase in income “between 25 and 75 percent”. Our 
findings also coincide on the importance for firms to offer an attractive price premium to 
compensate for the transaction costs involved in contract farming (Minot & Ronchi, 2015, p. 
2).We disagree with Minot and Ronchi (2015, p. 4) when they state that “most studies detect 
no significant difference in farm size between contracted farmers and other farms in a given 
region, a finding that points to a role for contract farming in inclusive growth and poverty.” 
Instead, we found strong evidence of bias towards the participation of relatively larger farms 
or richer farmers in areas where contract farming takes place. We agree that contract farming 
has a role in obtaining a more inclusive growth because it creates possibilities for upward 
social mobility of some smallholders and may be catalytic for technological upgrading and 
innovation in agriculture. It is, however, not the panacea for the poorest portion of 
smallholder farmers.  
In our conclusion that participation in contract farming tends to be biased towards the 
better-off farmers, we coincide with Wang et al. (2014), Prowse (2012, p. 85), and Otsuka, 
Nakano and Takahashi (2016). These reviews found that although most contract farming 
schemes target and include small farms, most included farms are larger. 
 
We coincide with most authors that the transaction costs embedded in contract farming need 
to be outweighed by the benefits, both for firms and farmer. Wang et al. (2014, p. 1260) stress 
the transaction costs savings for the processor, while we stress the benefits of transaction 
costs for farmers involved in contracting. We suggest that there is a need for a relatively high 
level of effectiveness of the contractual arrangement to compensate for the loss of autonomy 
in production and marketing. 
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Our review covers primarily empirical instances where the farmer had the option to step in 
and out of the contract (Narayanan, 2013), whereas other scholars emphasise the empirical 
instances in which contracts are ‘imposed’ on farmers without these options. For example, 
Wendimu et al. (2016, p. 84) argue that “... it is not surprising that most existing studies ﬁnd 
a positive effect of (private-led voluntary) contract farming on the participating households’ 
income. In contrast, it is questionable whether out-grower schemes with compulsory 
participation also provide beneﬁts for farmers because the farmers are forced to participate 
regardless of whether the participation is beneﬁcial for them or not.” We agree with this 
observation. 
 
We consider cooperatives to be important mediators of effectiveness, especially in sectors 
where there is no clear price premium compared to the local market. Our findings agree with 
those of Prowse (2012), Wang et al. (2014), Minot and Ronchi (2015), and Otsuka et al. 
(2016). Oya (2012) does not mention the role of previous collective marketing experience, 
though he does emphasise the importance of collective action for the negotiation capacities of 
farmers when contracting with the firm.  
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Authors’ conclusions 
Implications for practice and policy 
The publication and survivor bias detected in the studies prevents us from drawing strong 
conclusions on the effectiveness of contract farming arrangements. The effect sizes reported 
in published academic literature is prone to several biases, hence they are likely to paint too 
favourable a picture of contract farming as a way to increase smallholder incomes. The 
pooled average effects that result from the meta-analysis refers to empirical instances of 
contract farming that have existed for several years (which points to survivor bias), and 
where the income effects for smallholder farmers are large enough to show up even in 
relatively small samples, (which points to publication bias). 
 
All studies covered in the meta-analysis related to empirical instances of contract farming 
that had managed to survive the initial years. The professional literature indicates that there 
are many factors (e.g. lack of trust between firm and farmers, fragility of market access for 
the firm, low knowledge and skills on the new crop/livestock on the part of farmers) that 
result in a high likelihood of failure and subsequent abandonment of contract farming as a 
modality for a firm to source products from smallholders.  
 
Only one study assessed the effects on food security (Bellemare & Novak, 2017). They 
measure the ‘length of the hungry season’, and report the reduction in duration of 8 percent, 
and compute ‘the likelihood that a household's hungry season will end at any given time’ at 
18 percent larger for contract farmers than for non-contract farmers. The lack of studies 
shows that more research is needed on food security effects. 
 
The average increase in income for contract farmers is 62 percent due to the contractual 
arrangement, over the income of non-contract farmers. However, when we used a method 
which aims to control for publication bias, we estimate income among contract farmers is 
only 38 percent bigger than income for non-contract farmers. This is still a large effect of 
contract farming and suggests that the income effects of participating in the contractual 
arrangement need to be relatively high in order to be attractive and to compensate for the 
transaction costs and loss of autonomy and to prevent farmers from stepping out.  
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The services offered by a firm in exchange for the pre-planting sales agreement imply 
opportunities and risks for smallholders. Contract farming is especially attractive for those 
farmers who can bear more risk and investments. The qualitative synthesis in this review 
suggests that contract farming is biased towards the farmers that are wealthier in terms of 
land or other assets. Only 3 of the 22 empirical instances showed that contracted farms were 
statistically significantly smaller or farmers poorer than the comparison group, whereas in 16 
out of 22 cases the contract farms were significantly larger or farmers wealthier. Plausible 
explanations for this phenomenon -frequently mentioned in the studies - are the lower 
transaction costs for the firm when procuring the needed volume from larger farmers, and 
the capacity of the farmer to bear the associated production or post-harvest quality risks.  
 
We found some suggestive evidence on conditions that could be used by practitioners and 
policy makers to assist with enabling effectiveness. These differ per crop type. In perennial 
crops, a price premium was consistently present in all empirical instances with a relatively 
high effectiveness. It seemed to be preferable for firms not to offer credit as part of their 
services to farmers, but have farmers pay cash for the inputs. In the highly effective cases 
covered by the studies, the firm served as an access point for these key inputs (compost, 
fertiliser, pesticides), providing timely access and proper quality, but did not provide credit. 
In annual crops, a price premium seemed to be a necessary component of the service package 
in order to result in high income effects for farmers, especially in situations where there was 
no cooperative involved as an intermediary between the firm and the farmers. If the local 
market pays competitive prices, the intermediary role of farmer organisations at the moment 
of starting the firm-farm relationship may work as an enabler of effectiveness. In cases in 
which these organisations were not involved, contractual arrangements that provided a 
higher price than available on the spot market were consistently more effective. In animal 
husbandry, there was suggestive evidence that providing the package of ‘inputs plus credit’ is 
an enabling factor for higher effectiveness, especially in intensive animal husbandry, such as 
broiler production. 
 
We showed that all studies covered farmers in and around the geographical locations where 
the empirical instance of contract farming was operating. These geographical locations are 
not necessarily representative for the country as a whole. The contractual arrangements were 
most likely set up in regions which benefitted from external factors such as relatively good 
access to infrastructure or nearby processing facilities. Hence, one cannot conclude that 
contract farming would have similar effects in every region of these countries. National 
surveys or agricultural censuses should include questions on the service packages available to 
farmers as well as the source of funding for this service delivery, in order to get a better idea 
of the importance of contract farming in agriculture. 
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Implications for research 
Contract farming is a container concept that covers a wide range of contractual 
arrangements, which makes it difﬁcult to draw overly general conclusions. This does not 
necessarily change if more studies become available. Nevertheless, new research to assess the 
income effects in specific instances of contract farming may be relevant, especially when it 
assesses the effects of various well-specified service packages. Our findings lead to some 
recommendations for future research on contract farming. 
 
First, the reporting about the intervention can be improved. Because many contract farming 
arrangements imply the adoption of new inputs, new crops, and new ways of horizontal 
coordination (farmer groups), the effect of the ‘contract farming’ could likewise be framed as 
the result of ‘new inputs’, ‘access to credit’ or ‘collective marketing’, without changing the 
empirical analysis, but making the fact that a contract is involved an irrelevant detail. A 
better specification of the services provided by the firm to the farmer, and (quasi) 
experimental research with varying services packages in each empirical instance, would help 
to disentangle the effects and help to better identify the drivers and mechanisms of 
effectiveness in each contractual arrangement. In most studies selected in this review, the 
emphasis in the texts was on the econometric methods used to derive income effect 
estimates, whereas the description of the services, incentives and contractual clauses of these 
arrangements lacked sufficient detail, and there was no data on the drop-out or step-in 
dynamics of farmers. Although econometric rigour is valuable, we noticed that the literature 
often focused more on the econometric methods used than the description of the services 
provided under the contracts. 
 
Second, in order to obtain better insight into the enablers and barriers of effectiveness and 
drop-out dynamics, and to compensate for the apparent publication and survivor bias in the 
existing knowledge base on contract farming, new research should also document the less-
successful instances of contract farming, and report inconclusive results (insignificant 
effects). Research should start earlier and take particular care to cover the performance and 
dynamics of contract farming in the first years. When a baseline study is not possible, rigour 
will increase using repeated measurements or longitudinal monitoring. There is ample room 
for making research more comparative, by applying similar analyses on multiple instances of 
contract farming. Together, this would increase the relevance of meta-analysis, which is now 
highly influenced by the prevalent publication and survivor bias. There are important 
methodological advances in how net-effect estimates are derived from (cross-sectional) 
survey data. These include new survey questions to get appropriate instrumental variables to 
control for participation bias in net-effect estimates, as well as switching regressions that 
model farm outcomes according to crop-specific production functions instead of estimating 
these with an overall production function. New studies need to build on these methodological 
advances. Nevertheless, we show that most studies still face a risk of bias due to imperfect 
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group identification and weak instruments, especially because they relied on only one 
measurement in time. 
 
Third, in addition to income effects, other outcomes of contract farming are important to 
assess. Apart from food security effects, the role of contract farming in rural development, 
such as (sector-wide) innovation, and livelihood resilience, will need more research. Ideally, 
new studies should rely on common indicators and questions that improve the comparability 
of findings between studies. This should be possible to attain, as most studies in this review 
used fairly similar outcome areas and farm characteristics. However, because authors chose 
slightly different methods and slightly different definitions of variables and proxy-indicators, 
results were not always easy to compare. National surveys or agricultural censuses should 
include questions on the service packages available to farmers as well as the source of 
funding for this service delivery, to get a better idea of the importance of contract farming in 
agriculture. 
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Data and analyses 
Characteristics of included studies  
Awotide et al. 2015 
Methods PSM 
Sample 341  
Context of intervention Nigeria; rice; contracted by private firms.  
Interventions Seeds, agrochemicals, extension. 
No unique firm or contractual arrangement. 
Outcomes 2013: Crop income, yield, poverty 
 
Bellemare 2012 
Methods IV 
Sample 1178  
Context of intervention Madagascar; several crops (green beans, leek, snow peas, barley, rice); contracted 
by private firms.  
Interventions Seeds (for some), agrochemicals, extension 
No unique firm or contractual arrangement.  
Most of the sample, however, concerns one firm (Lecofruit) that has operated in 
Madagascar since the early 1990s 
Outcomes 2008 - Household income 
 
Bellemare and Novak 2016 
Methods IV 
Sample 1178  
Context of intervention Madagascar; several crops (green beans, leek, snow peas, barley, rice); 
contracted by private firms.  
Interventions Seeds (for some), agrochemicals, extension 
No unique firm or contractual arrangement.  
Most of the sample, however, concerns one firm (Lecofruit) that has operated in 
Madagascar since the early 1990s 
Outcomes 2008 – Duration (months) of the hungry season(s).   
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Bolwig et al. 2009 
Methods Heckman 
Sample 160  
Context of intervention Uganda; coffee; contracted by private firm 
Interventions Seeds (on a limited scale), agrochemicals (on a limited scale), extension 
Single firm (Kawacom) started certification in 2000 
Outcomes 2005 - Crop income, yield, practice adoption 
Briones 2014 
Methods IV 
Sample 316 
Context of intervention The Philippines; tobacco 
Interventions The contract offered by a private firm includes credit, seeds, agrochemicals and 
extension 
Outcomes Crop income per hectare. 
Observation Income effects could not be compute because additional data was not provided on 
request. Moreover, there are data inconsistencies between the regression and the 
text. 
Cahyadi and Waibel 2011 
Methods Heckman  
Sample 245  
Context of intervention Indonesia; oil palm; contracted by private firm 
Interventions Seeds, extension, other services unclear 
One oil palm company with 15,441 has. The contracts were offered in two periods, 
1989-94 and 1995-2000. 
Outcomes 2010 - Household income 
Escobal and Cavero 2012 
Methods Switching Regression 
Sample 360  
Context of intervention Peru; potatoes; contracted by private firm in cooperation with NGO 
Interventions Extension, other services unclear 
Dominated by one firm, facilitated by the GO FOVIDA from 2000 onwards. 
Outcomes 2002/2003 - Crop income 
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Girma and Gardebroek 2015 
Methods IV 
Sample 195  
Context of intervention Ethiopia; honey; contracted by private firm 
Interventions Credit, extension, inspections, honey containers, and other necessary inputs. 
Agreements between producers and processors in the region started in 2005. The 
firm (Beza Mar Agro) started contracting in 2007. 
Outcomes 2010/2011 - Crop income, price margin, labor productivity 
 
Ito et al. 2012 
Methods PSM 
Sample 318  
Context of intervention China; watermelon; contracted by farmers’ cooperative 
Interventions Seeds, agrochemicals, extension, subsidized land improvement, wholesale market. 
An executive of a cooperative established the firm in 2000 with 170 farmers. By 
2009, 2,300 households grew watermelon. 
Outcomes 2009 - Farming income 
 
Jones and Gibbon 2011 
Methods IV 
Sample 222  
Context of intervention Uganda; cocoa; contracted by private firm. Important changes between 2005 and 
2009 in the contractual arrangements. 
Interventions Seeds and agrochemicals (only for some and briefly at the beginning of the 
program), extension, initiation of savings society 
Set up with SIDA support in 2001/2002. I 
Outcomes 2005 & 2009 - Crop income, yield, price 
 
Maertens and Swinnen 2009 
Methods PSM 
Sample 217  
Context of intervention Senegal; French beans; contracted by private firms. 
Interventions Credit (for some), seeds, agrochemicals, extension, and land preparation, 
coordination and financing of planting and harvesting (on demand) 
Survey in the main horticultural zone that asked for contract with an agro-exporting 
company. This practice is common with FFV exporters organized in ONAPES since 
1999. 
Outcomes 2005 - Household income 
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Miyata et al. 2009 
Methods Heckman 
Sample 162  
Context of intervention China; apples and green onions; contracted by private firm; for super market 
channels vs. local markets 
Interventions Green onions: Seeds, agrochemicals (for most), extension, spraying services 
(sometimes) 
Apples: Agrochemicals (for most), extension, spraying services (sometimes) 
Two companies for each crop are investigated, with no detail on the time they were 
already active in the area. 
Outcomes 2005 - Household income 
Munungo. 2010 
Methods PSM 
Sample 516 
Context of intervention Zimbabwe: Various crops, including cotton, paprika and tobacco 
Interventions Not clear what the service package wag. 
Outcomes Crop income and household expenditure 
Observation The authors conclusions are inconsistent with the data analysis presented in the 
tables. Not clear how the results must be interpreted.  Income effects could likely 
have been calculated with additional information from the author, which was, 
however, not provided. 
Narayanan 2014 
Methods Switching regression 
Sample 262-289  
Context of intervention India; marigold, papaya, broiler and gherkins 
Interventions Marigold: Seeds, extension, other services unclear. Single firm. 
Papaya: Seeds, extension, other services unclear, organization and training of 
hired labor for latex extraction. Single firm. 
Broiler: Breeds, agrochemicals, extension, other services unclear. Multiple firms, 
one focus firm. 
Gherkins: Seeds, extension, other services unclear. Multiple firms, one focus firm. 
Companies are not explicitly mentioned, nor the time they were already active in 
the area. 
Outcomes 2009/2010 - Crop income 
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Ramaswami 2009 
Methods IV 
Sample 50  
Context of intervention India; broiler 
Interventions Production management’’ contract in which the integrator supplies inputs and 
extension, advances credit (in kind), provides price insurance and monitors grower 
effort through frequent inspection. Twenty growers were associated with 
Venkateshwara Hatcheries and remainder with two other firms. No details on the 
time that the companies already engaged in contract farming. 
Outcomes 2002/2003 - Crop income 
 
Rao and Qaim 2011 
Methods Switching regression 
Sample 402  
Context of intervention Kenya; vegetables. 
 
Interventions Services provided are unclear. 
Multiple firms (supermarkets, intermediaries) involved. 
Outcomes 2008 - Household income 
 
Saigenji 2012 
Methods PSM 
Sample 88, 90  
Context of intervention Vietnam; tea; contracted by private firms and farmers’ cooperatives or state-owned 
enterprises 
Interventions Private contracts: Credit, seeds, agrochemicals, extension, input application for 
production is implemented by the company. Several firms offer contract, most 
established only a decade ago. 
SEO: Agrochemicals, extension, other services unclear. Established in the 1950s. 
Outcomes 2007 - Household expenditure, technical efficiency  
 
Setboonsang et al. 2008 
Methods PSM 
Sample 585  
Context of intervention Laos; rice;. 
 
Interventions Seeds, agrochemicals, extension 
Contracted by private firm through a farmers’ cooperative Lao Arrowny Corporation 
contracts since 2002. 
Outcomes 2004 - Crop income, yield , price 
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Simmons et al. 2005 
Methods Heckman 
Sample 300 (seed rice), 200 (broiler), 300 (seed corn – covered by Winters et al. [2005]) 
Context of intervention Indonesia; seed corn, seed rice; contracted by private form through farmer groups; 
broiler, contracted by private firm; also contracts with state-owned businesses 
Interventions Seed corn: Credit (for land preparation), seeds, agrochemicals, extension, risk 
insurance (all production is accepted regardless of quality). Pioneer started to offer 
contracts in 1986. 
Seed rice: Seeds, extension, other services unclear. State-company started 
contracting in 1988. 
Broiler: Credit, breeds, agrochemicals, extension, veterinary services. Nusantara 
Unggasjava Mataram operates since 1998.  
Outcomes 2002 - Farming income, family, non-family, female and off-farm labor use 
 
Sokchea and Culas 2015 
Methods Heckman 
Sample 75  
Context of intervention Cambodia; rice;  
Interventions The farmers’ cooperative RSSADC started in 2003 supported by GIZ. 
Credit (through organization of collective savings), extension (market information), 
investing members receive annual dividends and share in earnings of credit 
program, transportation cost, packaging 
Outcomes 2010 - Farming income 
 
Trifković 2014 
Methods Heckman 
Sample 191  
Context of intervention Vietnam; catfish; contracted by private firm 
Interventions Outgrower (17%): fingerlings, fry, feed, medicines. No details on the background of 
the firm. 
Marketing contract (83%): No services provided. 
Outcomes 2010 - Household expenditure 
 
Wainaina et al. 2014 
Methods PSM 
Sample 180  
Context of intervention Kenya; poultry. 
 
Interventions Services unclear. 
Multiple firms, not detail on time these already were active. 
Outcomes 2010/2011 - Crop income 
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Wang et al. 2014 
Methods Heckman  
Sample 107  
Context of intervention Vietnam; ‘Safe’ vegetables; private firms through farmer cooperatives 
Interventions No services provided 
Multiple firms involved. The ‘safe vegetables’ program started in 1995. As of 2008, 
firms needed to organize VietGAP inspection/traceability. 
Outcomes 2007/2008 - Farming income 
Warning and Key 2002 
Methods Heckman 
Sample 26  
Context of intervention Senegal; peanuts; contracted by investor-owned firm (after initiation by the 
government, which still holds shares in the company) 
Interventions Seeds, agrochemicals, extension, collection 
NOVASEN started operations in 1990. 
Outcomes 1992/1994 - Farming income 
Winters et al. 2005 
Methods Heckman 
Sample 300  
Context of intervention Indonesia; seed corn; contracted by private firm and/or farmers’ cooperative 
Interventions Credit (for land preparation), seeds, agrochemicals, extension 
Pioneer started to source hybrid seeds in 1986. 
Outcomes 2002 - Farming income, input use, family and hired labor use 
 
Characteristics of excluded studies  
Anim, Raphala et al. (2008) 
Reason for exclusion Inadequate design T-tests only, no control for self-selection 
 
Bamiro, Momoh et al. (2009) 
Reason for exclusion No control for selection bias; not clear it is contract farming; mentions non-
integrated vs. partially integrated vs. fully integrated 
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Barrett, Bachke et al. (2010) 
Reason for exclusion It is about contract farming effectiveness, in the broad sense of the concept. It 
summarizes several studies, and provides insufficient data and information on 
methodologies 
 
Barrett, Bachke et al. (2012) 
Reason for exclusion Summary of five other studies include in the review 
 
Begum and Alam (2005) 
Reason for exclusion Inadequate counterfactual design, descriptions only 
 
Begum, Osanami et al. (2005) 
Reason for exclusion Inadequate counterfactual design, simple comparison of net return and other 
indicators, no self-selection control 
 
Begum (2005) 
Reason for exclusion Effectiveness study of contract farming; inadequate counterfactual design, 
simple comparison of mean profitability, no control for self-selection 
 
Begum (2008) 
Reason for exclusion Similar paper as Begum (2005). No counterfactual design, simple 
comparisons only, no control for self-selection 
 
Begum, Alam et al. (2012) 
Reason for exclusion Inadequate counterfactual design, efficiency frontier analysis without 
correction for self-selection bias 
 
Berdegué, Reardon et al. (2007) 
Reason for exclusion No counterfactual design, summary of other studies, simple comparisons, no 
control for self-selection 
 
Birthal, Joshi et al. (2005) 
Reason for exclusion Quantitative effectiveness study without adequate counterfactual design; 
focus on participation ‘choice’ 
 
Birthal et al. (2009) 
Reason for exclusion Reports net revenue per litre of milk, which is not a proxy for household 
income. Income effects could likely have been calculated with additional 
information from the author, which was, however not provided. 
 
Boulay, Tacconi et al. (2013) 
Reason for exclusion No control for self-selection bias 
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Cai and Han (2011) 
Reason for exclusion Regression analysis on many variables, including marketing and production 
contracts, ceteris paribus effects on use of organic fertilizer and off-farm 
income 
 
Cai et al. (2008) 
Reason for exclusion The authors do not study the impact on household income or expenditure. 
Income effects could likely have been calculated with additional information 
from the author, which could, however, not be obtained. 
 
Chengappa, Nagaraj et al. (2012) 
Reason for exclusion Inadequate counterfactual methodology, simple comparisons, no control for 
self-selection 
 
Boulay (2013) 
Reason for exclusion Comparison of contract with non-contract growers, but no control for self-
selection 
 
Costales, Delgado et al. (2007) 
Reason for exclusion No counterfactual design; comparative study of different marketing options 
 
Da Silva and Rankin (2013) 
Reason for exclusion Excluded from core set because no control groups (only detailed discussion 
of several contract schemes) 
 
Dedehouanou, Swinnen et al. (2013) 
Reason for exclusion Study with happiness as dependent variable; no outcome related with income 
or food security. 
 
Freguin-Gresh et al. (2012) 
Reason for exclusion Very weak instruments; average farm size of 50 hectares 
 
Gibbon and Bolwig (2007) 
Reason for exclusion Means and correlation analysis, no control for selection bias. 
 
Herck, Noev et al. (Herck, Noev, & Swinnen, 2012) 
Reason for exclusion No control for self-selection bias on contracts. Only study with growth rates as 
a dependent variables (and discussion where this is smallholder farming) 
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Indarsih (2012) 
Reason for exclusion Inadequate counterfactual method; very small sample, no control for self-
selection, simple comparison 
 
Jabbar and Akter (2006) 
Reason for exclusion Not really a quantitative effectiveness study, although contracts are 
mentioned. No control for self-selection 
 
Kennedy and Oniang’o (1990) 
Reason for exclusion Inadequate counterfactual design, mainly qualitative, simple comparisons, no 
control for self-selection 
 
Khamphone and Sato (2011) 
Reason for exclusion Inadequate counterfactual control, no control group, only comparisons over 
time 
 
Kongchheng (2010) 
Reason for exclusion Effectiveness study of contract farming; inadequate counterfactual method, 
only regression of only contracted farmers and a Probit model 
 
Kumar (Kumar, 2006) 
Reason for exclusion  Inadequate methods, only OLS, no control for self-selection bias 
 
Lee, Ghazoul et al. (2014) 
Reason for exclusion No control for selection bias 
 
Mabila (Mabila, 2006) 
Reason for exclusion Comparative data envelopment analysis, no counterfactual design 
 
Maertens, Dries et al. (2007) 
Reason for exclusion Effectiveness study of contract farming, but stays descriptive 
 
McCulloch and Ota (2002) 
Reason for exclusion No control for self-selection 
 
  
125 The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
Michelson (2010, 2013) 
Reason for exclusion Study of difference on income and assets between suppliers of traditional and 
supermarket channels. Contracts had no service provisioning component. 
 
Michelson, Reardon et al. (2012) 
Reason for exclusion Comparison, mainly on prices, between traditional and supermarket 
channels. No effectiveness studies controlling for self-selection 
 
Nagaraj, Chandrakanth Mysore et al. (2008) 
Reason for exclusion No control for selection bias 
 
Patrick (2004) 
Reason for exclusion No adequate control for self-selection 
 
Rana, Neeraj et al. (2014) 
Reason for exclusion Inadequate counterfactual method, contract farming not the focus of the 
study, few simple comparisons without correction of self-selection bias 
 
Roy and Thorat (2008) 
Reason for exclusion The profit equation is estimated with two related interaction terms. The 
authors do not assess impact on income. Additional data could not be 
obtained. 
 
Saenz and Ruben (2004) 
Reason for exclusion No counterfactual design, not primarily impact study but focused on 
participation choice 
 
Sáenz-Segura D’Haese et al. (2009) 
Reason for exclusion No counterfactual design, comparison of different marketing options without 
adequate control for self-selection 
 
Sänger (Sänger, 2012) 
Reason for exclusion Same as publications with Torero; no control group of independent farmers 
 
Schipmann and Qaim (2011) 
Reason for exclusion No counterfactual design (choice experiment on contracts) 
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Setboonsarng, Leung et al. (2006) 
Reason for exclusion No control for self-selection 
 
Setboonsarng, Leung et al. (2006) 
Reason for exclusion Authors mention control for unobservables, but no first-stage results shown. 
Only results of simulation models are reported 
 
Sharma (2008) 
Reason for exclusion  No counterfactual design (Heckman model, but without IV) 
 
Tadesse and Guttormsen (2009) 
Reason for exclusion Only study with marketed surplus as dependent variable; no reference group 
for meta-analysis 
 
Tatlidil and Akturk (2004) 
Reason for exclusion  No control for selection bias: comparative analysis (as per the title) 
 
Tongchure and Hoang (2013) 
Reason for exclusion Means comparison; regression on participation choice; verbal contracts 
 
Tripathi, Singh et al. (2005) 
Reason for exclusion  No control for selection bias; only linear regression 
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Search strategy   
Elaborated with the kind assistance of John Eyers (3ie) 
 
Scopus search – Searched 30th September 2015 
 
( ( ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( afghanistan OR albania OR algeria OR angola OR argentina OR armenia OR armenian 
OR aruba OR azerbaijan OR bangladesh OR benin OR byelarus OR byelorussian OR belarus OR belorussian 
OR belorussia OR belize OR bhutan OR bolivia OR bosnia OR herzegovina OR hercegovina OR botswana OR 
brasil OR brazil OR bulgaria OR "Burkina Faso" OR "Burkina Fasso" OR "Upper Volta" OR burundi OR urundi OR 
cambodia OR "Khmer Republic" OR kampuchea OR cameroon OR cameroons OR cameron OR camerons OR 
"Cape Verde" OR "Central African Republic" OR chad OR china OR colombia OR comoros OR "Comoro Islands" 
OR comores OR mayotte OR congo OR zaire OR "Costa Rica*" OR "Cote d'Ivoire" OR "Ivory Coast" OR cuba 
OR djibouti OR "French Somaliland" OR dominica OR "Dominican Republic" OR "East Timor" OR "East Timur" 
OR "Timor Leste" OR ecuador OR egypt OR "United Arab Republic" OR "El Salvador" OR eritrea OR ethiopia OR 
fiji OR gabon OR "Gabonese Republic" OR gambia OR gaza OR "Georgia Republic" OR "Georgian Republic" OR 
ghana OR grenada OR guatemala OR guinea OR guiana OR guyana OR haiti OR hungary OR honduras OR 
india OR maldives OR indonesia OR iran OR iraq OR jamaica OR jordan OR kazakhstan OR kazakh OR kenya 
OR kiribati OR korea OR kosovo OR kyrgyzstan OR kirghizia OR "Kyrgyz Republic" OR kirghiz OR kirgizstan OR 
"Lao PDR" OR laos OR lebanon OR lesotho OR basutoland OR liberia OR libya OR macedonia OR madagascar 
OR "Malagasy Republic" OR malaysia OR malaya OR malay OR sabah OR sarawak OR malawi OR mali OR 
"Marshall Islands" OR mauritania OR mauritius OR "Agalega Islands" OR mexico OR micronesia OR "Middle 
East" OR moldova OR moldovia OR moldovian OR mongolia OR montenegro OR morocco OR ifni OR 
mozambique OR myanmar OR myanma OR burma OR namibia OR nepal OR "Netherlands Antilles" OR "New 
Caledonia" OR nicaragua OR niger OR nigeria OR pakistan OR palau OR palestine OR panama OR paraguay 
OR peru OR philippines OR philipines OR phillipines OR phillippines OR "Puerto Ric*" OR romania OR rumania 
OR roumania OR rwanda OR ruanda OR "Saint Lucia" OR "St Lucia" OR "Saint Vincent" OR "St Vincent" OR 
grenadines OR samoa OR "Samoan Islands" OR "Navigator Island" OR "Navigator Islands" OR "Sao Tome" OR 
senegal OR serbia OR montenegro OR seychelles OR "Sierra Leone" OR "Sri Lanka" OR "Solomon Islands" OR 
somalia OR "South Africa" OR sudan OR suriname OR surinam OR swaziland OR syria OR tajikistan OR 
tadzhikistan OR tadjikistan OR tadzhik OR tanzania OR thailand OR togo OR togolese republic OR tonga OR 
tunisia OR turkey OR turkmenistan OR turkmen OR uganda OR ukraine OR uzbekistan OR uzbek OR vanuatu 
OR "New Hebrides" OR venezuela OR vietnam OR "Viet Nam" OR "West Bank" OR yemen OR yugoslavia OR 
zambia OR zimbabwe ) ) ) OR ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "Developing Countries" OR africa OR asia OR caribbean OR 
"West Indies" OR "South America" OR "Latin America" OR "Central America" OR ( ( developing OR "less* 
developed" OR "under developed" OR underdeveloped OR "middle income" OR "low* income" OR underserved 
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OR "under served" OR deprived OR poor* ) W/1 ( countr* OR nation* OR population* OR world ) ) ) ) OR ( TITLE-
ABS-KEY ( ( ( developing OR "less* developed" OR "under developed" OR underdeveloped OR "middle income" 
OR "low* income" ) W/1 ( economy OR economies ) ) OR ( low* W/1 ( gdp OR gnp OR "gross domestic" OR 
"gross national" ) ) OR ( low W/3 middle W/3 countr* ) ) ) OR ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( ( lmic OR lmics OR "third 
world" OR "lami countr*" ) ) OR "transitional countr*" ) ) ) AND ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( contract* W/2 farm* ) ) ) ) ) 
OR ( ( ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( afghanistan OR albania OR algeria OR angola OR argentina OR armenia OR 
armenian OR aruba OR azerbaijan OR bangladesh OR benin OR byelarus OR byelorussian OR belarus OR 
belorussian OR belorussia OR belize OR bhutan OR bolivia OR bosnia OR herzegovina OR hercegovina OR 
botswana OR brasil OR brazil OR bulgaria OR "Burkina Faso" OR "Burkina Fasso" OR "Upper Volta" OR burundi 
OR urundi OR cambodia OR "Khmer Republic" OR kampuchea OR cameroon OR cameroons OR cameron OR 
camerons OR "Cape Verde" OR "Central African Republic" OR chad OR china OR colombia OR comoros OR 
"Comoro Islands" OR comores OR mayotte OR congo OR zaire OR "Costa Rica*" OR "Cote d'Ivoire" OR "Ivory 
Coast" OR cuba OR djibouti OR "French Somaliland" OR dominica OR "Dominican Republic" OR "East Timor" 
OR "East Timur" OR "Timor Leste" OR ecuador OR egypt OR "United Arab Republic" OR "El Salvador" OR 
eritrea OR ethiopia OR fiji OR gabon OR "Gabonese Republic" OR gambia OR gaza OR "Georgia Republic" OR 
"Georgian Republic" OR ghana OR grenada OR guatemala OR guinea OR guiana OR guyana OR haiti OR 
hungary OR honduras OR india OR maldives OR indonesia OR iran OR iraq OR jamaica OR jordan OR 
kazakhstan OR kazakh OR kenya OR kiribati OR korea OR kosovo OR kyrgyzstan OR kirghizia OR "Kyrgyz 
Republic" OR kirghiz OR kirgizstan OR "Lao PDR" OR laos OR lebanon OR lesotho OR basutoland OR liberia 
OR libya OR macedonia OR madagascar OR "Malagasy Republic" OR malaysia OR malaya OR malay OR sabah 
OR sarawak OR malawi OR mali OR "Marshall Islands" OR mauritania OR mauritius OR "Agalega Islands" OR 
mexico OR micronesia OR "Middle East" OR moldova OR moldovia OR moldovian OR mongolia OR montenegro 
OR morocco OR ifni OR mozambique OR myanmar OR myanma OR burma OR namibia OR nepal OR 
"Netherlands Antilles" OR "New Caledonia" OR nicaragua OR niger OR nigeria OR pakistan OR palau OR 
palestine OR panama OR paraguay OR peru OR philippines OR philipines OR phillipines OR phillippines OR 
"Puerto Ric*" OR romania OR rumania OR roumania OR rwanda OR ruanda OR "Saint Lucia" OR "St Lucia" OR 
"Saint Vincent" OR "St Vincent" OR grenadines OR samoa OR "Samoan Islands" OR "Navigator Island" OR 
"Navigator Islands" OR "Sao Tome" OR senegal OR serbia OR montenegro OR seychelles OR "Sierra Leone" 
OR "Sri Lanka" OR "Solomon Islands" OR somalia OR "South Africa" OR sudan OR suriname OR surinam OR 
swaziland OR syria OR tajikistan OR tadzhikistan OR tadjikistan OR tadzhik OR tanzania OR thailand OR togo 
OR togolese republic OR tonga OR tunisia OR turkey OR turkmenistan OR turkmen OR uganda OR ukraine OR 
uzbekistan OR uzbek OR vanuatu OR "New Hebrides" OR venezuela OR vietnam OR "Viet Nam" OR "West 
Bank" OR yemen OR yugoslavia OR zambia OR zimbabwe ) ) ) OR ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "Developing Countries" 
OR africa OR asia OR caribbean OR "West Indies" OR "South America" OR "Latin America" OR "Central 
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America" OR ( ( developing OR "less* developed" OR "under developed" OR underdeveloped OR "middle 
income" OR "low* income" OR underserved OR "under served" OR deprived OR poor* ) W/1 ( countr* OR nation* 
OR population* OR world ) ) ) ) OR ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( ( developing OR "less* developed" OR "under 
developed" OR underdeveloped OR "middle income" OR "low* income" ) W/1 ( economy OR economies ) ) OR ( 
low* W/1 ( gdp OR gnp OR "gross domestic" OR "gross national" ) ) OR ( low W/3 middle W/3 countr* ) ) ) OR ( 
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( ( lmic OR lmics OR "third world" OR "lami countr*" ) ) OR "transitional countr*" ) ) ) AND ( ( 
TITLE ( "Food security" OR poverty OR "household* income*" ) OR ABS ( "Food security" OR poverty OR 
"household* income*" ) OR TITLE ( ( increas* OR improv* OR lower* OR decreas* OR diminish* OR reduc* OR 
loss OR declin* OR slump OR dwindl* OR curtail* OR restrict* OR shrink* OR fall ) W/3 ( income* OR revenue* 
OR yield* OR productivity ) ) OR ABS ( ( increas* OR improv* OR lower* OR decreas* OR diminish* OR reduc* 
OR loss OR declin* OR slump OR dwindl* OR curtail* OR restrict* OR shrink* OR fall ) W/3 ( income* OR 
revenue* OR yield* OR productivity ) ) OR TITLE ( "market power" OR net-return* OR "net return*" OR outcome* 
OR effect* OR impact ) OR ABS ( "market power" OR net-return* OR "net return*" OR outcome* OR effect* OR 
impact ) ) AND ( TITLE ( contract* OR "nucleus estate*" OR cooperative* OR "producer* association*" ) OR ABS ( 
contract* OR "nucleus estate*" OR cooperative* OR "producer* association*" ) OR TITLE ( embedded W/3 
service* ) OR ABS ( embedded W/3 service* ) OR TITLE ( ( pre-harvest ) W/2 ( agreement* OR sales ) ) OR ABS 
( ( pre-harvest ) W/2 ( agreement* OR sales ) ) OR TITLE ( "value chain*" OR farm-firm* OR outgrow* ) OR ABS ( 
"value chain*" OR farm-firm* OR outgrow* ) OR TITLE ( ( vertical ) W/3 ( integration OR coordination OR linkage* 
) ) OR ABS ( ( vertical ) W/3 ( integration OR coordination OR linkage* ) ) ) AND ( ( TITLE ( farm* OR smallhold* 
OR "small hold*" OR small-hold* ) OR ABS ( farm* OR smallhold* OR "small hold*" OR small-hold* ) OR TITLE ( ( 
small-scale OR "small scale" ) W/3 ( producer* ) ) OR ABS ( ( small-scale OR "small scale" ) W/3 ( producer* ) ) ) 
OR ( TITLE ( agricultur* OR outgrower* OR "small farmer*" OR "small grower*" ) OR ABS ( agricultur* OR 
outgrower* OR "small farmer*" OR "small grower*" ) ) OR ( TITLE ( ( vegetable* OR fruit OR livestock OR dairy 
OR milk OR beef OR poultry OR pig* OR flower* OR cereal OR tea OR soybean* OR rice OR coffee OR potato* 
OR sugarcane OR mushroom* OR maize OR millet OR pepper* OR crop OR crops ) W/3 ( produc* OR grow* ) ) 
OR ABS ( ( vegetable* OR fruit OR livestock OR dairy OR milk OR beef OR poultry OR pig* OR flower* OR 
cereal OR tea OR soybean* OR rice OR coffee OR potato* OR sugarcane OR mushroom* OR maize OR millet 
OR pepper* OR crop OR crops ) W/3 ( produc* OR grow* ) ) ) OR ( TITLE ( floriculture ) OR ABS ( floriculture ) ) ) 
) ) )   - 973 hits 
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CAB Abstracts search – Searched 29th September 2015 
 
- Database: CAB Abstracts  
19   ("Food security" or poverty or "household* income*" or ((lower* or decreas* or diminish* or reduc* or loss or 
declin* or slump or dwindl* or curtail* or restrict* or shrink* or fall) adj3 (income* or revenue* or yield* or 
productivity)) or "market power" or net-return* or "net return*" or outcome* or effect* or impact).ti,ab,sh. (2095228)  
21   (Contract* or "nucleus estate*" or cooperative* or "producer* association*" or (embedded adj3 service*) or 
(pre-harvest adj2 (agreement* or sales)) or "value chain*" or farm-firm* or outgrow* or (vertical adj3 (integration or 
coordination or linkage*))).ti,ab,sh. (52881) 
23   (Farm* or smallhold* or "small hold*" or small-hold* or ((small-scale or "small scale") adj3 producer*) or 
agricultur* or outgrower* or "small farmer*" or "small grower*" or ((vegetable* or fruit or livestock or dairy or milk or 
beef or poultry or pig* or flower* or cereal or tea or soybean* or rice or coffee or potato* or sugarcane or 
mushroom* or maize or millet or pepper* or crop or crops) adj3 (produc* or grow*)) or floriculture).ti,ab,sh. 
(943886) 
24   (Afghanistan or Angola or Albania or "American Samoa" or Argentina or Armenia or Armenian or Azerbaijan 
or Bangladesh or Belarus or Belize or Benin or Bolivia or Bosnia or Herzegovina or Botswana or Brazil or Bulgaria 
or Burkina Faso or Burkina Fasso or Burundi or Urundi or Cambodia or Cameroon or Cameroons or Cameron or 
Camerons or Central African Republic or Chad or China or Colombia or Comoros or Comoro Islands or Comores 
or Congo or Costa Rica or Cuba or Zaire or Cote d'Ivoire or Ivory Coast or Djibouti or Dominica* or East Timor or 
East Timur or Timor Leste or Ecuador or Egypt or United Arab Republic or El Salvador or Eritrea or Ethiopia or Fiji 
or Gabon or Gambia or Gaza or Georgia Republic or Georgian Republic or Ghana or Grenada or Guatemala or 
Guinea or Guiana or Guyana or Haiti or Honduras or Hungary or India or Indonesia or Iran or Iraq or Kazakhstan 
or Kenya or Kiribati or Korea or Kosovo or Kyrgyzstan or Kirghizia or Kyrgyz Republic or Kirghiz or Kirgizstan or 
Lao PDR or Laos or Lebanon or Lesotho or Liberia or Libya or Macedonia or Madagascar or Malagasy Republic 
or Malawi or Malaysia or Maldives or Marshall Islands or Mali or Mauritania or Mauritius or Agalega Islands or 
Mexico or Micronesia or Moldova or Moldovia or Moldovian or Mongolia or Montenegro or Morocco or Ifni or 
Mozambique or Myanmar or Myanma or Burma or Namibia or Nepal or Nicaragua or Niger or Nigeria or Pakistan 
or Palau or Palestine or Panama or Paraguay or Peru or Philippines or Philipines or Phillipines or Phillippines or 
Romania or Rwanda or Ruanda or Samoa or Samoan Islands or Sao Tome or Senegal or Serbia or Seychelles or 
Sierra Leone or Sri Lanka or Solomon Islands or Somalia or South Africa or St Lucia or St Vincent or Grenadines 
or Sudan or Suriname or Swaziland or Syria or Tajikistan or Tadzhikistan or Tadjikistan or Tadzhik or Tanzania or 
Thailand or Tonga or Togo or Togolese Republic or Tunisia or Turkey or Turkmenistan or Tuvalu or Uganda or 
Ukraine or Uzbekistan or Uzbek or Vanuatu or Venezuela or New Hebrides or Vietnam or Viet Nam or West Bank 
or Yemen or Zambia or Zimbabwe).hw,ti,ab,cp. (2004287) 
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25   ((developing or less* developed or under developed or underdeveloped or middle income or low* income or 
underserved or under served or deprived or poor*) adj (countr* or nation? or population? or world)).ti,ab. (44493) 
26   ((developing or less* developed or under developed or underdeveloped or middle income or low* income) adj 
(economy or economies)).ti,ab. (712) 
27   (low* adj (gdp or gnp or gross domestic or gross national)).ti,ab. (43) 
28   (low adj3 middle adj3 countr*).ti,ab. (1881) 
29   (lmic or limits or third world or lami countr*).ti,ab. (2264) 
30   transitional countr*.ti,ab. (78) 
31   exp developing countries/ (1347769) 
32   or/24-31 (2068603) 
33   23 and 32 (9796) 
34   19 and 23 and 32 (3496) 
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About this review
Contract farming is a sales arrangement agreed before production begins, which provides 
the farmer with resources or services. The  service package provided by the firm varies per 
location, and can include transport, certification, input provisioning and credit.
This systematic review summarises evidence on income effects for smallholders to assess 
average effects and explore combinations of factors that increase these effects.
